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The thesis uses as case studies the Stabilisation and Association Process and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in order to exemplify the increasing role played by the Union’s 
administrative power in external relations. While seemingly harmless, the administrative 
power bears important legal consequences regarding the position of individuals, of third 
countries, and of the Union as a whole. In a system based on the rule of law (and 
committed to its respect in external relations), it is crucial to question whether 
implementing arrangements are in place or ought to be put in place with the aim of 
subjecting the external administrative power to administrative rules and principles. The 
analytical framework suggested by the thesis uses as a starting point the features and the 
impact of the administrative power externally. Based on this analysis, it identifies which 
administrative law principles (as developed within the framework of the internal market) 
have the potential of giving effect to the administrative rule of law externally once applied 
and operationalized in the external domain. Despite the increasing role granted to 
administrative power externally, administrative law in external relations is 
underdeveloped. Therefore, the analytical framework suggested by this thesis is relevant 
as it helps to ensure that the action of the Union in the international scene is carried out 
in compliance with its constitutional aspiration, i.e. upholding the rule of law in its 
relations with the outer world, and as it structures the relation between the Union and 
individuals, and between the Union and third countries. The ‘long-overdue encounter’ 
between EU external relations and EU administrative law ought to be encouraged. The 
thesis aims to offer a methodology for structuring such an encounter and for planning 
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‘Altogether the external competences of the institutions and bodies of the EU/EC require more attention from  
EU law and administrative law expert communities than has been granted thus far.’  1 
 
1. The rise – and relevance – of administrative power in EU external relations 
 
Emerging developments might not be defined as ‘paradigm shifting’, since they have not 
yet brought about a qualitative change; however, they may apply substantial pressure on 
our understanding of the existing legal world.2 Indeed, they can cast doubt on the 
conventional legal categories that have helped us so far to comprehend the constructs that 
regulate the reality that surrounds us. The complex net of instruments that regulate the 
relations between the EU and third countries, which has so far been analysed from a 
constitutional and international law perspective, is gradually changing in nature.3 The 
Union external action is no longer simply dominated by agreements regulated by 
international law; it is instead increasingly characterised by the proliferation of 
instruments produced by the Union’s complex administrative machine. Substantially, 
these instruments mainly aim at assessing the development of third countries with which 
the Union has built ties, at determining the agenda of political and economic reforms that 
these countries need to pursue in order to intensify their relations with the EU, or at 
                                                          
1 H.C.H. Hofmann and A.H. Türk, ‘Conclusions’, in H.C.H. Hofmann and A.H. Türk, (eds.), Legal Challenges in 
EU Administrative Law: Towards an Integrated Administration (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 
2009), at 372. 
2 G. Bermann, ‘The emergence of transatlantic regulation’, in H.C.H. Hofmann and A.H. Türk (eds.), Legal 
Challenges in EU Administrative Law Towards and Integrated Administration (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2009), 168, at 168. 
3 S. Duke and S. Vanhoonacker, ‘Administrative governance and CFSP’, in H.C.H Hofmann and A.H. Türk 
(eds.), EU Administrative Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2006), 361-387; G. Bermann, 
‘The emergence of transatlantic regulation’, in H. Hofmann and A.H. Türk (eds.), Legal Challenges in EU 
Administrative Law Towards and Integrated Administration (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2009), 
168-175; D. Thym, ‘Foreign Affairs’, in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of European 
Constitutional Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2009), 309, at 315; R. Wessel and J. Wouters, ‘The Phenomenon 
of Multilevel Regulation: Interactions between Global, EU and National Regulatory Spheres: Towards a 
Research Agenda’, in A. Follesdal, R. Wessel and J. Wouters (eds.), Multilevel Regulation and the EU: The 
Interplay between Global, European and National Normative Processes (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2008), 9-47; H.C.H. Hofmann, ‘Dealing with Trans-Territorial Executive Rule-Making’, 78 Missouri Law 
Review 2013, 423-442; J. Scott, ‘Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law’, 62 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 2014, 87-125; E. Chiti and B.G. Mattarella, ‘Introduction: The Relationships Between 
Global Administrative Law and EU Administrative Law’, in E. Chiti and B.G. Mattarella (eds.), Global 
Administrative Law and EU Administrative Law: Relationships, Legal Issues and Comparison (Berlin: Springer 
2011), 1-10; M. Cremona, ‘Introduction’, Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2008), 1-9; G. De Bύrca, ‘EU External Relations: The Governance Mode of Foreign Policy’, 
in B. Van Vooren, S. Blockmans and J. Wouters (eds.), The EU’s Role in Global Governance The legal Dimension 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), 39-58; S. Lavenex, ‘EU External Governance in wider Europe’, 11 
Journal of European Public Policy 2004, 680-700. 
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evaluating the impact of the Union’s action. While seemingly harmless, these instruments 
create expectations and bear important legal consequences for the position of individuals, 
of third countries, and of the Union as a whole. The unclear legal nature of these 
documents too often conceals their real function and impact. The way in which power is 
exercised (whether through legally binding or non-legally binding acts) ought not to 
mislead us. Non-legally binding acts too can constrain the freedom of other legal subjects.4 
Therefore, it becomes all the more important to flesh out the external administrative 
power in order to fully understand its significance; fundamental considerations as to its 
features and effects are in order.  
Despite the increasing role granted to administrative power in EU external action 
and the increasing tensions as to how it is exercised, administrative law in external 
relations is underdeveloped. EU administrative law – to be understood as the body of law 
and principles governing the exercise of administrative power – does not seem to openly 
face the challenges posed by this new development. The power exercised by the 
administration of the Union in external relations escapes the review mechanisms and the 
structural guidance currently provided by EU administrative law. The Union is a legal 
system based on the rule of law, meaning that the exercise of public power is subject to or 
regulated by a set of substantive and procedural standards.5 Consequently, the external 
administrative power cannot be left unbounded, deprived of guidelines as to how it 
should be exercised. This should particularly be the case especially after the entrance into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which makes clear that the respect of the rule of law applies 
also to the development and implementation of the Union’s external action.6 This 
statement does not seem to cast doubt as to the legal obligation that the Union is required 
to respect, yet it becomes essential to understand concretely what this statement implies.  
If internally the Court had (and still has) a crucial role in developing the principles 
giving effect to the administrative rule of law by deciding cases dealing with the validly of 
administrative decisions, externally this does not seem to be the most evident path.7 The 
                                                          
4 A. von Bogdandy, ‘Common principles for a plurality of orders: A study on public authority in European 
legal area’, 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 2014, at 988.  
5 Article 2, Treaty of the European Union, OJ [2010] C 83/01, 30.03.2010 (hereafter TEU); Case 294/83 Les 
Verts v. Parliament, EU:C:1986:166, para. 23. 
6 Articles 3(5), 21(1) and 21(3) TEU. 
7 E.g. in some exceptional cases the principles giving effect to the administrative rule of law (like the right 
to be heard) were also developed and discussed by the Court in case of legislative acts having a high degree 
of individualisation: Case C-49/88 Al-Jubail Fertilizer v. Council, EU:C:1991:276, para. 15. See Nehl in respect 
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final decision as to whether to open accession negotiations for EU membership or to 
suspend economic relations with a third country due to human rights violations is 
political. Third countries cannot acquire a right as to how the Union should act towards 
them (e.g. they cannot challenge a decision not granting them candidate status), and third 
countries’ citizens cannot acquire a right as to how the Union should behave towards their 
own states.8 However, the administrative processes leading to this type of political 
decisions are not deprived of relevance. On the contrary, by acknowledging their 
shortfalls and their addresses it becomes clear why certain principles ought to be 
respected by the administration in the exercise of its powers. In the absence of a powerful 
judiciary that could take the lead in guaranteeing the respect of the administrative rule of 
law externally, its articulation might also be guaranteed by the EU legislature.9 
Nevertheless, as it will become clear in the first chapters of this thesis, only a handful of 
attempts have been made so far in this direction. In this gap of forces willing to give effect 
to the administrative rule of law externally, the debate as to what this obligation 
concretely implies ought to be initiated by EU and administrative law scholars. 
It is outside the scope of this thesis to analyse the administrative power as exercised 
in all the Union’s external policies. An investigation of the application of administrative 
law in a specific EU policy area requires concrete examples. It cannot be made in the 
abstract. This research will use the Union wider neighbourhood – comprising the 
Stabilisation and Association Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy – in order 
to exemplify the growing role of the Union’s administration in external relations, and in 
order to understand its features and impact.10 As it will become clear in the first part of 
                                                          
of the development of the right to be heard. H.P. Nehl, Principles of Administrative Procedures in EC Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing 1999), 70-99.  
8 See cases: Case T-367/03 Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v. Council of the European Union 
and Commission of the European Communities, EU:T:2006:96; Case T-346/03 Krikorian v. European 
Parliament, Council and Commission, EU:T:2003:348; Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner House 
Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights project v. Commission, EU:T:2006:97; Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. 
Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418; Case C-581/11 P Mugraby v. Council and Commission, 
EU:C:2012:466.  
9 Administrative law scholars share the recognition that both the Court of Justice of the European Union and 
the EU legislature have gradually established an administrative rule of law applicable to the various 
components of the EU administrative system. E. Chiti, ‘Is EU Administrative Law Failing in Some of Its 
Crucial Tasks?’, European Law Journal, (forthcoming). 
10 The SAP and the ENP has so far been analysed from an international law and constitutional law 
perspective. C. Hillion (eds.), EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach (London: Bloomsbury Publishing 2004); A. 
Ott and K. Inglis (eds.), Handbook on European Enlargement: a Commentary on the Enlargement Process (The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2002); N. Ghazaryan, The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic 
Values of the EU (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014); S. Blockmans and A. Lazowski (eds.), The European Union 
  Introduction 
4 
 
the thesis, the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) with their thick net of administrative activities exemplify best this 
phenomenon.11 The analytical framework suggested by this thesis is topical to the extent 
that cases are currently litigated before the Court of Justice of the European Union and the 
European Ombudsman, which question the use of administrative power externally.12  
  
2. What does this thesis have to add? A new perspective on EU external relations  
 
The field of external relations law has been so far analysed from the perspective of 
constitutional and international relations law.13 The relevance and significance of these 
analyses are unquestionable in as far as they offer a thorough understanding of the 
Union’s decision-making machinery in external relations in terms of: division of 
competences between the Union and Member States; the scope of EU external 
competences and the choice of legal basis; inter-institutional relations; the interaction 
between EU law and international law; and the type of international actor the EU strives 
to be on the international arena. Nevertheless, these approaches seem to have 
disregarded the development of new forms of administrative activities in EU external 
action that have in this way so far escaped serious scrutiny as to how they are adopted 
and as to their impact on third states and individuals. Some authors have reflected on the 
                                                          
and its Neighbours: a Legal Appraisal of the EU’s Policies of Stabilisation, Partnership, and Integration  (The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2006). 
11 The SAP is a Union’s regional approach initiated by the Commission in 1999 in order to assist the Western 
Balkan countries in meeting the relevant EU accession criteria and ultimately be accepted as official 
candidate for membership. The Western Balkan states include: Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo. However, since 1 July 2013 Croatia is no longer a state taking 
part in the SAP because it became a member of the European Union. The European Union officially launched 
its ENP in 2003 with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged 
EU and our neighbours; and it focused on strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all. The ENP 
framework is offered to the EU's closest neighbours: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.  
12 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953 (currently under appeal 
before the Court of Justice); Case C-660/13 Council v. Commission, EU:C:2016:616 (decided on the 28 July 
2016); Decision on 26 February 2016 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 1409/2014/JN against 
the European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, Duty of care; Decision on 2 
September 2016 of the European Ombudsman on complaint OI/7/2015/ANA against the European 
Commission, external relations, breach of Article 23 ECGAB. 
13 Among others: P. Eeckout, EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011); A. 
Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2008); R. Schütze, Foreign Affairs and EU Constitution: selected essays (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2014); M. Cremona and B. de Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law: 
Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2008); M. Cremona and A. Thies, European Court of 
Justice and External Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014); P. Koutrakos, 
EU International Relations Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2015); D. Kochenov and F. Amtenbrink, The 
European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013). 
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use and impact of these new forms of EU external governance and have rightly made a 
comparison between the numerous instruments composing these new structures and soft 
law. However, these reflections have so far focused on the legal effects that these soft law 
measures have internally,14 on their ability to enhance conditionality and promote change 
in the recipients’ countries,15 and on the type of governance they recreate in the external 
relations.16 If EU external relations law scholars seem to have so far disregarded the 
increasing use of administrative power externally, the lack of interest for EU external 
relations law is also reflected in the administrative lawyers' community. EU 
administrative law has so far evolved on a policy-by-policy basis;17 mainly ignoring the 
field of external relations law.18 
The current thesis intends to advance the current literature by suggesting a new 
analytical framework for the study of EU external relations through the lenses of EU 
administrative law. This approach has the potential of regulating the use of administrative 
power externally, and of upholding the obligation that the Union has to respect the rule of 
law in developing and implementing its external action. European administrative law is 
not simply the right to enforcement; it is rather – and particularly in this project – the 
                                                          
14 B. Van Vooren, ‘A case-study of soft law in EU external relations: the European Neighbourhood Policy’, 34 
European Law Review 2009, 698-719. 
15 D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality (Alphen aan Den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International 2008). 
16 B. Van Vooren, EU External relations law and the neighbourhood policy: a paradigm for coherence (London: 
Routledge 2011); S. Lavenex, ‘Experimentalist Governance in EU Neighbourhood Policies: Functionalist 
versus Political Logic’, in J. Zeitlin (eds.), Extending Experimentalist Governance?: the European Union and 
Transnational Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015), 24-47; E. Tulmets, ‘Experimentalist 
Governance in EU External Relations: Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy’, in C.F. Sabel 
and J. Zeitlin (eds.), Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2010), 297-324. 
17 Among others: P. Craig, ‘History and Typology’, EU Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2012), 4-34; H.C.H. Hofman, G.C. Rowe and A.H. Türk, ‘The Idea of European Union Administration – Its 
Nature and Development’, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2012), 4-19; M.P. Chiti, ‘Forms of European Administrative Action’, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 2004-
2005, 37-57; European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Citizen’s Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, ‘The context and legal elements of a Proposal for a Regulation on the Administrative 
Procedure of the European Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies’, Study for the European 
Parliament Juri Committee, December 2015, at 12. Available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/536487/IPOL_STU(2016)536487_EN.pdf
> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
18 Some exceptions are: S. Duke and S. Vanhoonacker, ‘Administrative governance and CFSP’, in H.C.H 
Hofmann and A.H. Türk (eds.), EU Administrative Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2006), 
361-387; G. Bermann, ‘The emergence of transatlantic regulation’, in H.C.H. Hofmann and A.H. Türk (eds.), 
Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law Towards and Integrated Administration (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2009), 168-175; H.P. Nehl, Principles of Administrative Procedures in EC Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 1999), 73-77; H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe and A.H. Türk, ‘Part I: Foreign Relations and Affairs’, 
Specialized Administrative Law of the European Union – A Sectoral Treatment – (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press forthcoming). 
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branch of a legal system that should make operational the ambitions of the constitutional 
order.19 The legal framework suggested by this thesis is about using and adapting familiar 
European administrative law principles and rules in the admittedly less familiar setting 
of the Union’s external relations, with the goal of subjecting the implementation of the 
external action of the Union to the rule of law. In this respect, the following questions will 
be addressed: how is the administrative power exercised in the Union external action? 
What are the types of instruments used? How are they drafted? Who are the actors 
involved? What is their impact? Which aspects of the rule of law are relevant in order to 
constrain the Union’s external administrative action? Are there legal arrangements 
operationalizing the administrative rule of law principles externally? What are the means 
to enforce them? Is it possible to state that the current regulatory framework respects the 
rule of law?  
 This thesis ultimately suggests that the encounter between European 
administrative law and EU external relations should engender a deep understanding 
between two legal realities that have so far ignored each other. European administrative 
law ought to be ready to adapt its principles and rules to a new legal reality that presents 
features, functions, addresses and impacts that at first glance do not seem to fit the legal 
categories that have so far regulated the exercise of administrative power internally. The 
aspiration of the EU external action to respect constitutional values requires a hard look 
at the exercise of its own power. The Union needs to recognise the impact of its actions 
both on third countries and on individuals. At least initially, reconciliatory and open 
environments, like the office of the European Ombudsman, are recommended venues for 




                                                          
19 In this respect the thesis position itself within the literature which has so far tried to frame new modes of 
governance by taking into account the constitutional guarantees and constraints imposed by the Treaties. 
Among others: J. Scott and D. Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the 
European Union’ 8 European Law Journal 2002; C. Kilpatrick, ‘New EU Employment Governance and 
Constitutionalism’ in B. de Búrca and J. Scott (eds.), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing 2006); C. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governance in the EU’, 14 European Law Journal 2008; M. Dawson, New Governance and 
the Transformation of European Law coordinating EU Social Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2001); O. Stefan, Soft Law in Court. Competition Law, State Aid and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (Alphen aan Den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2012). 
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3. The structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is conceptually divided in two parts. Part I aims at fleshing out the features and 
the addresses of the Union’s administrative power in the SAP and the ENP. Part II, by using 
as a starting point the characteristics of the administrative power identified in part I, aims 
at transposing the obligation that the Union has to respect the rule of law when acting 
externally from paper to the reality of the Union’s external administrative action.  
 
PART I 
The administrative power externally: understanding its features and its impact 
 
Chapter I opens by explaining the two main foundational claims of the thesis: first, the rise 
of administrative power in the Union’ external action; and second, the obligation on the 
side of the Union to respect the rule of law when acting externally. In doing so, the chapter 
introduces the two case studies: the Stabilisation and Association Process and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. Chapter I is meant to present the reader to the 
administrative dimension of the Union’s external action, and to the obligation on the side 
of the Union to respect the rule of law in structuring its relations with third states and 
their natural and legal persons. Merging these two premises implies also highlighting the 
challenges that this thesis has to face in framing the Union external action within EU 
administrative law. The main challenge in this context is the lack of powerful forces 
determined to give effect to the administrative rule of law within the framework of the 
Union’s external action.20 However, these challenges should not stop the discussion; on 
the contrary they shall boost the debate. Implicit in the conception of the rule of law is the 
idea that principles and rules need at least to be considered in the creation of regulatory 
regimes, even if the current legal reality might seem hostile to this development.21 In 
order to identify which principles are best suited to give effect to the administrative rule 
of law externally, the thesis will start by analysing the features and addresses of 
administrative power in the SAP and ENP. 
                                                          
20 Internally EU administrative law has developed through the encounter of four main forces born out of the 
interaction between EU law (and its administration) and national administrative law. Chiti, ‘Is EU 
Administrative Law Failing in Some of Its Crucial Tasks?’, European Law Journal (forthcoming). 
21 J. Mendes, ‘Rule of law and participation: A normative analysis of internationalized rulemaking as 
composite procedures’, 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 2014, at 386. 
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Chapter II is mainly descriptive; however, a detailed account of the numerous 
administrative activities is important in order to understand the nature of the 
administrative power exercised externally. Understanding how such power is exercised 
is a first fundamental step in order to select the administrative law principles which have 
the potential to bind the administration to the respect of the rule of law. For example, the 
duty of care is called in question by the Court of Justice of the European Union when the 
administration enjoys a wide margin of discretion.22 Thus, understanding whether the 
administrative power aimed at implementing the SAP and the ENP enjoys a wide power 
of appraisal is essential in order to select (in chapter IV) the administrative principles that 
give effect to the rule of law externally. With this aim in mind chapter II begins by 
describing the basic parameters for the execution of administrative power in the SAP and 
the ENP; second, it maps the complex net of instruments, measures and acts 
characterizing the two policies according to their sector specific tasks; and third, it 
analyses the procedures leading to their adoption. Finally, the chapter tries to position 
and connect all the various actors involved in the enactment of all these measures.  
Chapter III completes the analysis started by chapter II by identifying the addressees 
and the impact of the administrative power. This is an important passage in the study of 
administrative law in external relations, particularly in order to guarantee protection for 
affected parties. The chapter identifies and explains the different impacts that the 
administrative activities implementing the SAP and the ENP exercise on public power (of 
the Union and of third countries) and on natural and legal persons. In carrying out such 
analysis, the chapter also classifies the de facto administrative processes that are 
concealed in the modes of foreign governance constructed by the SAP and the ENP. The 
impact of the administrative activities implementing the two policies is neither incidental 
nor unforeseeable. Instead, it is often the outcome of processes that have crystalised over 
time. Finally, Chapter III aims at demonstrating how the administrative power exercised 
by the Union in the SAP and ENP is significant and cannot be neglected – regardless of the 
legal forms it takes.  
                                                          
22 See as an example the TU München case: ‘[…] where the Community institutions have such a power of 
appraisal [involving complex technical evaluations], respect for the rights guaranteed by the Community 
legal order in administrative procedures is of even more fundamental importance. Those guarantees 
include, in particular, the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the 
relevant aspects of the individual case, the right of the person concerned to make his views known and to 
have an adequately reasoned decision. Only in this way can the Court verify whether the factual and legal 
elements upon which the exercise of the power of appraisal depends were present.’ Case C-269/90 
Hauptzollamt München-Mitte v. Technische Universität München, EU:C:1991:438, para 14. 




Giving effect to the rule of law: administrative law principles applied to the external action  
 
Building upon the analysis developed by the thesis in part I, Chapter IV identifies the 
administrative law principles – as derived from the rule of law – which are best capable 
of guiding the exercise the administrative power externally, and of protecting the parties 
affected by it. In other words, the choice of principles is based on the characteristics that 
the administrative power assumes in the SAP and ENP; and on their ability to serve the 
two fundamental functions of the administrative rule of law: rationality of outcomes and 
individual protection. Once the principles are identified, the chapter continues by 
studying their operationalisation externally. It explores whether there are any rules in 
place stating what the application of the principles implies in the external relations 
context. The lack of powerful driving forces determined to give effect to the 
administrative rule of law externally does not imply a complete vacuum of norms. In this 
respect, the chapter tries to reconnect all the attempts made so far by the Court, the 
European Ombudsman, the European Parliament, the Commission, the EEAS, etc. in 
articulating the respect of the administrative rule of law in the Union external action. 
Based on this analysis, the chapter subsequently evaluates the current state of art and 
suggests which legal arrangements ought to be put in place in order to fully guarantee the 
respect of the administrative rule of law externally.  
Upholding the administrative rule of law externally does not only require the 
identification of the principles giving effect to the rule of law in the external domain; it 
also demands that a comprehensive set of enforcement mechanisms are in place with the 
aim of ensuring that the external administrative power adopts measures in conformity 
with the principles identified, and that natural and legal persons are able to challenge 
(directly or indirectly) any act which affects them. Therefore, the last chapter of the thesis 
(chapter V) aims at analysing how the principles identified in chapter IV could be 
enforced. The chapter starts by questioning what the Court should review and examines 
any reasons to be concerned as to the Court’s approach. In this context judicial control is 
certainly relevant, but it is only one component of the enforcement process. Based on this 
assumption the chapter continues by exploring other forms of out-of-court enforcement: 
the European Ombudsman and mechanisms of compliance building. Enforcement 
mechanisms need to take into account the context in which they operate. Ultimately, the 
chapter suggests that the European Ombudsman can work as catalyst in guaranteeing the 
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respect of the administrative rule of law externally – particularly in respect of the 
relations between the Union and natural and legal persons, and that compliance-building 
mechanisms are particularly suited for regulating the relations between the Union 
administration and third states.  
 The ultimate goal of the thesis is to offer to its readers a new way of looking at the 
external relations of the Union. It tries to make a case for a new path to be followed; it 
offers a new line of inquiry into the studying of the relations between the Union and third 
states – including their natural and legal persons. The increasing use of administrative 
activities aimed at regulating the relations between the Union and its external partners 
requires understanding the legal implications of such developments. In line with the 
finalité of this thesis, this manuscript will not end with a conclusion. It will instead end 
with an epilogue questioning the future of administrative law in external relations. It will 
apply the theoretical framework and methodology developed by the thesis to a case which 
was recently decided by the European Ombudsman.23 The case deals with a natural 
person challenging the Commission’s failure to disclose its comments on the draft Serbian 
Free Legal Aid Act, as contrary to Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to 
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.24 
 
                                                          
23 The initial idea for the Epilogue was to present a pending case, however, the case was decided ten days 
before the thesis formal submission. Therefore, the Ombudsman’s decision will also be discussed. Decision 
on 2 September 2016 of the European Ombudsman on complaint OI/7/2015/ANA against the European 
Commission, external relations, breach of Article 23 ECGAB. 
24 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council 
and Commission documents, OJ [2001] L145/43, 31.05.2001. 
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Chapter I: The increasing relevance of administrative power in external relations 
…and the obligation to respect the rule of law when the EU acts externally  
 
1. EU external action meets EU administrative law  
 
The aim of this first chapter is to illustrate the two main premises upon which the thesis 
is based: the presence of significant administrative power in the way the EU manages its 
relations with its neighbours, and the obligation on the side of the Union to respect the 
rule of law when acting externally. In doing so, the chapter will try to explain why the time 
has now come to merge these two discussions, and will present the challenges faced by 
this thesis in embarking on this endeavor. Before starting the debate on the two 
foundational claims, the chapter will explain the choice of the two case studies: the 
Stabilisation and Association Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy.  
 
2. The EU wider neighbourhood policies under analysis 
 
For the purpose of this thesis the term ‘Union wider neighbourhood’ includes both the 
Stabilisation and Association Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy. These two 
policies have been chosen as case studies for three main reasons. First and foremost, they 
are two effective examples in understanding the increasing use of administrative power 
in external relations of the Union. The EU both with the SAP and with the ENP sets up a 
mode of foreign governance that sees the proliferation of administrative activities 
exercising a significant power in neighbouring countries. Second, there are many 
similarities between the pre-accession tools (exemplified in the SAP) and the ENP 
instruments, making the two policies a suitable comparable example.1 Third, the fact that 
the SAP states agreed to prepare themselves to cede part of their sovereignty to the EU, 
while the ENP states remain sovereign states without accession perspective is an 
                                                          
1 M. Cremona and C. Hillion, ‘L’Union fait la force? Potentials and limitations of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy as an integrated EU Foreign Security Policy’, EUI Working Paper, Law no. 2006/39, 8-15; G. Meloni, 
‘Is the Same Toolkit Used During Enlargement Still Applicable to the Countries of the New Neighbourhood? 
A problem of Mismatching Between Objectives and Instruments’, in G. Meloni and M. Cremona (eds.), The 
European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Modernisation?,  EUI Working Paper, Law no. 2007/21; R. 
Dannreuther, ‘Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy’, 11 
European Foreign Affairs Review 2006; J. Kelly, ‘New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Adaptation in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy’, 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 2006; B. Van Vooren, ‘The European 
Union as an international actor and progressive experimentation in its neighborhood’ in P. Koutrakos (eds.), 
European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2011), 147-
172; M. Cremona, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: More than a Partnership?’ in  M. Cremona (eds.), 
Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), 244, at 265. 
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interesting difference that is worth analyzing since it should be reflected in the way in 
which the administration implements the two policies.2 The primary political choice in 
the SAP lies in the Council Conclusions clearly stating that the Western Balkan countries 
are ‘bound to join the Union’.3 This commitment is reiterated in the preamble of the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs).4 The activities implementing the 
relations between the EU and the SAP countries aim at supporting the candidates and the 
potential candidates for accession in the final goal of membership. The situation is 
however different for the European Neighbourhood Policy; the ENP is a jointly owned 
initiative and its implementation requires action on both sides, by the neighbours and the 
EU.5 The ENP primary political choice is embedded in a contractual agreement between 
two – at least in theory – equal parties. Thus, the administrative activities should reflect 
this reality. 
Even though it seems straightforward that the countries under analysis can all be 
defined as Union neighbours due to their geographical position, it is at the same time 
important to highlight that the geographical dimension is not necessarily an objective 
criterion. Neighbourhood is a question of politics as well as geography.6 It is up to the EU 
to decide which states are ‘special neighbours’ and thus entitled to be included in the pre-
accession strategy, and which are ‘simple neighbours’ and thus are placed in the 
framework of the neighbourhood policy (even if according to article 49 TEU some of them 
are potential candidates for accession). The Union’s choice to place a country in the ENP 
                                                          
2 Arguably, for the current SAP states accession seems a mirage rather than a concrete perspective (i.e. for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia).  
3 ‘The European Council, recalling its conclusions in Copenhagen (December 2002) and Brussels (March 
2003), reiterated its determination to fully and effectively support the European perspective of the Western 
Balkan countries, which will become an integral part of the EU, once they meet the established criteria.’ 
Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki, 19–20 June 2003. 
4 E.g. the preamble of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement concluded by the European Union with 
Albania states: ‘RECALLING the European Union’s readiness to integrate to the fullest possible extent 
Albania into the political and economic mainstream of Europe and its status as a potential candidate for 
European Union membership on the basis of the Treaty on European Union and fulfilment of the criteria 
defined by the European Council in June 1993, subject to the successful implementation of this Agreement, 
notably regarding regional cooperation.’ Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part, OJ 
[2009] L 107/166, 28.04.2009. 
5 Commission Communication of 11 March 2003, ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for 
Relations with our Eastern and South Neighbours’, COM(2003) 104 final. 
6 M. Cremona, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy More than a Partnership?’, in M. Cremona (eds.), 
Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), 245, at 251.  
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box rather than in the pre-accession one stems from the political significance that the EU 
gives to each particular neighbour.7  
 
2.1 The Stabilisation and Association Process 
 
The SAP is a Union’s regional approach initiated by the Commission in 1999 in order to 
assist the Western Balkan countries in meeting the relevant EU accession criteria and 
ultimately be accepted as official candidates for membership.8 The SAP does not provide 
an explicit promise of EU membership, however, at the Santa Maria de Feira European 
Council meeting in 2000 and again at the EU-Western Balkan Summit in Thessaloniki in 
2003 the European Union stated that the SAP countries were ‘potential candidates’ for EU 
accession.9 The SAP assumes that combining stabilisation, which necessarily implies 
regional cooperation, with accession could be a suitable choice for offering to these 
countries membership perspective.10 In this way, stabilisation would remain the conditio 
sine qua non for any movement in the membership direction.  
 The SAP offers to each Western Balkan state enhanced trade liberalisation, improved 
financial and economic assistance, a regular political dialogue, cooperation in justice and 
home affairs, and a new tailor-made category of contractual relations: Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements.11 The instruments and the benefits of the SAP are open to all 
Western Balkan countries; however, their actual availability depends on each country’s 
compliance with the general and country-specific conditions. Therefore, conditionality is 
a fundamental pillar of the SAP. The process is aimed at helping the Western Balkan 
countries in speeding up their transition to a market economy and in adopting and 
implementing EU laws, as well as European and international standards.12 The SAP 
                                                          
7 R. Aliboni, ‘The Geographical Implications of the European Neighbourhood policy’, 10 European Foreign 
Affairs Review 2005, at 3. 
8 The Western Balkan states include: Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia and Kosovo. Croatia as of 1 July 2013 is no longer a SAP states since it become the 28th member of 
the European Union. Commission Communication of 26 May 1999, ‘The Stabilisation and Association 
Process for Countries of South-East Europe’, COM(1999) 235 final. The promise of EU membership 
‘however vague and unconditional, cannot be withdrawn’. L. Friis and A. Murphy, ‘Enlargement of the 
European Union: Impacts on the EU, the Candidates and the ‘Next Neighbours’’, 14 European Community 
Study Association Review 2001, at 2. 
9 Declaration of the EU-Western Balkan Summit at Thessaloniki, Bull. EU 6-2003, point 1.6.70. 
10 M. Maresceau, Bilateral Agreements Concluded by the European Community, Collected Courses (The Hague: 
Academy of International Law, vol. 309, 2006), at 366. 
11 S. Blockmans, Tough Love: The European Union’s Relations with the Western Balkans (The Hague: T.M.C. 
Asser Press 2007), at 251. 
12 European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement website, ‘Stabilisation and Association 
Process’. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/saa_en.htm> (Consulted 
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includes both overarching administrative instruments aimed at supporting the 
achievement of the overall goals of the policies (e.g. progress reports, financial assistance 
instruments, etc.); as well as sector specific instruments aimed at implementing specific 
areas of cooperation (e.g. visa liberalisation) within the whole framework of the policy.  
 
2.2 The European Neighbourhood Policy 
 
The EU officially launched the ENP in 2003, although its roots can be traced back to 1997 
when the central eastern European enlargement began to gather momentum.13 Arguably, 
the policy goes back even further to the EU’s response to the break-up of the former Soviet 
Union in the early 1990s. Back then the EU started negotiating Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements with the newly independent states and launched the Barcelona 
Process with the Mediterranean countries in 1995.14 The Commission dealt separately 
with the different groups of neighbours (the eastern and the southern) until 2002 when 
in its strategy papers it became more specific about the need to establish a new coherent 
approach for all.15 A Commission Communication on the new ‘Wider Europe’ policy was 
published in 2003 and endorsed by the Council in Thessaloniki in the same year. The 
Council summarised the overall goal of the new policy as follows:  
 
‘[t]o work with partners to reduce poverty and create an area of shared prosperity 
and values based on free trade, deeper economic integration, intensified political and 
cultural relations, enhanced cross-border co-operation and shared responsibility for 
conflict prevention between the EU and its neighbours; [and to] anchor the EU’s offer 
of concrete benefits and preferential relations […] to progress made by the partner 
countries in different areas, in particular political and economic reform as well as in 
the field of JHA [Justice and Home Affairs]’.16  
                                                          
on 07.08.2016); A. Tatham, Enlargement of the European Union (Alphen aan Den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International 2009), at 166. 
13 The Commission in 2001 attached to the Central Eastern European pre-accession country progress 
reports a Commission Strategy Paper in which it started to develop the concept of ‘proximity policy’ towards 
the new neighbours. The Strategy Paper made numerous references to the expanded range of common 
interests between the Union and the future neighbours, including economic reforms, alignment with the 
regulatory framework of the internal market, migration and border management. Commission Strategy 
Paper of 13 November 2001, ‘Making a Success of Enlargement’, COM(2001) 700 final, at 7; Commission 
Communication of 11 March 2003, ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with 
our Eastern and South Neighbours’, COM(2003) 104 final. 
14 For a comprehensive analysis on the origins of the policy see: M. Cremona, ‘The European Neighbourhood 
Policy More than a Partnership?’, in M. Cremona (eds.), Development in EU External Relations Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2008), 245-300. 
15 Commission Strategy Paper of 9 October 2002, ‘Towards the Enlarged Union’, COM(2007) 700 final, at 6-
7. 
16 Commission Communication of 11 March 2003, ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for 
Relations with our Eastern and South Neighbours’, COM(2003) 104 final. 
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Subsequently, in June 2007 the Council set out what it called the ‘key principles’ of the 
ENP:  
 
 A strategy based on joint ownership to promote modernisation and reform; 
 A single, inclusive, balanced and coherent policy framework;  
 A performance driven differentiation and tailor made assistance; 
 A policy distinct from the question of EU membership which, however, does not 
prejudge any possible future developments.17  
 
 Once the core of the policy was established, the Commission together with the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) continued to modify some aspects of the ENP 
with the aim of adapting it to changing circumstances. 18 For example, in 2011 after the 
outburst of the Arab Spring the Commission and the EEAS adopted a Joint Communication 
titled ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood’ according to which more support 
was to be provided to partner countries building deep and sustainable democracies.19 
Another more recent and radical example is the 2015 Commission and HR Consultation 
Paper demanding for a more profound revision of the policy.20 The revision is aimed at 
challenging ‘the assumption on which the policy is based, as well as its scope, and how 
instruments should be used’.21 The revision of the policy finds its roots in the recent 
inability of the Union to offer adequate responses to rapid developments and changing 
aspirations of its neighbours. On the 11 November 2015 the Commission and High 
Representative adopted a Joint Communication elaborating a review of the ENP in light of 
the responses obtained from the consultations.22 Despite the expectations raised, the 
Commission Communication on the new ENP did not manage to really break through its 
structural limitations.23 However, it tried to take a more pragmatic and focused approach 
                                                          
17 GAER Council conclusions on European Neighbourhood Policy, 18 June 2007.  
18 The European External action was established by the Treaty of Lisbon (article 27(3) TEU) and was created 
after its entrance into force. Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning 
of the European External Action Service, OJ [2010] L 201/30, 03.06.2010. 
19 The renewed ENP focused on political association and economic integration, the mobility of people, more 
EU financial assistance, a stronger partnership with civil society and better cooperation on specific sector 
policies. Joint Communication of 25 May 2011, ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood’, COM(2011) 
303 final. 
20 Joint Consultation Paper of 4 March 2015, ‘Towards a New European Neighbourhood Policy’, JOIN(2015) 
6 final. 
21 Joint Consultation Paper of 4 March 2015, ‘Towards a New European Neighbourhood Policy’, JOIN(2015) 
6 final, at 3. 
22 Joint Communication of 18 November 2015, ‘Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, JOIN(2015) 
50 final. 
23 This view is also shared by H. Kostanyan, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy reviewed: Will 
pragmatism trump normative values’, CEPS European Neighbourhood Watch, Issue 121, December 2015. 
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by listing all the policy objectives on which the relations between the Union and the 
neighbours should be based.  The ENP, likewise the SAP, includes both overarching 
administrative instruments aimed at supporting the achievement of the overall goals of 
the policies, as well as sector specific instruments aimed at implementing specific areas 
of cooperation.  
 
3. The administrative power in the EU wider neighbourhood policies 
 
The SAP and the ENP are overarching polices which aim at integrating the neighbouring 
states within the EU. The SAP countries prepare themselves to become Member States 
while the EU works with the ENP states to achieve the closest possible political 
association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration. Therefore, the SAP 
and ENP are macro policies which embrace a number of other policies to achieve the final 
goal of integration – whether full or to the greatest possible extent (see some examples in 
figure 1). In order to achieve the ambitious goals set forth by the SAP and ENP, the EU has 
so far developed with its external partners what has been defined as ‘governance mode of 
foreign policy’.24 In other words, the EU strives to achieve with its neighbours stable, long-
term, institutionalized relationships; which necessarily imply the need to create a 
regulatory framework foreseeing policy-making and norm generating structures as well 
as coordinating and monitoring institutions. It goes without saying that within this mode 
of foreign governance a pivotal role is played by the Union administration, which has 
constantly attempted to find solutions aimed at implementing the Union’s primary 
political choices.  
The Commission and the European External Action Service are required to 
administer complex, multi-layered and sectorial relations between the Union and its 
neighbouring states. However, the administrative tasks specific to the SAP and ENP can 
nowhere be found in the Treaties. It was the same administration which over the years 
has developed in the wake of changing circumstances ad-hoc solutions aimed at adjusting 
the Union’s mode of foreign governance to the challenges posed by the external 
                                                          
24 G. De Búrca, ‘EU External Relations: The Governance Mode of Foreign Policy’, in B. Van Vooren, S. 
Blockmans and J. Wouters (eds.), The EU’s Role in Global Governance The legal Dimension (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2013), 39, at 42; See also M. Cremona: ‘There is a bias, inherent perhaps in the EU system, 
towards institutionalizing relationships and policy-making to a degree with which we are familiar in the 
regulatory state but less so in the sphere of foreign policy.’ M. Cremona, ‘Introduction’, Developments in EU 
External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), 1, at 9. 
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geopolitical context. The creation of ad-hoc solutions has, however, over the years 
crystallized to form a real array of administrative tasks and procedures aimed at 
implementing the SAP and ENP. This process has been the result of a constant dialogue 
between the Commission and the Council which welcomed suggestions made by the 
Commission communications with subsequent Council Conclusions. Consequently, both 
the SAP and ENP have been increasingly coordinated through the use of a great diversity 
of tools but have also shifted their core political nature to a more technocratic-driven 


















The Union’s activities aimed at implementing the SAP and ENP are administrative in 
nature since they are essentially geared towards meeting the policy objectives of these 
two policies.25 If we picture the decision-making machinery of the SAP and the ENP as a 
cycle (figure 2), on the left side of the cycle we have the instruments defining the Union’s 
primary political choice; while on the right side of the cycle we have the administrative 
instruments aimed at their implementation. This cycle can also be replicated for the study 
of other EU external policies: the European Council sets out the strategic interest and 
                                                          
25 H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe and A.H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford: 
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objectives of the Union in external relations, the Council defines those policies, and it is 




















Some of the administrative activities aimed at implementing the SAP and ENP are 
envisaged and adopted within the regulatory framework established by the agreements 
concluded by the EU (and its Member States) with each neighbouring state. These 
activities are specifically adopted in order to guarantee the smooth functioning of the 
international agreements. Examples of this type would be ‘Association Council Decisions’ 
adopted within the intergovernmental framework established by the agreements.27 
Alongside these acts, other administrative activities are adopted outside the commonly 
agreed scheme – even if sometimes they make use of it – with the aim of implementing 
                                                          
26 See in this respect Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 26 November 2015 on Case C-
660/13 Council v. Commission, EU:C:2015:787, para. 106. 
27 Each agreement concluded by the Union (and its Member States) with each neighbouring state establish 
an Association Council (‘Stabilisation and Association Council’, or ‘Partnership and Cooperation Council’ or 
‘Association Council’ depending on the type of agreement) composed of members of the Council of the 
European Union and of the European Commission, on the one hand; and of members of the Government of 
the neighbouring state, on the other. Association Councils have the power to take decisions within the scope 
of the agreements in the cases provided for therein. Each Association Council shall establish its rules of 
procedures. Finally, the Association Council are assisted by a Committee and (if necessary) by other special 
committees or bodies. E.g. articles 119 to 124, Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the 
other part, OJ [2010] L 108/03, 29.04.2010.   
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the overall SAP and ENP goals. Examples of this type are progress reports, impact 
assessments and Memoranda of Understanding.28 The focus of this thesis will be on the 
latter instruments. This choice is made since the activities concluded within the 
framework of the agreements are regulated by principles and procedures already agreed 
by the parties while the one adopted outside the regulated framework – despite their 
relevance – are adopted without clear legal guidance. The next two sub-sections will 
explain the development and the relevance that the administrative power has acquired 
within the SAP and the ENP over the years.  
 
3.1 The ever-evolving rise of administrative power externally 
 
The wars leading to the break-up of ex-Yugoslavia were a tremendous shock for the 
European Union, which found itself unprepared to deal with such an increase of violence 
at its borders. At the end of the 1999 Kosovo war the political leaders of the EU – against 
the backdrop of yet another violent crisis – reached the conclusion that the incentives for 
regional cooperation in the Western Balkans had to be tied to the prospect of Union 
membership.29 With this objective in mind the Commission on 26 May 1999 presented its 
Commission Communication initiating the SAP.30 The Communication proposed the 
content of the Process as well as its first instruments, which were a combination of 
previously existing tools and new initiatives. This initial Communication was then 
followed by others which adjusted and developed it. For example, the 2003 
Communication on the ‘Western Balkans and their European Integration’ introduced the 
‘European Partnerships’ as tools to better steer the membership process.31 The SAP 
borrowed many of its tools from the pre-accession strategy as developed by the 
Commission in light of the needs faced by the Central Eastern European states on their 
path to membership.32 However, the mode of foreign governance used for the Central 
Eastern European states was creatively modified by the same Commission in order to 
meet the demands of the Western Balkan region, especially in situations of domestic or 
                                                          
28 Chapter II, section 3. 
29 S. Blockmans, Tough Love: The European Union’s Relations with the Western Balkans (The Hague: T.M.C. 
Asser Press 2007), at 249. 
30 Commission Communication of 26 May 1999, ‘The Stabilisation and Association Process’, COM(99) 235 
final. 
31 Commission Communication of 21 May 2003, ‘The Western Balkans and European Integration’, 
COM(2003) 285 final. 
32 M. Maresceau, Bilateral Agreements Concluded by the European Community. Collected Courses (The Hague: 
Academy of International Law, vol. 309, 2006), at 366. 
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bilateral deadlock. Over the years the Commission, with the aim of developing new 
incentive mechanisms for further supporting the SAP states on their road to membership, 
introduced further changes to the SAP implementing structure by introducing – among 
others – the High Level Accession Dialogue with Macedonia, the Structured Dialogue on 
Justice with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Structured Dialogue on the Rule of Law with 
Kosovo, and the High Level Dialogue with Albania.33  
The 2004 Central Eastern European ‘big bang enlargement’ saw the need to address 
both the relations between the EU and the new neighbours (i.e. Ukraine, Belarus, etc.) as 
well as the situation of the staff of Directorate General Enlargement (DG ELARG) which 
found itself ‘task-less’ from one day to another. Against this background in 2003 the 
‘Wider Europe’ task force was formed within Directorate General for External Relations 
(DG RELEX) and was staffed with DG ELARG civil servants with the goal of addressing the 
challenges posed by the new geopolitical position of an enlarged EU.34 The Wider Europe’ 
task force, finding itself in a position to think about new modes of foreign governance that 
would implement the goals set forth by the ENP, determined that using the successful 
tools of the pre-accession process was probably the most suitable option.35 This decision 
was probably very much influenced by the transfer of human resources from DG ELARG 
to what was DG RELEX which led to some direct mechanical borrowing of instruments 
and strategies from the successful enlargement experience to the newly established 
ENP.36 The regulatory framework envisaged for the ENP in 2003 underwent over the 
                                                          
33 European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies, ‘The Western Balkans and EU 
Enlargement: Lessons learned, ways forward and prospects ahead’, Study for the European Parliament 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 5 November 2015, at 13. Available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/534999/EXPO_IDA(2015)534999_EN.pd
f> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). See also S. Kacarska, ‘Losing the Rights along the Way: The EU-Western 
Balkans Visa Liberalisation’, 16 European Politics and Society 2015, 363-378. 
34 E. Tulmets, ‘Experimentalist Governance in EU External Relations: Enlargement and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy’, in C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (eds.), Experimentalist Governance in the European Union 
Towards a New Architecture (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), 297, at 315. 
35 ‘Let me try to explain what model we should follow. I admit that many of the elements which come to my 
mind are taken from the enlargement process.’ R. Prodi, ‘A Wider Europe: A Proximity Policy as the Key to 
Stability’, Brussels, SPEECH/02/619, at 4.   
36 This explains the many similarities between the ENP and the pre-accession instruments. M. Cremona, 
‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: More than a Partnership?’, in M. Cremona (eds.), Developments in EU 
External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), 245, at 265; N. Ghazaryan, The European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of the EU A Legal Analysis (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014), 
at 74; E. Tulmets, ‘Experimentalist Governance in EU External Relations: Enlargement and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy’, in C. F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (eds.), Experimentalist Governance in the European Union 
Towards a New Architecture (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), 297, at 315; J. Kelly, ‘New Wine in Old 
Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy’, 44 Journal of 
Common Market Studies (2006), at 31 and 32. 
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years some changes in light of the political evolutions in the Union’s neighbourhood (e.g. 
the Arab Spring, the Crimea crisis, etc.). For the latest revision of the policy in 2015 the 
Commission and the High Representative held, as already mentioned, an open 
consultation. The Consultation Paper clearly shows the difficulties faced by the 
administration itself in adjusting its implementing instruments and procedures to 
changing realities in order effectively achieve the goals of the ENP. Some of the questions 
asked in the Consultation Paper specifically referred to the use of the Commission and 
EEAS powers.37 The administrative actors – finding themselves in the position of 
constantly developing new tools and strategies to face changing realities without clear 
parameters – slowly but surely developed and increased their power in external action.38  
 
3.2 The relevance of the administrative power externally 
 
The ensemble of administrative activities (i.e. progress reports, action plans, impact 
assessments, Memoranda of Understanding, etc.) aimed at achieving the goals set forward 
by the SAP and ENP are not neutral. Regardless of their legal nature, these instruments 
have a significant impact on the Union, on third countries, and on natural and legal 
persons. Internally, they prepare and guide the Union’s future action. Externally, some 
instruments have an undeniable regulatory function in as far as they are quite detailed as 
to which standard shall be used by third countries when passing legislation.39 The 
guidance offered by these documents has to be followed because the advantages of 
compliance outweigh the costs of non-compliance and because implementation 
mechanisms exist whereby positive or negative sanctions can be imposed.40 Any doctrine 
                                                          
37 E.g. ‘Are the ENP Action Plans the right tool to deepen our partnerships? Are they too broad for some 
partners? Would the EU, would partners, benefit from a narrower focus and greater prioritisation?’; or ‘Can 
EU and/or partner interests be served by a lighter reporting mechanism? Should the reporting be 
modulated according to the level of engagement of the ENP partner concerned?’. Joint Consultation Paper 
of 4 March 2015, ‘Towards a New European Neighbourhood Policy’, JOIN(2015)6 final. 
38 Chapter II, section 2.  
39 For example, the Action Plan with Jordan requires the latter (among others): 
- To sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) of the 
Community Civil Protection Mechanism; 
- To review all legislation concerning children to ensure compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC) and other relevant international human rights instruments and standards. 
- To continue working on the full implementation of the WTO agreement on the application of the sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures and actively participate in relevant international bodies (OIE, IPPC, and 
Codex Alimentarius). 
40 Examples of negative sanctions are: suspension of financial aid, postponement of the signature of an 
agreement, etc. Examples of positive incentives are: visa liberalisation, financial assistance granted with the 
aim of implementing the guidelines.  
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centred on the traditional principle of sovereignty neglects the impact that the most 
powerful legal orders have in acting as standard setters in the world, and runs the risk of 
being blind and deaf to such weighty phenomena.41 The importance of these activities for 
third countries is evidenced by the springing up all over the neighbourhood states of 
think-tank and associations that have as one of their main aims the review of the various 
progress reports and action plans that the Commission and the EEAS compile.42 Finally, 
the presence of administrative self-imposed rules for virtually every act that the 
administration adopts in order to implement its relations with the neighbouring states 
says something about the importance of the acts themselves. If progress reports, action 
plans, programming documents, impact assessments, etc. lacked impact, why would the 
administration develop internal guidelines for the adoption of simply staff working 
documents? The adoption of administrative self-imposed rules in a way shows that the 
administration acknowledges their relevance.  
 The impact of the administrative activities on the position of individuals can be 
clearly sensed by the cases that reached the CJEU and to the European Ombudsman in 
which individuals (especially from third countries) challenged the action or inaction of 
the European Commission in developing and implementing the Union’s external action.43 
The adoption of administrative instruments increases the predictability of how a certain 
policy will be implemented; thus, the expectations of individuals increase as to the 
                                                          
41 A. von Bogdandy, ‘Common principles for a plurality of orders: A study on public authority in European 
legal area’, 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 2014, at 988. 
42 Some examples are the Inicijativa za monitoring europskih integracija BiH available at: <http://eu-
monitoring.ba/> (Consulted on 21.01.2016); Solidar Global Network available at: 
<http://solidar.org/IMG/pdf/tunisia_v23.10.13_fr.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016); Al Hayar Center for 
Civil Society Development available at: <http://www.hayatcenter.org/index.php/en/> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016); Balkan Civil Society development network available at: <http://www.balkancsd.net/> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016); NGO Monitor available at: <http://www.ngo-
monitor.org/article/analysis_of_the_eu_s_report_implementation_of_the_european_neighborhood_policy_i
n_israel_progress_in_and_recommendations_for_actions_> (Consulted on 07.08.2016); Beogradski centar 
za bezbednosnu politiku available at: <http://www.bezbednost.org/Bezbednost/1/Naslovna.shtml> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
43 See cases: Case T-367/03 Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v. Council of the European Union 
and Commission of the European Communities, EU:T:2006:96; Case T-346/03 Krikorian v. European 
Parliament, Council and Commission, EU:T:2003:348; Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner House 
Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights project v. Commission, EU:T:2006:97; Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. 
Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418; Case C-581/11 P Mugraby v. Council and Commission, 
EU:C:2012:466; and Ombudsman decisions: Decision on 26 October 2000 of the European Ombudsman on 
complaint 530/98/JMA against the European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB; 
Decision on 28 June 2005 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 933/2004/JMA against the European 
Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB; Decision on 26 February 2016 of the European 
Ombudsman on complaint 1409/2014/JN against the European Commission, General financial and 
institutional matters, Article 4 ECGAB and duty of care. 
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determination of the Union to enforce its policies.44 For example, the Union made clear in 
a number of Commission communications that it has a clear conditionality policy 
according to which it will activate sanctions in case a third country fails to respect human 
rights.45 The adoption of this type of communications, as well as of progress reports 
indicating the failure on the side of the third country to respect human rights, increases 
the expectations of individuals, whose human rights are violated, that measures – like 
suspension of aid – will be taken by the Union at the moment in which their country 
violates human rights.  
 
3.3 The third step of waltz 
 
If we visualise what has so far been described by this chapter as a three-step waltz, we 
will see that the third step is still missing. Mashaw evocatively suggests imagining the 
development of administrative law as a waltz, a three-step pattern repeated over and over 
again.  
 
‘First, something happens in the world. Second, public policymakers identify that 
happening as a problem, or an opportunity, and initiate new forms of governmental 
action to take advantage of or to remedy the new situation. Third, these new forms of 
action generate anxieties about the direction and control of public power. Means are 
thus sought to make the new initiative fit within existing understandings of what it 
means to be accountable to law.’46  
 
If we transpose this three-step waltz to the discussion undertaken by this thesis, the dance 
would go in this direction. The fall of the Berlin wall, the Yugoslav wars, the ‘2004 big bang 
enlargement’, and the subsequent political developments changed radically the power 
balance in the European continent. The EU policymakers identified in these occurrences 
opportunities to initiate new forms of governance with their neighbours, and associated 
with this event the need to develop an administrative apparatus capable of implementing 
such policies. These new forms of governance – as it will become clearer in the next two 
                                                          
44 H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe and A.H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2013), at 536. 
45 Among others: Commission Communication of 23 May 1995, ‘The inclusion of respect for democratic 
principles and human rights in agreements between the Community and third countries’, COM(95) 216 
final; Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Common principles for 
future contractual relations with certain countries in South-Eastern Europe of 2 October 1996, COM(96)476 
final;  Commission Communication of 8 May 2001, ‘The European Union’s role in promoting human rights 
and democratisation in third countries’, COM(2001) 252 final. 
46 J.L. Mashaw, ‘Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801’, 115 Yale 
Journal 2006, at 1337. 
 The increasing relevance of administrative power in external relations 
24 
 
chapters – have started to shows signs that their implementation presents some tensions 
as to how the power is exercised and controlled; but administrative law considerations 
are still missing.  
 It is now, thus, time to take the third step of waltz and search for means to make sure 
that the action of the Union in external relations fit within the Union’s understanding of 
what it means to be subject to the administrative rule of law. The SAP and the ENP are 
exemplary case studies in order to understand the challenges on the way of integrating 
the proliferation of these new forms of external administrative action into a coherent 
system of protection offered by the administrative rule of law. Before focusing on the 
identification of the principles and rules that shall guide the action of the administration 
externally, it is important to inquire as to whether the Union is actually under an 
obligation to respect the rule of law when acting on the international scene.  
 
4. The obligation to respect the rule of law when the EU acts externally 
 
In order to determine whether we can talk of the rule of law as a legal norm guiding the 
external relations of the Union, the argument will proceed as follows. First, the new Lisbon 
Treaty articles which make a clear reference to the rule of law in the context of external 
relations will be analysed; and secondly, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(hereafter referred as the ‘CJEU’ or ‘the Court’) case law will be examined to stress how 
the rule of law is a principle that needs to be respected internally as well as externally.  
 
4.1 The obligation in the Treaties 
 
The Treaties of the European Union seem to be rather straightforward in establishing the 
obligation on the Union to respect the rule of law when acting externally. The most 
significant articles will be hereby analysed. 
 
Article 3(5) TEU: ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and 
promote its values […].’ [emphasis added] 
 
The values to which article 3(5) TEU refers are the ones listed in article 2 – among which 
is the rule of law. The Union under this article is not only required to promote the rule of 
law; it is also required to uphold it in its relation to the wider world. Even if it is easy to 
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belittle such idealistic ambition, it is a fundamental Treaty provision formulated in 
mandatory terms: shall uphold.47 
 
Article 21(1) TEU: ‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and 
which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for 
human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles 
of the United Nations Charter and international law.’ [emphasis added] 
 
Article 21(3) TEU: ‘The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set 
out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the different areas 
of the Union’s external action covered by this Title and by Part Five of the Treat’. 
[emphasis added] 
 
Article 21 TEU is probably the most significant article. Differently from article 3(5) TEU, 
article 21 TEU uses the term principles as contrary to values. Even if it is doubtful that 
those responsible for the terminological variation between ‘values’ and ‘principles’ in the 
Treaties intended to introduce a theoretical distinction, it is still remarkable that while in 
article 2 TEU the rule of law is defined as a value, in article 21 TEU is defined as a principle. 
Values have a more indeterminate configuration and can be seen as part of the cultural 
patrimony or common heritage of Europe whereas legal principles possess a more 
defined structure which makes them more suitable for the creation of legal rules.48 Most 
importantly, article 21(3) TEU makes a clear link between the respect of the principles 
and the development and implementation of the Union’s external action. Again, also in 
this article the provision is formulated in mandatory terms: shall respect. 
The respect of the rule of law, in the development and implementation of the 
different areas of Union external action, is not only a principle that constrains the action 
of the Union: it is also an objective. The Union according to article 21(2) TEU shall define 
and pursue common policies and actions in order to: 
 
Article 21(2)(b) TEU: ‘consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and the principles of international law.’ [emphasis added] 
 
                                                          
47 P. Eeckout, ‘A normative basis for EU external relations? Protecting internal values beyond the Single 
Market’, in M. Krajewski (eds.), Services of General Interest Beyond the Single Market: External and 
International Law Dimenstions (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2015), 219, at 220. 
48 L. Pech, ‘A Union Founded on the Rule of Law: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of Law as a Constitutional 
Principle of EU Law’, 6 European Constitutional Law Review 2010, at 366; M.F. Esteban, The Rule of Law in 
the European Constitution (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1999), at 40 and 41. 
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Article 21(2)(h) TEU: ‘promote international system based on stronger multilateral 
cooperation and good global governance.’49 [emphasis added] 
 
The fact that the rule of law is also an objective that the Union needs to pursue in its 
relation with the outer world simply strengthens the claim that the Union needs to respect 
the rule of law when interacting with third states. The conjunction of objectives and 
principles does not undermine the distinction between the rule of law as a principle and 
as an objective to be pursued.50   
 
4.2 The obligation in the case law of the Court of Justice  
 
In its very famous Les Verts judgment the CJEU already back in 1986 referred to the 
European Community as a ‘a community based on the rule of law’ to the extent that 
neither the Member States nor the Community’s institutions could avoid review of the 
conformity of their acts with the Community’s ‘constitutional character’.51 Subsequently 
in its Opinion 1/91, by contrasting the EEA agreement with the Community legal order, 
the Court stated that: 
 
‘[…] the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international agreement, none 
the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of 
law.’52 [emphasis added] 
  
There seems to be widespread consensus among scholars that the rule of law has 
increasingly become an overarching and primary principle of Union constitutional law. 
Von Bogdandy concludes in his article on the founding principles of EU law that the 
‘values’ listed in article 2 TEU – among which the rule of law – can be understood as 
‘constitutional principles and a constitutional legal discourse based thereon is viable both 
                                                          
49 Good global governance (from a legal perspective) has increasingly been the subject of research of the 
new emerging Global Administrative Law project; which in its essence is a rule of law project. It aims at 
constitutionalising transnational public administration by binding it to general principles of administrative 
law. F. Schuppert, ‘New Modes of Governance and the Rule of Law’, in M. Zürn, A. Nollkaemper, and R. 
Peerenboom (eds.), Rule of Law Dynamics: In an Era of International and Transnational Governance  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012), 90, at 103.  
50 A. Von Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles of EU Law: A Theoretical and Doctrinal Sketch’, 16 European Law 
Journal 2010, at 107. 
51 Case 294/83 Les Verts v. Parliament, EU:C:1986:166, para. 23; L. Pech, ‘A Union Founded on the Rule of 
Law: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of EU Law’, 6 European 
Constitutional Law Review 2010, at 359. 
52 Opinion 1/91 of the Court Pursuant to article 228 of the EEC Treaty on the Draft Treaty on the Establishment 
of the European Economic Area, EU:C:1991:490, para. 21.  
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from a theoretical and technical legal point of view’.53 Pech is of the idea that article 2 TEU 
ultimately clarifies that the Union is ‘founded on’ the rule of law and that this is a 
‘foundational principle of constitutional value’.54 Compliance with the respect of the rule 
of law is not labelled as being an obligation to be respected only when the Union acts 
internally. Achieving this constitutional value demands that the Union – in the exercise of 
its powers – respects the rule of law both internally and externally. If the rule of law is to 
be understood as a legal principle having constitutional value in the EU polity, the latter 
should be upheld both to its actions having an external as well as an internal dimension. 
This assumption of legal unity of EU law can also be justified in light of the new growing 
importance of guaranteeing coherence in Union’s action.55 With the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon significant emphasis has been put on the importance of guaranteeing 
consistency between Union’s policies and activities.56   
 As Cremona suggests, article 21 TEU – with its long list of principles and objectives 
for all external action – ‘is intended to bridge policy divisions and to enhance policy 
coherence.’57 Developing this line of argument, it can be added that article 21 TEU is also 
about guaranteeing consistency as to the obligation on the side of the Union to respect its 
foundational values when developing and implementing its action (both internally and 
externally). Article 21 TEU formally extends the obligation on the side of the Union to 
comply with its foundational value when acting in the external domain. Respecting the 
                                                          
53 A. Von Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles of EU Law: A Theoretical and Doctrinal Sketch’, 16 European Law 
Journal 2010, at 111. 
54 L. Pech, ‘The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 
04/09, at 61. 
55 A. Von Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles of EU Law: A Theoretical and Doctrinal Sketch’, 16 European Law 
Journal 2010, at 109. 
56 Some significant examples are: article 13(1) TEU ‘The Union shall have an institutional framework which 
shall aim to promote its values, advance its objectives, serve its interests, those of its citizens and those of 
the Member States, and ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions.’; 
article 21(3) TEU ‘The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and 
between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that 
effect.’; article 7 Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, OJ [2010] C 83/01, 30.03.2010 (hereafter 
TFEU) ‘The Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into 
account and in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers.’; and article 256(2)(3) TFEU ‘[…] 
Decisions given by the General Court under this paragraph may exceptionally be subject to review by the 
Court of Justice, under the conditions and within the limits laid down by the Statute, where there is a serious 
risk of the unity or consistency of Union law being affected. […] Decisions given by the General Court on 
questions referred for a preliminary ruling may exceptionally be subject to review by the Court of Justice, 
under the conditions and within the limits laid down by the Statute, where there is a serious risk of the unity 
or consistency of Union law being affected.’ 
57 M. Cremona, ‘Coherence in European Union foreign relations law’, in P. Koutrakos (eds.) European Foreign 
Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2011), 55, at 89. 
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rule of law is not a competence that the Union has to achieve, but a value to be upheld. 
However, if a parallelism can be made with the principle of complementarity developed 
by Dashwood and Heliskoski, the respect of the rule of law as a constitutional value can 
only be achieved once the Union complies with the rule of law in the development and 
implementation of all its actions.58 The Union, in respecting the rule of law when entering 
in international commitments, works towards upholding the rule of law in the Union legal 
order.59 It complements the respect of the rule of law as a constitutional principle. The 
respect of the rule of law externally is to be read on the grounds of unity, coherence, and 
complementarity of the Union legal order.60  
 The CJEU seems to be of the same view. In both Kadi I and Kadi II it stressed the 
importance of reviewing any community measure in light of fundamental rights in order 
to ensure consistency with the expression ‘a Community based on the rule of law’.61 The 
expression ‘Union based on the rule of law’ instead of ‘Community based on the rule of 
law’ was for the first time used in the E & F case.62 This new expression seems to reinforce 
the idea that the rule of law is a constitutional principle covering all actions of the Union 
and not only the ones under the old Community pillar. The Court in the Air Transport case 
reinforced the role of article 3(5) as obliging the Union to respect the Union’s values when 
acting externally.  
 
‘Under Article 3(5) TEU, the European Union is to contribute to the strict observance 
and the development of international law. Consequently, when it adopts an act, it is 
bound to observe international law in its entirety.’ 63 [emphasis added] 
 
                                                          
58 A. Dashwood and J. Heliskoski, ‘The Classic Authorities Revisited’, in A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds.), 
The General Law of E.C. External Relations (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2000), 3, at 13. 
59 The principle of complementarity has been recently affirmed by the CJEU in Case C-658/11 Parliament v. 
Council, EU:C:2014:2025, paras 55-57.  
60 Eeckout in one of its recent pieces clearly stated ‘[t]he EU is required to act externally according to its 
own constitutionally determined normative basis: i.e. its values.’ P. Eeckout, ‘A normative basis for EU 
external relations? Protecting internal values beyond the Single Market’, in M. Krajewski (eds.), Services of 
General Interest Beyond the Single Market: External and International Law Dimenstions (The Hague: T.M.C. 
Asser Press 2015), 219, at 226; see also E. Herlin-Karnell, ‘EU values and the shaping of the international 
legal context’, in D. Kochenov and F. Amtenbrink (eds.), The European Union’s Shaping of the International 
Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014), 89, at 97. 
61 By no means may EU measures challenge ‘the principles that form part of the very foundations of the EU 
legal order’. Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and 
Commission, EU:C:2008:461, para. 304.  
62 ‘[T]he European Union is based on the rule of law and the acts of its institutions are subject to review by 
the Court of their compatibility with EU law and, in particular, with the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union and the general principles of law.’ Case C-550/09 E & F, EU:C:2010:382, para. 44. 
63 Case C-366/10 Air transport Association of America v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, 
EU:C:2011:864, para. 101. 
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If the Court could make the link between the Union’s obligation to contribute to the strict 
observance and the development of international law and the Union’s obligation to 
observe international law when adopting an act, it would be very difficult to argue that 
the same link could not be established under the same article between the Union 
obligation to uphold its values – among which the rule of law – and the Union’s obligation 
to respect them when adopting an act.  
The Court in a recent case on a request from the European Parliament to annul a 
CFSP Council Decision on the signature and conclusion of the Agreement between the 
European Union and the United Republic of Tanzania on the conditions of transfer of 
suspected pirates and associated seized property from the European Union-led naval 
force to Tanzania; made the direct link between the obligation to respect the rule of law 
in ‘all action of the European Union’ and article 21 TEU.64 The Court clearly stated: 
 
‘As regards, in particular, provisions of the EU-Tanzania Agreement concerning 
compliance with the principles of the rule of law and human rights, as well as respect 
for human dignity, it must be stated that such compliance is required of all actions of 
the European Union, including those in the area of the CFSP, as is clear from the 
provisions, read together, set out in the first subparagraph of Article 21(1), 
Article 21(2)(b) and (3) TEU, and Article 23 TEU.’65 [emphasis added] 
 
Furthermore, the Court in the H case extended its jurisdiction to disputes having a CFSP 
dimension. According to the Court, the Treaties provisions limiting its jurisdiction over 
CFSP measures (articles 24(1) TEU and 275 TFEU) need to be interpreted narrowly.66 In 
reaching such important conclusion the Court refers to the Union’s obligation to respect 
the rule of law in its internal and external action.67 
In light of the analysis so far conducted, there can be little argument as to the validity 
of the Union’s obligation to respect the rule of law as a legal norm structuring the Union’s 
external action. However, even under the premise of uniform validity of the principle 
internally and externally, the question still arises as to whether this corresponds to a 
                                                          
64 Case C-263/14 European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, EU:C:2016:435. 
65 Case C-263/14 European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, EU:C:2016:435, para. 47. 
66 Case C-455/14 H v. Council, Commission and EUPM, EU:C:2016:569, para. 40. 
67 ‘[I]t must be noted that, as is apparent from both Article 2 TEU, which is included in the common 
provisions of the EU Treaty, and Article 21 TEU, concerning the European Union’s external action, to which 
Article 23 TEU, relating to the CFSP, refers, the European Union is founded, in particular, on the values of 
equality and the rule of law […]. The very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure 
compliance with provisions of EU law is inherent in the existence of the rule of law.’ Case C-455/14 H v. 
Council, Commission and EUPM, EU:C:2016:569, para. 41. 
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uniform content.68 In order to construct the features that the rule of law assumes 
externally, it seems reasonable to use as a starting point the meaning that the rule of law 
assumes when operating internally and consequently adjust it to the external context. 
 
4.3 The challenges in articulating the rule of law externally 
 
The ‘external rule of law’, in the same way as the internal, is an organizational principle 
to the extent that it governs the exercise of Union’s power by subjecting it to the respect 
of principles and rules. However, some structural differences between the external and 
the internal domains, and the conduct of specific subjects in respect of the external realm 
require re-thinking the application of the rule of law externally.  
 
 Change of actors 
 
The major difference between the two realms lies in the change of actors. Internally the 
principles giving effect to the rule of law regulate the relation between the Member States 
and the Union, and between the national or Union authorities and the persons under their 
jurisdiction. Externally the Union is required to respect the rule of law in its relations with 
those outside the EU legal system. Shall the right to be heard be granted to third countries 
when a measure is addressed to them? Shall the duty of care be respected when the Union 
makes complex evaluations having an impact on third countries? The change of 
interlocutors demands rethinking the application of the principles giving effect to the 
administrative rule of law internally in light of the distinctive characters of the decision 
making process in the external domain. This passage is necessary in ensuring that the 
principles giving effect to the rule of law internally would also serve their function 
externally. The necessity of possibly attuning the principles derived from the rule of law 
to the domain should not be seen as a heresy. As Cremona suggests ‘principles operate in 
their particular context and the external context is simply a manifestation of that inherent 
contextual operation of principles’.69 Principles giving effect to the rule of law can be 
understood as norms having a high degree of generality as to their content. They can be 
                                                          
68 A. Von Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles of EU Law: A Theoretical and Doctrinal Sketch’, 16 European Law 
Journal 2010, at 109. 
69 M. Cremona, ‘Structural principles and their Role in EU External Relations Law’, in M. Cremona (eds.) 
Structural Principles in EU External Relations Law (London: Hart Publishing forthcoming).  
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valid for a whole subject (e.g. contracts) or for a general branch of law (e.g. administrative 
law), but can also acquire sector specific connotations.70 
 
 The unclear legal nature of external acts 
 
The external domain is characterised by the presence of a dense net of instruments of 
unclear legal nature. As clearly pointed out by AG Sharpston in one of her recent opinions 
on the use of non-legally binding instruments externally stated: 
 
 ‘[…] unlike the internal Union action, the instruments through which the Union acts 
externally are not limited to those for which the Treaties expressly provide, establish 
the form and effects and lay down the procedural steps to be taken.’71  
 
The conflict between the use of non-binding instruments and the rule of law is real and it 
should not be wished away by reference to these documents as being simply ‘internal 
working paper documents’ or ‘internal coordinating documents’.72 Even the Court, 
despite its tendency to privilege substance over form in deciding which measures may be 
challenged, has proven inefficient in giving effect to the rule of law in case of non-legally 
binding acts.73 Finally, it should not be forgotten that in the EU discourse on the 
invasiveness of Union power in the activities of third countries is not perceived as harmful 
and – consequently – as not actionable.74 The Union developed over the years this image 
of acting externally as a normative power reflecting in its action its values. A more 
thorough analysis as to the features and addresses of the power exercised by the 
administration externally is, thus, in order. 
                                                          
70 M. D’Alberti, ‘Diritto Amministrativo e Principi Generali’, in M. D’Alberti (eds.) Le nuove mete del diritto 
amministrativo (Bologna: Il Mulino 2010), at 67.  
71 See in this respect Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 26 November 2015 on Case C-
660/13 Council v. Commission, EU:C:2015:787, para. 107. 
72 On the conflict between soft law and the rule of law internally see M. Dawson, ‘Soft Law and the Rule of 
Law in the European Union: Revision or Redundancy’, in B. de Witte and A. Vauchez (eds.) Lawyering 
Europe: European Law as a Trans-national Social Field (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013), 221-242. 
73 In relation to the difficulties posed by the CJEU in reviewing no binding acts in the internal domain see: J. 
Scott, ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-Legislative Guidance as a Challenge for European Administrative Law’, 48 
Common Market Law Review 2011, 329-355. 
74 The idea of the EU as a Union of values is reflected in the Laeken Declaration: ‘What is Europe's role in 
this changed world? Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world 
order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many 
countries and peoples? Europe as the continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the 
French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity and above all diversity, 
meaning respect for others' languages, cultures and traditions.’ See also M. Cremona, ‘Values in EU Foreign 
Policy’, in P. Koutrakos and M. Shaw (eds.), Beyond the established orders Policy interconnections between 
the EU and the rest of the world (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2011), 275-315; and I. Manners, ‘Normative Power 
Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’,40 Journal of Common Market Studies 2002, 235-258. 
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 A reticent Court 
 
Besides these structural differences between the external and the internal domains, the 
respect of the rule of law externally is challenged by a reticent Court. As Cremona 
suggests, ‘the Court appears to be reticent (non-interventionist) if not deferential as 
regards the policy choices of the political institutions in external relations; it does not 
question them’; even more it ‘emphasise[s] the need for the political institutions to retain 
their policy discretion, their room for manoeuvre’.75 In other words, if internally the Court 
has been the main driving force in giving effect to the rule of law,76 externally this does 
not seem to be the most immediate solution. If on the one hand the Court in some 
instances showed its willingness to operationalise the rule of law externally by 
constraining the exercise of administrative power, on the other, it confined itself to stating 
that the Commission enjoys a wide margin of discretion without indicating any 
constraints to it. The Court in Al-Jubail – a case dealing with anti-dumping – was ready to 
extend the right to hear the other side also in case of acts of general application so as to 
protect external importers.77 Moreover, in the Front Polisario case on the legality of a 
Council decision on the adoption of an agreement in the form of exchange of letters 
between the EU and the Republic of Morocco, the General Court established that the EU 
institutions even when enjoying a large margin of discretion – in this case deciding 
whether to conclude an agreement with a third state – have the obligation to comply the 
duty of care.78 In contrast, in the cases of Mugraby and of a coalition of Turkish citizens, the 
General Court stated clearly that the implementation of suspension mechanisms is a 
matter of discretion of the Commission which excludes the right for an individual to 
                                                          
75 M. Cremona, ‘A Reticent Court? Policy Objectives and the Court of Justice’, in A. Thies and M. Cremona 
(eds.), The European Court of Justice and External Relations Law:  Constitutional Challenges, (London, Hart 
Publishing 2014), 15, at 15. 
76 L. Pech, ‘A Union Founded on the Rule of Law: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of Law as a Constitutional 
Principle of EU Law’, 6 European Constitutional Law Review 2010, at 370. 
77 Case C-49/88, Al-Jubail Fertilizer v. Council, EU:C:1991:2, para. 15; see also H.P. Nehl, Principles of 
Administraive Procedures in EC Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 1999), 74-75; Case T-512/12 Front Polisario 
v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, paras 224 and 225. 
78 ‘[J]udicial review must necessarily be limited to the question whether the competent EU institution, in 
this case the Council, by approving the conclusion of an agreement such as that approved by the contested 
decision, made manifest errors of assessment (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 June 1998 in Racke, 
C-162/96, ECR, EU:C:1998:293, paragraph 52). That being the case, in particular where EU institution 
enjoys a wide discretion, in order to verify whether it has committed a manifest error of assessment, the 
Courts of the European Union must verify whether it has examined carefully and impartially all the relevant 
facts of the individual case, facts which support the conclusions reached (judgments of 21 November 1991 
in Technische Universität München, C-269/90, ECR, EU:C:1991:438, paragraph 14, and 22 December 
2010 Gowan comércio Internacional e Servios, C-77/09, ECR, EU:C:2010:803, paragraph 57).’ Case T-512/12 
Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, paras 224 and 225. 
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require the Commission to take a position in that connection. Even if one could agree that 
individuals have no right to require the Commission to take a position in respect of their 
claims, one could still expect from the Court to provide indications as to whether there 
are any constraints to the Commission’s discretion – e.g. the duty to give reasons as to 
why it decided not to act.79  
In the context of external relations, the Court might be reluctant to impose 
procedural obligations or grant procedural rights to third countries and third countries’ 
citizens without a first step from the legislator or the administration itself. In fact, the 
Court after having decided in Al-Jubail to extend the duty to hear the other side to acts of 
general application, in the CEUC case limited the circle of beneficiaries of procedural 
protection to those parties which had a financial or economic interest at stake.80 In the 
Front Polisario case, the General Court was probably ready to extend the duty of care since 
the action of the Union (i.e. the conclusion of agreements in the form of exchange of letters 
with Morocco) had the possible effect of violating human rights in West Sahara.81 The 
decision to expand the duty of care to such a sensitive area of the Union’s external action 
might have been the result of the Union’s new emphasis on carrying out a human rights 
impact assessment before the Union concludes an agreement with a third state.82 In 
                                                          
79 Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418, paras 38-39; Case T-2/04 Cemender 
Korkmaz, Corner House Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights project v. Commission, EU:T:2006:97, para. 
50. 
80 Case C-170/89, Bureau des Unions des Consommateurs (BEUC) v. Commission, EU:C:1991:450, para. 24. 
81 ‘[T]he Council must examine, carefully and impartially, all the relevant facts in order to ensure that the 
production of goods for export is not conducted to the detriment of the population of the territory 
concerned, or entails infringements of fundamental rights, including, in particular, the rights to human 
dignity, to life and to the integrity of the person (Articles 1 to 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), the 
prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 5 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), the freedom to 
choose an occupation and right to engage in work (Article 15 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), the 
freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), the right to property 
(Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), the right to fair and just working conditions and the 
prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights).’ Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 
228. 
82 The 2012 Action Plan requires the Commission to incorporate human rights in all impact assessment 
when conducting negotiations on trade agreements that have significant economic, social and 
environmental impacts. Council Document of 25 June 2012 ‘Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human 
Rights and Democracy’, 11855/12; European Commission, Directorate General for Trade, document of 
October 2015 titled: ‘Trade for all, towards a more responsible trade and investment policy strategy’ also 
stresses the importance of carrying out impact assessments, at 18, 23 and 26, available at: 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
Finally, DG TRADE itself established guidelines as to how to carry out human rights impact assessments 
‘Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy 
initiatives’, available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
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general, the CJEU in external relations has always been careful to understand the political 
sensitiveness of certain situations.83  
 
 A divided legislator  
 
Next to the Court, the articulation and operationalisation of the rule of law might also be 
guaranteed by inter-institutional conflicts or by a strong motivation on the side of the 
Union to maintain its role as normative power in the international arena.84 The Council 
has not yet shown any real interest in effectively executing the respect of the rule of law 
when the Union acts externally; however, the European Parliament has shown in recent 
instances a real willingness to oversee the power of the Commission in external relations. 
During the negotiations for the IPA II regulation the European Parliament pushed for the 
introduction of a declaration according to which the Commission shall conduct a strategic 
dialogue with the Parliament on the strategising and programming of financial 
assistance.85 The Commission according to the declaration, differently from the past, ‘will 
have to take into account the position expressed by the European Parliament on the 
matter’.86 The European Parliament resolutions on the evaluation of the EU’s actions in 
the area of human rights protection in third countries provide another example. In these 
documents the European Parliament expresses some concerns as to how the Commission 
establishes benchmarks and monitors the respect of human rights, and as to the failure to 
take appropriate or restrictive measures in the event of a situation marked by persistent 
human rights violations.87 Overall, the European Parliament demands a more principled 
and proceduralised approach in the way the EU implements its human rights policy. 
                                                          
83 M. Cremona, ‘A Reticent Court? Policy Objectives and the Court of Justice’, in A. Thies and M. Cremona 
(eds.), The European Court of Justice and External Relations Law:  Constitutional Challenges , (London, Hart 
Publishing 2014), 15, at 15. 
84 See preamble of the Lisbon Treaty: ‘Confirming their attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy 
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law’. 
85 Interview with EU civil servant working in the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
19.03.2014, Florence. 
86 ‘Declaration by the European Commission on the strategic dialogue with the Parliament’, Regulation (EU) 
No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument 
for Pre-accession Assistance (hereafter IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014. 
87 The European Parliament ‘[c]onsiders that failure to take appropriate or restrictive measures in the event 
of a situation marked by persistent human rights violations seriously undermines the Union's human rights 
strategy, sanctions policy and credibility.’ European Parliament resolution of 4 September 2008 on the 
‘Evaluation of EU sanctions as part of the EU's actions and policies in the area of human rights’, 
2008/2031(INI), para. 21; see also paras 10, 48, 64, 72 and 77 of the European Parliament resolution of 13 
December 2012 on the ‘annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2011 and the European 
Union’s policy on the matter’, 2012/2145(INI). 
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Nevertheless, the mismatch of interests between the Council and the EU Parliament have 
the effect of limiting the possibility of adopting legally binding rules aimed at guiding the 
administrative action externally. Finally, it is the administration that has so far tried to 
impose on itself some guidelines on the procedures to be followed when drafting the 




The present thesis is about suggesting a way to make ‘the third step of waltz’ and merge 
the increasing use of administrative power in the external context with the obligation that 
the Union has to respect the rule of law when acting externally. It is about concretely 
suggesting a way of giving effect to the rule of law in the way the Union develops and 
implements its relations with external partners. The thesis does not seek to critique the 
conception of the rule of law in the EU.89 However, its articulation in the EU external 
relations domain does question the possibility of re-thinking its application in order to 
frame the most recent transformations of public power.90 The point here is to apply the 
definition of the rule of law as developed internally by the Court (precisely the one 
applicable to internal administrative action) to the external action of the Union 
(specifically the administrative activities in the SAP and ENP) and to determine whether 
it assumes sector-specific nuances. The core idea of the rule of law entails the potential to 
adjust to changing realities.91 
                                                          
88 For example – among many others – see: European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, 
Guidance Note Enlargement Package 2012, Access to documents request GESTDEM Reference 2013/3857; 
EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2013/5084; 
Commission Regulation No 718/2007 of 12 June 2007 implementing Council Regulation No 1085/2006 
establishing an instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA), OJ [2007] L170/1, 15.03.2014; European 
Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II) Quick 
Guide to IPA II Programming, Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2014/4443; European 
Commission, Directorate General for Trade, ‘Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact 
assessments for trade-related policy initiatives’, available at: 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
89 For a critical view on the definition of the rule of law in the EU see: G. Palombella, ‘The EU sense of the 
rule of law and the issue of its oversight’, RSCAS 2014/125; and D. Kochenov, ‘EU Law without the Rule of 
Law:  Is the Veneration of Autonomy Worth It?’, 34 Yearbook of European Law 2015, 1-23. 
90 G. Palombella, ‘The Rule of Law at its Core’, in G. Palombella and N. Walker (eds.) Relocating the Rule of 
Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2009), 17, at 39.  
91 J. Mendes, ‘Rule of Law and Participation: A Normative Analysis of Internationalised Rulemaking as 
Composite Procedures’, Jean Monnet Working Paper Series, JMWP 13/13, at 21; M. Dawson, ‘Soft Law and 
the Rule of Law in the European Union: Revision or Redundancy’, in B. de Witte and A. Vauchez (eds .) 
Lawyering Europe: European Law as a Trans-national Social Field (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013), 221-242. 
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 The absence of powerful forces working together in giving effect to the rule of law 
in the Union’s external action demands developing an analytical framework which uses 
as a starting point the two foundational values of the administrative rule of law: driving 
the exercise of administrative power and protecting individuals affected by it.92 In order 
to identify ways to guide the exercise of administrative power externally, and in order to 
protect individuals affected by it, it is necessary to become closely acquainted with the 
characteristics and relevance of the power itself. Once the features and the impact of the 
administrative power externally have been thoroughly grasped (chapters II and III), the 
thesis identifies which administrative law principles (as developed within the framework 
of the internal market) have the potential to give effect to the administrative rule of law 
externally (chapters IV and V). The analytical framework – by using as a starting point the 
commonalities between the exercises of administrative power internally and externally – 
will try to redefine and legally articulate the principles and rules giving effect to the 




                                                          
92 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration (London: Hart Publishing 2014), 
at 325; H.P. Nehl, ‘Good Administration as procedural right and/or general principle?’, in H.C.H. Hofmann 
and A.H. Türk (eds.), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law Towards and Integrated Administration 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2009), 322, at 343; H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe and A.H. Türk, 
Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), 144-146 and 
149-151; P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), 250-252. 
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Chapter II: How is the external administrative power exercised?  
Administrative tasks, acts and measures, procedures, and structural organisation 
 
1. The features of the administrative power externally 
 
Like Ariadne gave Theseus a ball of red thread to find his way back out of the labyrinth, 
chapter II aims at accompanying the reader through the intricate web of administrative 
activities characterising the SAP and the ENP. The chapter tries to categorise the different 
instruments based on their objective, legal value, and adopting institution.1 However, 
before entering into the specificities of each administrative act, the next section provides 
an overview of the basic parameters and tasks for the exercise of administrative power 
within the SAP and ENP; it sets the ground for the subsequent more detailed and technical 
discussion. In describing the different activities implementing the SAP and the ENP, the 
chapter not only aims at fleshing out the external administrative power, but it also studies 
how the power is exercised. A detailed account of the administrative activities 
implementing the SAP and the ENP is fundamental in order to understand the legal 
challenges they pose, and in order to identify the characteristics of the external 
administrative power as a whole. This is a crucial step for the subsequent selection of the 
administrative law principles aimed at guiding the exercise of administrative power 
externally. The last section of the chapter will describe the key actors within the EU wider 
neighbourhood policies by indicating their nature, status and composition. The final 
section of the chapter will also inquire as to the interactions between EU, international 
and local actors by giving a bird’s eye view of the informal networks and cooperative 
arrangements between them. In sum, the two main objectives of chapter II are to orientate 
the reader in the constellation of administrative activities implementing the EU wider 
neighbourhood policies, and to describe the nature of the power they exercise.  
 
2. Basic parameters and administrative tasks in the EU wider neighbourhood policies 
 
This section aims at determining to what extent primary and secondary legislation are in 
place with the aim of guiding the exercise of administrative power in the SAP and ENP 
respectively. 
   
                                                          
1 For an overview of all the instruments see the summary tables at the end of chapter III.  
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2.1 Basic parameters for the exercise of administrative power: are there any? 
 
In June 1993 the European Council meeting in Copenhagen set forth the conditions of 
membership to the Union: ‘[a]ccession will take place as soon as an associated country is 
able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political 
conditions required’.2 Over the years, such political and economic conditions became 
known as ‘Copenhagen criteria’.3 The Copenhagen criteria have to be read jointly with the 
relevant Treaty provisions, which in 1993 were to be found in Article O of the Treaty on 
European Union signed in Maastricht.4 Nowadays the enlargement provision is to be 
found in article 49 TEU. If on the one hand, article 49 TEU – as already recognised by the 
Court back in 1978 – provides for the main aspects of the enlargement procedure,5 the 
Treaty does not contain any particular provision on the preparation for accession. The 
expression ‘pre-accession’ formally appeared for the first time in the Essen European 
Council of December 1994.6 Pre-accession strategies have developed with the idea of 
supporting countries applying for EU membership in making the political, economic and 
legal adaptations requested by the Copenhagen criteria, before accession could be 
seriously contemplated.7 The introduction of pre-accession strategies led to the 
development of additional instruments which concretised the rather abstract obligations 
envisaged by the Copenhagen criteria.8 As it will be explained later in the chapter, for a 
long time the most important pre-accession act of the SAP were the European 
Partnerships. The latter include a set of priorities for potential candidates to meet the 
Copenhagen criteria. European Partnerships find their legal base in Council Regulation 
No. 533/2004, which in turn find its legal basis not in article 49 but in ex-article 181a(1) 
EC – now article 212 TFEU – on economic financial and technical cooperation with third 
                                                          
2 Copenhagen European Council 21-22 June 1993, point 7, A, (iii).  
3 The three Copenhagen criteria include: ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for the protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy 
as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to 
take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aim of political, economic and monetary 
union.’ Copenhagen European Council 21-22 June 1993, point 7, A, (iii). 
4 The Copenhagen criteria developed over time; for a comprehensive overview see: C. Hillion, ‘The 
Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny’, in C. Hillion (eds.), EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach (London: 
Bloomsbury Publishing 2004), 1-22.  
5 Case 93/78 Mattheus v. Doego, EU:C:1978:206, para 7. 
6 Essen European Council 9-10 December 1994, Annex IV, point III.  
7 M. Maresceau, ‘Pre-accession’, in M. Cremona (eds.), The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2003), at 11.  
8 C. Hillion, ‘The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny’, in C. Hillion (eds.), EU Enlargement: A Legal 
Approach (London: Bloomsbury Publishing 2004), at 13.  
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countries.9 Likewise, article 49 was not used as legal base for the adoption of the current 
‘Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance’ (IPA II) – the EU regulation aimed at financing 
the SAP – article 212(2) TFEU – was instead used.10  
Until the entrance into force of the Treaty of Lisbon there was no specific reference 
in primary law to the European Neighbourhood Policy; therefore, article 8 TEU is a new 
neighbourhood-specific provision. Article 8 TEU does not refer to the ENP as such; 
however it was drafted with the latter in mind, giving grounds for it to be considered as a 
‘constitutionalisation’ of the ENP.11 Paragraph one of article 8 sets out the final objectives 
of the policy (i.e. ‘develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to 
establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the 
Union’); while paragraph 2 establishes that the Union – in order to achieve the objectives 
of paragraph 1 – may conclude specific agreements with neighbouring states and that 
these agreements may contain reciprocal rights, obligations and the possibility of 
undertaking activities jointly. Despite the introduction of this neighbourhood-specific 
provision in the Treaties the instruments implementing the policy do not use article 8 as 
legal basis. Action plans – an instrument comparable to the European Partnerships – 
which have a pivotal role in implementing the ENP, do not use article 8 as legal base.12 As 
for IPA II, article 8 was not used as legal base for the adoption of the ‘European 
Neighbourhood Policy Instrument’ (ENI) – the EU regulation aimed at financing the ENP.13 
Even the Council Decisions on the signature of the latest Association Agreements 
concluded by the Union with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova are silent on article 8.14 The 
reasons for this are to be found in the presence in the Treaties of already detailed 
procedures as to how to adopt regulations providing financial assistance to third 
                                                          
9 Council Regulation No 533/2004 of 22 March 2004 on the establishment of European partnerships in the 
framework of the stabilisation and association process, OJ [2004] L 86/1, 24.03.2004.  
10 Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014. 
11 P. Van Elsuwege and R. Petrov, ‘Article 8 TEU: Towards a New Generation of Agreements with the 
Neighbouring Countries of the European Union?’, 36 European Law Review 2011, at 690. 
12 The next section will further develop the choice of legal basis for action plans.  
13 Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L 77/30, 15.03.2014.  
14 E.g. see: Council Decision of 16 June 2014 approving the conclusion, by the European Commission, on 
behalf of the European Atomic Energy Community, of the Association Agreement between the European 
Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, 
of the other part (2014/495/Euratom), OJ [2014] L 261/744, 30.08.2014. 
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countries (articles 209(1) and 212(2)); and as to how to conclude association agreements 
(217 TFEU).15  
As things stand at the moment of writing article 8 TEU can mainly be regarded as a 
political instrument, while article 49 TEU is only concerned with the accession procedures 
and the proper accession negotiations. Therefore, the two main articles on enlargement 
and neighbourhood are not per se basic parameters for the exercise of administrative 
power in the SAP and ENP. Nevertheless, as already pointed out, there are other Treaty 
provisions that have been used as legal base in order to adopt acts and measures 
implementing the SAP and the ENP. The question remains as to their appropriateness as 
legal basis. Beside Treaty articles there are other three categories of basic parameters for 
the exercise of administrative power externally which should be mentioned before 
concluding this section: the agreements concluded by the Union (and its Member States) 
with each neighbouring state, secondary law, and Council Conclusions. 
Even if it is outside the scope of this thesis to analyse the administrative activities 
specifically aimed at implementing the agreements concluded by the Union with the SAP 
and ENP states, it ought not to be forgotten that the bilateral agreements can work as basic 
parameters for the adoption of the administrative instruments aimed at implementing the 
two wider neighbourhood policies. This is particularly the case for the ENP. Differently 
from the SAP, the ENP countries are not offered membership perspective. Therefore, if 
the EU administration for the SAP states knows that the final aim is accession and that it 
should support the SAP countries to achieve this goal; the same cannot be said for the ENP 
– which does not have a clear and concrete finalité. In implementing the ENP, the 
administration uses the agreements concluded by the Union with each neighbouring state 
as indicators against which to modulate its conduct. Moreover, the agreements can also 
establish fora, like association committees and councils, where administrative activities 
carried out by the Union administration can be discussed with the each neighbouring 
country.  
The two  financial regulations implementing the SAP and ENP respectively, together 
with the regulation laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of 
the Union's instruments for financing external action, also offer parameters indicating to 
the administration the principles and the procedures that need to be respected when 
                                                          
15 G. Van der Loo, P. Van Elsuwege and R. Petrov, ‘The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Assessment of 
an Innovative Legal Instrument’, EUI Working Paper Series, Law Department, LAW 2014/09, at 9. 
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programming and implementing funds.16 Council Conclusions are not stricto sensu basic 
parameters for the exercise of administrative power; nevertheless, in the SAP and the ENP 
context they are the main source of legitimacy as to how the administration is to develop 
and implement its action. In some instances, the European Council made specific demands 
as to which instruments the Commission was required to adopt. For example, progress 
reports were explicitly requested at the Luxembourg European Council.17 However, in 
other circumstances it was up the Commission to suggest new instruments. The 
‘European Partnerships’ were suggested by the Commission as instruments for the SAP 
upon invitation by the European Council in March 2003.18 As Thym correctly points out, 
‘the Council prefers the informal vehicle of Council Conclusions, Declarations of the 
Presidency and internal strategy papers’ to the adoption of legally binding acts.19 These 
documents are as carefully drafted as legal instruments, although they lack binding 
character. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that on certain occasions Council 
Conclusions work as basic parameters for the EU administration.  
Finally, we can state that primary and secondary legislation are rather silent and 
ambiguous on certain crucial aspects of the exercise of administrative power in the EU 
wider neighbourhood policies. The legislator seems to intentionally leave different 
options open for the administration as to how to achieve the Union’s primary political 
choice. For example, article 8 TEU is cast in mandatory terms ‘the Union shall develop a 
special relationship with neighbouring countries; however, the objective to be attained is 
                                                          
16 Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014; Regulation 
(EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014; Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 2014 laying down common rules and procedures for the 
implementation of the Union's instruments for  financing external action, OJ [2014] L 77/95, 15.03.2014. 
17 ‘From the end of 1998, the Commission will make regular reports to the Council, together with any 
necessary recommendations for opening bilateral intergovernmental conferences, reviewing the progress 
of each Central and East European applicant State towards accession in the light of the Copenhagen criteria, 
in particular the rate at which it is adopting the Union acquis. […] The Commission's reports will serve as a 
basis for taking, in the Council context, the necessary decisions on the conduct of the accession negotiations 
or their extension to other applicants.’ Luxembourg European Council 12-13 December 1997, point d. 29.  
18 ‘In this perspective [further enhancing the relationship between the EU and the Western Balkan 
countries], the European Council invites the Council and the Commission to examine ways and means, based 
also on the experience from the enlargement process, to further strengthen the Union's stabilisation and 
association policy towards the region.’ Brussels European Council Conclusions 20-21 March 2003, point 84. 
Following the Council Conclusions, the Commission adopted a Communication on 21 May 2003 titled ‘The 
Western Balkans and European Integration’ introducing the European Partnerships as pre-accession 
instruments. Commission Communication of 21 May 2003, ‘The Western Balkans and European 
Integration’, COM(2003) 285 final. 
19 D. Thym, ‘Foreign Affairs’, in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing 2009), 309, at 333. 
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set out at such a high level of generality that it cannot be simply achieved in one clear and 
linear way. The type of discretion granted to the administration under these conditions 
demands particular attention. 
 
2.2 Administrative tasks: the three macro categories 
 
The administrative tasks specific to the SAP and ENP can nowhere be found in the Treaties 
of the European Union; however, some specific administrative tasks are to be found in 
secondary law, like the financial assistance regulations IPA II and ENI, and other general 
Treaties provisions, and political declarations of intent.20 The administrative tasks of the 
SAP and ENP can be grouped into three categories: the first group aims at coordinating 
the achievement of the main goal of the two policies (i.e. full integration in the EU or to 
the greatest possible extent); the second group – based on the assessment made by the 
measures of the first group – aims at financing the attainment of the final policies goals; 
and the last group includes the administrative activities that are carried out in order to 
achieve sector specific goals within the overarching policy framework of the SAP and the 
ENP.  
The first group ‘setting the agenda for action’ includes policy instruments such as 
progress reports, action plans, European partnerships, and Memoranda of 
Understanding. The peculiarity of these instruments is their ability not only to inform, 
regulate and implement the EU internal decision making machine; but also to indicate to 
third countries what they need to do in order to intensify their relations with the Union. 
The instruments of the second group ‘financing the agenda for action’ coordinate the 
disbursement of financial assistance via strategy papers and annual programming 
documents.21 These documents indicate the activities that will be financed in order to 
achieve the objectives identified by the financial assistance regulations, Commission 
communications, progress reports, and action plans.22 The third group of administrative 
                                                          
20 E.g. article 6, Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014; and 
article 7, Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014. 
21 The Commission adoptes strategy papers and annual programming documents in accordance with 
comitology examination procedure as outlined in article 5, Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning 
mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, OJ [2011] 
L55/13, 28.02.2011. 
22 Article 6 and 4(1), Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2014 establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014; 
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instruments analysed by this thesis are those aimed at ‘implementing sector specific 
objectives’. Sector specific objectives may either be designed with the aim of further 
supporting third states in their road to full or partial integration within the Union; or 
might be carried out by the administration in order to ensure that the process of 
implementation of Union’s external policies meets EU transversal policy objectives. This 
thesis takes as examples of administrative activities implementing sector-specific 
objectives visa liberalisation action plans and progress reports, and human rights impact 
assessments. Visa liberalisation action plans and visa liberalisation progress report are 
examples of administrative activities supporting third states in their path to full or partial 
integration within the Union by granting them visa liberalization free regime.23 The 
Commission’s obligation to carry out human rights impact assessments before it proposes 
a new policy initiative – such as the opening of a trade negotiation with third countries – 
has been chosen as a transversal obligation that the administration is obliged to respect 
in line with the Union’s Human Right policy towards the outer world.24  
The choice of this thesis to cover – alongside the classical ENP and SAP instruments 
– also sector-specific acts is a conscious attempt to provide the reader with a more 
comprehensive overview of the intricate net of administrative activities that cover the 
external action of the Union. The administrative activities aimed at implementing the 
Union external action do not run in parallel to each other as self-sufficient systems, but 
interact with one another. Ignoring such a complexity would run the risk of supporting 
what Chiti as defined as ‘administrative instability’.25 
                                                          
article 7 and 3(2), Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014. 
23 Visa Liberalisation Dialogues with Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia including: visa liberalization action 
plans and progress reports; available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/international-affairs/eastern-partnership/visa-liberalisation-moldova-ukraine-and-
georgia/index_en.htm> (Consulted on 07.08.2016); and for Kosovo (the last SAP state which hasn’t 
completed the visa liberalization process) see Stabilisation and Association Process and Visa Liberalisation 
with the Western Balkans; available at <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/international-affairs/enlargement/index_en.htm> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
24 The 2012 Action Plan requires the Commission to incorporate human rights in all impact assessment 
when conducting negotiations on trade agreements that have significant economic, social and 
environmental impacts. Council Document of 25 June 2012 ‘Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human 
Rights and Democracy’, 11855/12; European Commission, Directorate General for Trade, document of 
October 2015 titled: ‘Trade for all, towards a more responsible trade and investment policy strategy’ also 
stresses the importance of carrying out impact assessments, at 18, 23 and 26, available at: 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016).  
25 Chiti uses the term in the context of the relation between the EU administration and private persons. 
However, such approach could also be used in respect of the relation between the Union and third states. 
This aspect will become clearer later in the thesis; specifically, in chapter IV. E. Chiti, ‘Is EU Administrative 
Law Failing in Some of Its Crucial Tasks?’, European Law Journal, (forthcoming). 
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3. Administrative acts and measures implementing the EU wider neighbourhood policies 
 
The analysis carried out by this section will follow the tripartite division introduced by 
the previous one. Administrative measures will be presented according to their main task: 
setting the agenda for action, financing the agenda for action, and implementing sector- 
specific objectives. Each administrative activity will be presented following the same 
structure: objective, legal value, legal base (if any), and future developments.  
 
3.1 Setting the agenda for action  
 
 European partnerships 
 
European partnerships (EPs) are Council decisions establishing for each SAP partner a 
list of tailor-made priorities in order to implement the goals of the SAP – which includes 
the gradual fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria in view of future membership. The list 
of priorities is found in the annex of each Council decision. EPs find their legal base in 
Council Regulation No. 533/2004 ‘on the establishment of European Partnerships in the 
framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process’, which in turn find its legal basis 
in ex-article 181a(1) EC – now article 212 TFEU.26 European Partnerships – despite their 
ambitious goal of steering the pre-accession process – find their legal base in a Treaty 
article dealing with economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries. 
This choice was probably justified by the fact that EPs were used as reference documents 
in order to establish which policy area should receive financial support.27 Recent 
developments seem to indicate that EPs are slowly disappearing as instruments 
implementing the SAP. First, the new IPA II regulation no longer list European 
partnerships as a source of information when programming funding.28 Second, EPs seem 
to have been replaced by the so-called Commissions’ ‘key priorities’. The Commission in 
its latest Opinions on the accession of Albania, Montenegro and Serbia introduced an 
alternative way of updating the key priorities for each SAP state without the need of 
                                                          
26 Council Regulation No 533/2004 of 22 March 2004 on the establishment of European partnerships in the 
framework of the stabilisation and association process, OJ [2004] L 86/01, 24.03.2004. 
27 Article 5, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 establishing an Instrument of Pre-
accession Assistance (IPA), OJ [2006] L 210/82, 31.07.2006. 
28 Article 4 of the new IPA II regulation does not use European Partnerships as tools to frame assistance. 
Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing 
an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014. 
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adopting a Council decision.29 All the three Opinions contain a clear list of priorities that 
countries need to respect in order to open accession negotiations.30  
 
 Action plans 
 
Action plans (APs) lay down the strategic objectives of the cooperation between each ENP 
country and the EU. Their implementation helps fulfil the provisions of the agreements 
concluded by the EU with each neighbouring state, build ties in new areas of cooperation, 
and encourage and support the objective of further integration of the ENP countries into 
the Union’s economic and social structures.31 APs are adopted within the joint bodies 
established by the agreements concluded by the Union and each ENP country (i.e. 
association councils).32 Externally, they do not have a legally binding effect on third 
countries; they are political documents whose implementation is not subject to prior 
formal ratification by the parties. Internally, before being endorsed by the joint bodies, 
they are presented by the Commission to the Council which swiftly endorse them as 
Council decisions on the position to be adopted by the Union and the Member States.33 In 
the past, the legal base for the adoption of the Council decisions was article 15 TEU (now 
article 29 TEU) dealing with the CFSP, together with the Council Decision on the 
conclusion of the agreement between the Union and the respective neighbouring state.34 
However, since 2009 the Council refused to continue the pre-Lisbon practice. Its main 
claim has been that action plans are political documents and they should be adopted also 
internally as recommendations. Nevertheless, with the adoption of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy Instrument – where it is clear and undeniable that action plans do 
                                                          
29 The Commission delivers an Opinion when a third state presents its application for starting accession 
negotiations. At present, there are no clear legal rules regulating the formulation and structure of Opinions. 
The Commission is requested to make a comprehensive analysis on the application of each candidate on the 
basis of the country’s capacity to meet the criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council of 1993 as well 
as the conditionality of the Stabilisation and Association Process.  
30 Commission Opinion on Albania's application for membership of the European Union of 9 November 
2010, COM(2010) 680; Commission Opinion on Montenegro's application for membership of the European 
Union of 9 November 2010, COM(2010) 670; Commission Opinion on Serbia's application for membership 
of the European Union of 12 October 2011, COM(2011) 668 final. 
31 European Neighbourhood Policy, ENP action plans, available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/action-plans/index_en.htm> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
32 B. Van Vooren, ‘A case-study of soft law in EU external relations: the European Neighbourhood Policy’, 34 
European Law Review 2009, at 710. 
33 E.g. see Council Decision of 9 February 2005 on the position to be adopted in the Association/Co-
operation Council Ukraine, Brussels, 5428/1/05 REV 1. 
34 B. Van Vooren, ‘A case-study of soft law in EU external relations: the European Neighbourhood Policy’, 34 
European Law Review 2009, 709 - 710; Interview with Commission official from the Legal Service, 
24.04.2015, e-mail exchange. 
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produce legal effects – once again the Council has been asked to change its position.35 As 
the situation stands at the moment of writing, there is more or less consensus that the 
Council decisions on the position to be adopted by the Union and the Member States in 
the joint bodies will be adopted using article 218(9) as the procedural legal basis and as 
substantial legal base article 217 TFEU, or articles 209 and 217 together, leaving aside the 
legal basis dealing with CFSP.36 Thus, another important question is raised here as to who 
will be responsible for drafting the action plans in the future: can the proposal be a joint 
one (Commission and High Representative) if there is no substantive CFSP legal basis?  
Action plans have been succeeded (for some eastern neighbours) by ‘Association 
Agendas’. Compared to action plans, association agendas were envisaged with the aim of 
broadening the areas of cooperation between the EU and the ENP states, including 
explicit reference to the acquis in their texts, and reflecting more fully the partners’ own 
reform agenda.37 Finally, the Commission proposed that these new documents should 
promote preparations for the implementation of the new agreements.38 Now, after the 
entry into force of the latest Association Agreements with some of the eastern 
neighbours, the association agendas have been updated to prepare and facilitate the 
implementation of the agreement themselves.39 Despite of these changes, association 
agendas are comparable to action plans. They aim at promoting further political 
association and economic integration of the neighbouring states into the EU, ‘by creating 
a comprehensive and practical framework through which these overriding objectives can 
be realized’.40 The adoption of the association agendas has not followed a linear path. 
                                                          
35 ‘The key points of reference for setting the priorities for Union support under this Regulation and for the 
assessment of progress as outlined in article 2(3) shall be: action plans or other equivalent documents such 
as the association agendas (…)’. Article 3(2), Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] 
L77/30, 15.03.2014.  
36 Interview with Commission official from the Legal Service, 24.04.2015, e-mail exchange. 
37 Commission Non-Paper on ‘the successor documents to current ENP Action Plans’ expanding on the 
proposal of the Commission Communication of 3 April 2008 on the ‘Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy 2007’, COM(2008) 164 final.  
38 Prior to the adoption of the latest association agreements, Association Agendas aimed at clearly 
identifying on a sector by sector basis the priorities which required urgent action in anticipating the entry 
into force of the new agreements. 
39 See G. Van der Loo, The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(The Hague: Brill Nijhoff 2016), 93-95.   
40 See Association Agenda between the EU and Ukraine, available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/2010_eu_ukraine_association_agenda_en.pdf> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
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Interestingly enough, a new EU-Morocco Action Plan was adopted in December 2013 –41 
instead of an association agenda – although the Union started negotiations for a DCFTA 
with Morocco and despite the existence of an Association Agreement with Morocco.42   
 
 Progress reports 
 
Progress reports for each SAP country are Commission working documents 
accompanying the yearly Commission Communication on the ‘Enlargement Strategy’. The 
Communication is addressed to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions.43 The reports are 
aimed at evaluating the candidates’ and potential candidates’ advancement in meeting the 
SAP requirements and the 1993 Copenhagen criteria. Progress reports are approximately 
seventy-page-long documents which review in great detail the situation in each SAP 
country.44 The type of analysis carried out by these documents is rather complex and 
technical; the administration needs to determine, for example, the capacity of each SAP 
country to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union or the 
existence of a functioning economy. Furthermore, the analysis requires an extensive 
knowledge of the Union acquis as well as of the legal systems of each SAP states.45 A lack 
of knowledge of the SAP countries’ legal systems might force the Commission to rely 
excessively on governmental and international sources. Finally, progress reports, like 
action plans, produce legal effects to the extent that they inform which area should receive 
financial support.46 However, in contrast to action plans, no one has yet questioned their 
legal base. 
                                                          
41 The EU-Morocco action plan was formally adopted in December 2013, available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/morocco_enp_ap_final_en.pdf> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016). 
42 ‘The [EU-Morocco] DCFTA negotiations were officially launched on 1 March 2013 by President Barroso 
in Rabat. The first round of negotiations was held in Rabat in April 2013. So far, four rounds of negotiations 
have taken place, the last one in April 2014.’ European Commission Service Position Paper on the trade 
sustainability impact assessment in support of negotiations of a deep and comprehensive free trade 
agreement between the European Union and Morocco. Available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153336.pdf (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
43 See the latest Commission Communication of 10 November 2015, ‘Enlargement Strategy’, COM(2015) 
611 final.  
44 E.g. see Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2015 Report of 10 November 2015, Accompanying 
the Commission Communication on the EU Enlargement Strategy, SWD(2015) 213 final. 
45 Stabilisation and Association Process, Strategy and Reports, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/package/index_en.htm> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
46 Article 4, Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014. 
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ENP progress reports are joint staff working documents accompanying the yearly 
Joint Communication on the ‘Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy’. 
The Joint Communication is addressed to the Council, the EU Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions.47 The aim of these 
documents is to assess, for each ENP country, the progress made in the implementation 
of the priorities listed in their respective action plans. Nonetheless they are not supposed 
to be a general review of the political and economic situation for each ENP country; a 
comparative analysis between each ENP action plan and their respective progress reports 
does not seem to suggest that the latter monitor the former.48 ENP progress reports are 
rather an overall evaluation of the ENP countries reform process. Furthermore, instead 
of being tailor-made documents based on each ENP action plan, they all follow the same 
structure. They are approximately fifteen-page-long documents covering seven policy 
areas: political dialogue and reform; economic, social and development reforms; trade 
related issues, market and regulatory reforms; cooperation on justice freedom and 
security; transport, energy, environment, climate change, information society, research 
and development and innovation; people to people contact, education and health care.49 
The November 2015 review of the ENP suggests abandoning regular progress reports in 
favour of a ‘new style of assessment, focusing specifically on meeting the goals agreed 
with partners’.50 How this type of assessment will differ from the old progress reports 
remains unclear. However, one important difference is that these reports will be timed to 
provide the basis for a political exchange of views in the relevant high-level meetings with 
partner countries, such as Association and Cooperation Councils. In addition to the 
country-specific reporting the new ENP revision foresees transversal regular reports 
tracking developments in the neighbourhood. 
 
 
                                                          
47 See the latest Joint Commission and High Representative Communication of 25 March 2015 on the 
‘Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2015’, JOIN(2015) 9 final.  
48 E.g. EU-Georgia Action Plan, available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/georgia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016); and Joint Staff Working Document of 25 March 2015, Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in Georgia: Progress in 2014 and recommendations for actions, SWD(2015) 66 final. 
49 European Neighbourhood Policy, ENP progress reports, available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/progress-reports/index_en.htm> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
50 Joint Communication of 18 November 2015, ‘Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, JOIN(2015) 
50, at 5. 
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 Memoranda of Understanding 
 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) aimed at implementing the SAP and the ENP are 
examples of international agreements of a non-legally binding nature. They reflect a 
political agreement between the Union and one or more third states, with the express 
intention not to become bound in a legal sense. The fields covered by these instruments 
are numerous, encompassing a wide range of topics, such as: energy,51 political priorities 
for cooperation,52 conditions of loans and the terms of repayment,53 etc. The task of the 
MoUs is very much dependent on the fields they cover; they vary between exploratory 
arrangements and administrative ones.54 Exploratory MoUs are the outcome of 
preliminary talks that might precede the negotiations of an international agreement. 
Administrative MoUs are functional to the cooperation between administration of the 
Union and the administration of third countries. Some of these documents are not 
available on the official website of the European Union; for some only the press release is 
accessible. The post-Lisbon practice seems to suggest that MoUs will now be adopted 
internally as Commission decisions and as Commission implementing decisions based on 
a mandate granted to the Commission by the Council and the European Parliament via a 
joint decision.55 For example, the recent MoU on macro financial assistance concluded 
between the Union with Ukraine was adopted as a Commission implementing decision,56 
using as legal base the European Parliament and Council decision on macro-financial 
                                                          
51 Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership between the European Union and the Republic 
of Azerbaijan in the fields of Energy. Available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/international/regional/caucasus_central_asia/memorandum
/doc/mou_azerbaijan_en.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
52 EU-Jordan Memorandum of Understanding on further cooperation. Press release available at: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-316_en.htm> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
53 EU-Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding establishing conditions of loans and the terms of repayment. 
Press release available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5024_it.htm> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016); Commission Implementing Decision of 18.5.2015 approving the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the European Union and Ukraine related to macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, 
C(2015) 3444 final; Commission Implementing Decision of 16.7.2014 approving the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the European Union and Tunisia related to macro-financial assistance to Tunisia, 
C(2014) 5176 final.  
54 B. Van Vooren and R. A. Wessel, EU external relations law: text, cases and materials (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2014), at 54.  
55 A. Ott, ‘EU administration through international soft law: Does soft law breach the institutional balance 
in EU external relations?’, Conference title ‘Soft Law before the European Courts: a common pattern?’, 19 and 
20 November 2015, Brussels.  
56 Commission Implementing Decision of 18 May 2015 approving the Memorandum of Understanding 
between the European Union and Ukraine related to macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, 
C(2015)3444/F1. 
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support to the country.57 The entrance into force of the MoU requires – besides the 
signature of both parties – also the ‘receipt by the European Union of written notification 
by Ukraine of fulfilment of internal procedures envisaged by the law of Ukraine’.58 
Likewise a similar procedure was used for Tunisia.59 
 
3.2 Financing the agenda for action 
 
The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II) and the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI) are the current financial assistance regulations for the SAP and the ENP. 
IPA II covers the SAP states plus Turkey; while the ENI covers both the EU’s eastern and 
southern neighbours.  The overall goal of IPA II is to support the SAP countries in 
‘adopting and implementing the political, institutional, legal, administrative, social and 
economic reforms required’ by those countries in order to comply with the Union’s values 
and practices, with a view to Union membership.60 The Union financial support under the 
ENI regulation has the overarching goal of further achieving the finalité of the ENP (i.e. 
the creation of ‘an area of shared prosperity and good neighbourliness’) and in particular 
of implementing the present and future agreements concluded by the Union with the 
neighbouring countries as well as the agreed action plans or equivalent documents (i.e. 
association agendas).61 The IPA II and ENI regulatory frameworks are complemented by 
Regulation No. 236/2014 laying down common rules and procedures on the 
implementation of the Union's instruments for external financial assistance (Regulation 
No. 236/2014).62 Under both the IPA II and ENI regulations the Commission is 
empowered to adopt delegated and implementing acts.  
 
                                                          
57 Article 3(1), Decision (EU) 2015/601 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 April 2015 
providing macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, OJ [2015] L100/1, 17.04.2015. 
58 Annex to Commission Implementing Decision of 18 May 2015 approving the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the European Union and Ukraine related to macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, 
C(2015)3444/F1. 
59 Article 3(1), Decision (EU) 534/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
providing macro-financial assistance to the Republic of Tunisia, OJ [2015] L151/9, 21.05.2014; Commission 
Implementing Decision of 16 July 2014 approving the Memorandum of Understanding between the 
European Union and Tunisia related to macro-financial assistance to Tunisia, C(2014)5176/F1. 
60 Article 1, Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014. 
61 Article 1, Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014. 
62 Regulation No 236/2014 of 11 March 2014 laying down common rules and procedures for the 
implementation of the Union's instruments for financing external action, OJ [2014] L77/95, 15.03.2014. 
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 Commission delegated acts 
 
The Commission can adopt delegated acts (article 290 TFEU) under the IPA II and ENI 
regulations in order to amend their respective annex II.63 Annex II in both regulations 
comprises a long list of priorities for Union support. 
 
 Commission implementing acts 
 
In accordance with the IPA II and ENI regulations, the Commission is granted 
implementing powers (article 291 TFEU) to adopt strategy papers, annual programming 
documents and the specific rules establishing the uniform conditions for the 
implementation of the IPA II and ENI regulations.64 Strategy papers and annual 
programming documents can be country-specific or multi-country documents, and they 
identify the priorities and the projects to be financed by the Union with the aim of 
achieving the specific objectives identified by the two financing regulations.65 The pool of 
objectives to be achieved comprises the list provided by article 2 of both IPA II and ENI, 
the list offered by their respective Annex II, and the priorities identified by progress 
reports, action plans, association agendas, and Commission communications.66 While 
seemingly purely technical activities, these implementing instruments have a clear policy 
orientation nature – which is also acknowledged in the preamble of the regulation.67 The 
objectives that the Union’s financial assistance should strive to achieve are expressed in 
broad terms (e.g. reducing  poverty); thus, they implicitly leave to the administration the 
                                                          
63 Articles 10 and 11, Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2014 establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014; 
articles 13 and 14, Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30. 
64 Articles 6 and 12, Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2014 establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014; 
and articles 7 and 12, Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014. 
65 Articles 6 and 7, Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014; article 
7, Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014. 
66 Article 4(1), Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014; article 
3(2), Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014. 
67 Preamble (point 16) Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2014 establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014; 
preamble (point 28) Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014. 
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discretion to choose which type of actions are better suited in order to achieve such 
elusive objectives. By providing a detailed list of specific objectives, the regulations offer 
the impression that the EU administration is bound by ascertainable goals when deciding 
what to finance, and is not engaged in a political process of adjusting to a range of possibly 
conflicting claims.  
The Commission under the IPA II and ENI regulations adopts two types of 
implementing decisions. Under the IPA II regulation, country-specific ‘Indicative Strategy 
Papers’ for the period 2014-2020 are adopted as Commission implementing decisions for 
each SAP state, using as legal base article 6 IPA II.68 Based on these documents the 
Commission again adopts as Commission implementing decisions ‘Annual Country Action 
Programmes’,69 using as legal base article 2(1) of Regulation No. 236/2014.70 Likewise, 
under the ENI regulation the Commission adopts ‘Single Support Frameworks’ for the 
years 2014-2017 as implementing decisions for each ENP country, using as legal base 
article 7 ENI.71 Based on these strategizing documents the Commission subsequently 
adopts, again as implementing decisions, ‘Annual Country Action Programmes’ for each 
ENP state, using as legal base article 2(1) of Regulation No 236/2014.72 Interesting to 
notice here is that the ‘Single Support Frameworks’ are Commission and EEAS documents, 
even if they are adopted as Commission Implementing decisions. The focus of the thesis 
will be on these Commission implementing documents; and it will not cover the cross-
border and multi-country programming. 
The Commission implementing powers under the ENI and IPA II regulation are 
comparable; however, there is one significant difference worth noticing. The ENI 
regulation tends to rely more on the policy instruments (i.e. action plans or their 
equivalent association agendas) in order to determine objectives and priority of Union 
support.73 In the absence of such documents (e.g. in the case of Belarus) the regulation 
                                                          
68 E.g. Commission Implementing Decision of 18 August 2014 adopting an Indicative Strategy Paper for 
Montenegro (2014-2020), C(2014) 5771. 
69 E.g. Commission Implementing Decision of 10 December 2014 adopting an Annual Country Action 
Programme for Montenegro for the year 2014, C(2014) 9387. 
70 Regulation No 236/2014 of 11 March 2014 laying down common rules and procedures for the 
implementation of the Union's instruments for financing external action, OJ [2014] L77/95, 15.03.2014. 
71 E.g. Commission Implementing Decision of 11 June 2014 adopting a Single Support Framework for 
Georgia (2014-2017), C(2014)3994. 
72 E.g. Commission Implementing Decision of 14 July 2014 adopting the Annual Action Programme 2014 in 
favour of Georgia to be financed from the general budget of the European Union, C(2014) 5020. 
73 Article 7, Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014. 
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specifies that tailor-made comprehensive programming documents including strategy 
and multi-annual indicative programmes need to be adopted.74 This difference – 
compared to the IPA II regulatory structure – can be explained by the fact that the ENP 
does not have a clear end goal, but rather moving targets depending on the willingness of 
the neighbouring states to integrate in the Union.  
 
3.3 Implementing sector-specific objectives 
 
This sub-section presents the two examples of administrative activities implementing 
sector-specific objectives. The first objective (visa liberalization) is aimed at further 
integrating the neighbouring states within the EU while the second is aimed at 
implementing an EU transversal objective: respecting human rights in the EU external 
action. Even if apparently presented as administrative practices distinct from the ones 
directly related to the implementation of the SAP and the ENP, they also involve the 
overarching relation between the Union and its neighbours.  
 
 Visa liberalisation  
 
The objective of the visa liberalisation dialogues that the Union established with both the 
SAP and the ENP countries is their removal from the so-called ‘Schengen black list’.75 The 
Schengen black list registers all the countries whose nationals must be in possession of 
visas when crossing the Schengen border.76 The visa liberalisation policies for both the 
SAP and ENP countries foresee two key administrative instruments. The first instruments 
set out a comprehensive list of reforms that each neighbouring country is requested to 
implement to fulfil the requirements for a visa free regime. This type of instrument is 
called a ‘roadmap’ under the SAP, and a Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP) under the 
ENP. The second type of instrument is the visa liberalisation progress report (VLPR). 
Their objective is to monitor the implementation of the Road Maps and VLAPs. Roadmaps 
                                                          
74 Article 7(3), Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014. 
75 See European Commission, Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs, International Affairs, 
Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/enlargement/index_en.htm> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016).  
76 Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must 
be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from 
that requirement, OJ [2001] L 81/1, 21.03.2001. 
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and VLAPs are non-classified documents, while VLPRs (both for the SAP and ENP) are 
Commission reports to the European Parliament and the Council.77  
The SAP visa liberalisation strategy finds its foundation in the Thessaloniki agenda 
announced in June 2003.78 However, it was only in January 2008 that the Council 
welcomed the Commission’s intention to launch a visa dialogue with all the countries of 
the SAP with the aim of defining detailed roadmaps setting clear benchmarks to be met in 
order to gradually advance towards visa liberalisation.79 The Visa Liberalisation Road 
Maps are organised in four blocks: document security, illegal migration, public order and 
security, and fundamental rights linked to the movement of persons.80 The benchmarks 
of the first three blocks are related to justice, freedom and security acquis and reflect the 
content of Regulation No. 539/2001.81 The last most recent, fourth, block is titled 
‘Fundamental rights and the right of free movement’ and deals with the conditions and 
procedures for issuing identity documents, adopting and enforcing anti-discrimination 
legislation, and implementing policies regarding all minorities.82 Besides evaluating the 
countries’ progress through VLPRs, the Commission also makes a set of recommendations 
for the countries’ authorities in areas where more decisive action is needed.83 At the time 
of writing Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia enjoy a 
visa liberalisation regime, while Kosovo is still waiting.84  
 VLAPs and their respective progress reports are foreseen only for the eastern 
neighbours, almost at indicating that visa liberalisation is not on the agenda with the 
                                                          
77 The first VLPRs for the eastern neighbouring states were joint Commission and HR working documents. 
See some example of VLAPs and VLPR, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/international-affairs/eastern-partnership/visa-liberalisation-moldova-ukraine-and-
georgia/index_en.htm> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
78 Thessaloniki Agenda 16 June 2003, General Affairs and External Relations Council, at 16. 
79 2845th/ 2846th General Affairs and External Relations Council Meeting of 28 January 2008, at 17. 
80 E.g. see Visa Liberalisation Roadmap with Kosovo, available at 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/documents/eu_travel/visa_liberalisation_with_kosovo_road
map.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
81 Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must 
be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from 
that requirement, OJ [2001] L 81/1, 21.03.2001.  
82 S. Kacarska, ‘Losing the Rights along the Way: The EU-Western Balkans Visa Liberalisation’, 16 European 
Politics and Society 2015, at 364. 
83 See European Commission, Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs, International Affairs, 
Enlargement, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-
affairs/enlargement/index_en.htm> (Consulted on 07.08.2016).  
84 On 18 December 2015 the Commission adopted the final visa liberalisation report on Kosovo, Press 
Release available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6369_en.htm> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016). 
How is the external administrative power exercised? 
55 
 
Mediterranean partners to who is instead offered visa facilitation.85 The VLAPs are built 
upon the Justice and Home Affairs section of each ENP Action Plan.86 The VLAPs are 
comparable in structure to the SAP visa liberalisation roadmaps; they also envisage the 
same four blocks of benchmarks.87 The implementation of the VLAPs is monitored by the 
Commission through regular progress reports, which are transmitted to the European 
Parliament and the Council.88 Currently, the EU conducts ‘Visa Liberalisation Dialogues’ 
with three Eastern Partnership countries, namely Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Finally, 
it has been argued that the benchmarks set by the VLAPs are much more specific and 
demanding than the roadmaps with the Western Balkan states.89 This difference between 
the two policies might be explained by a more stringent approach developed by the Union 
over time, rather than a difference between the two policies. If we compare the latest SAP 
visa liberalisation roadmap with Kosovo and the VLAP with Moldova, it is possible to see 
that the two documents take a very similar approach.90  
 
 Human rights impact assessments 
 
Impact Assessments (IAs) are Commission staff working documents whose importance 
has been underlined by the latest ‘Better Regulation Package’.91 They were first 
introduced by the Commission in 2002 and have undergone continuous strengthening 
                                                          
85 P. Dumas and I. Goldner Lang, ‘EU Mobility Regimes and Visa Policy towards ENP Countries’, RSCAS 
2015/79 Working Paper Series Migration Policy Center, at 5. 
86 ‘The Justice and Home Affairs section of the EU-Republic of Moldova ENP Action Plan, in place since 2005, 
provides the overall framework for EU-Republic of Moldova cooperation in the area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice (JLS)’, Visa Liberalisation Action Plan with Moldova, available at: <http://www.enpi-
info.eu/library/content/action-plan-visa-liberalisation-moldova> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
87 See European Commission, Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs, International Affairs, 
European Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Partnership, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/eastern-partnership/visa-liberalisation-moldova-
ukraine-and-georgia/index_en.htm> (Consulted on 07.08.2016).  
88 See European Commission, Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs, International Affairs, 
European Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Partnership, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/eastern-partnership/visa-liberalisation-moldova-
ukraine-and-georgia/index_en.htm> (Consulted on 07.08.2016).  
89 P. Dumas and I. Goldner Lang, ‘EU Mobility Regimes and Visa Policy towards ENP Countries’, RSCAS 
2015/79 Working Paper Series Migration Policy Center, at 5. 
90 Visa Liberalisation Action Plan with Moldova, available at: <http://www.enpi-
info.eu/library/content/action-plan-visa-liberalisation-moldova> (Consulted on 07.08.2016); and Visa 
Liberalisation Roadmap with Kosovo, available at 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/documents/eu_travel/visa_liberalisation_with_kosovo_road
map.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
91 Commission Staff Working Document of 19 May 2015, ‘Better Regulation Guidelines’, SWD(2015) 111 
final, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/swd_br_guidelines_en.pdf> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016).  
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over the years.92 IAs guide pre-political decision making with the aim of increasing the 
amount and quality of information available on the impacts of various policy options.93 
While the Commission has been doing IAs before opening trade negotiations with third 
countries since 2006, the practice only became systematic in 2010.94 Since 2012 the 
Commission has been called upon by the Council to ‘incorporate human rights in all 
impact assessments on an on-going basis’.95 This initial obligation – which arguably was 
the follow-up of the Commission’s strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights by the European Union –96 has further developed into concrete 
instruments and guidelines, especially in the EU trade policy.97 Human rights impact 
assessments (HRIAs) are adopted in order to analyse the possible human rights impact of 
a trade-related initiative both in the EU and in the partner countries.  
 According to the Commission’s guidelines ‘on the analysis of human rights impacts 
in impact assessments for trade-related policy initiatives’, HRIAs should include 
consideration of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural and core labour rights. The 
guidelines provide a non-exhaustive list of international and regional human rights 
conventions that should be taken into account when carrying out the analysis.98 The 
guidelines also establish that ‘the depth and scope of the assessment should be calibrated 
to the type of trade measures included in the initiative, as well as to the magnitude of the 
                                                          
92 After a phasing-in, impact assessments became allegedly systematic in 2005 for initiatives set out in the 
Commission Legislative Work Programme (CLWP). Commission Communication of 5 June 2002, ‘Impact 
Assessment’, COM(2002) 276 final.  
93 A. Alemanno and A. Mauwese, ‘Impact Assessment of EU Non-Legislative Rulemaking: The Missing Link 
in ‘New Comitology’’, 19 European Law Journal 2013, at 76. 
94 Interview with Commission official from Directorate General for Trade, 01.04.2016, e-mail exchange. 
95 Council Document of 25 June 2012 ‘Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy’, 11855/12. 
96 Commission Communication of 19 October 2010, ‘Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights by the European Union’, COM(2010) 573/4. 
97 ‘On 25 June 2012 the Council adopted a Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy 
accompanied by an Action Plan1. The Action Plan called on the Commission to ‘incorporate human rights in 
all impact assessments on an on-going basis’ (point 1) and to develop by 2014 ‘a methodology to aid 
consideration of the human rights situation in third countries in connection with the launch or conclusion 
of trade and/or investment agreements’ (point 11a). In response to these commitments DG TRADE has 
developed in-house guidelines in order to help with examination of the potential impacts of a trade-related 
initiative on human rights in both the EU and the partner country/ies.’ European Commission, Directorate 
General for Trade, ‘Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-
related policy initiatives’, available at: 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016); see 
also European Commission, Directorate General for Trade, document of October 2015 titled ‘Trade for all, 
towards a more responsible trade and investment policy strategy’, at 18, 23 and 26, available at: 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
98 ‘Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy 
initiatives’, available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016), at 5. 
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expected human rights impacts.’ However, no further details are offered as to which type 
of trade measures should receive more or less attention in determining their human rights 
impacts. This lacuna – as it will be clear from the examples below – promotes 
uncertainties as to administrative action.   
At the moment of writing there are no official records of IAs carried out before the 
Commission actually opened trade negotiations with the SAP and ENP states.99 The launch 
of the negotiations with the Western Balkans countries predates the commitment to carry 
out impact assessments. As for the latest Association Agreements concluded by the Union 
with the eastern neighbours, an IA in support of a proposal for a Council decision to 
authorize the Commission to open negotiations with Ukraine for an Enhanced Agreement 
was carried out in 2006; however, it does not envisage a human right section.100 In 2011 
the Foreign Affairs Council and the European Council responded to the Arab Spring by 
calling for the launch of negotiations with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan.101 Despite 
the fact that actual trade negotiations with some of the ENP states have started, no HRIAs 
have been adopted.102  According to an official from Directorate General for Trade (DG 
TRADE), adopting HRIAs was unnecessary since the political decision to launch 
negotiations was already taken.103 Finally, a last incongruence is the case of Azerbaijan, 
with whom the Commission started negotiations on an Association Agreement in 2010 
without prior adoption of HRIAs.104 According to the same DG TRADE official, HRIAs are 
a trade-specific instrument to be applied only to major trade negotiations; i.e. negotiations 
under the aegis of the EU Commissioner for Trade.105 The approach of the Commission’s 
official clearly highlights the level of discretion which is granted to the Commission under 
these circumstances.  
                                                          
99 European Commission, Better Regulation, Impact Assessment, List of Impact Assessments from 2003 to 
2016, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/cia_2016_en.htm> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
100 Commission Staff Working Document of 13 November 2006, Recommendation from the Commission to 
the Council authorising the Commission to open negotiations with Ukraine for a new Enhanced Agreement, 
Impact Assessment, SEC(2006) 1110. Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2016/046.  
101 Council Press Release on the Foreign Affairs Council Meeting of 14 December 2011 (Doc No 1868/11), 
at 8. 
102 E.g. negotiations for an association agreement with Tunisia were opened in October 2015 but no HRIA 
was adopted. European Commission, Directorate General for Trade, Countries and Regions, Tunisia, 
available at <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/tunisia/> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016). 
103 Interview with Commission official from Directorate General for Trade, 01.04.2016, e-mail exchange. 
104 European Commission, Directorate General for Trade, Countries and Regions, Azerbaijan, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/azerbaijan/> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016).   
105 Interview with Commission official from Directorate General for Trade, 01.04.2016, e-mail exchange. 
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4. The procedures governing the adoption of administrative acts and measures 
 
The procedural rules governing the drafting and the adoption of administrative acts and 
measures implementing the Union wider neighbourhood policies are not always clearly 
defined. With the exception of the procedures leading to the adoption of acts aimed at 
‘financing the agenda for action’, the majority are administrative self-imposed guidelines 
– whose availability is dependent on an official access to document request.106 The 
strictness of these self-imposed rules is a matter of choice of the Commission and the 
EEAS, as distinct from externally imposed requirements. This section will follow the same 
tripartite division adopted by the previous section. 
 
4.1 Setting the agenda for action: in search for the way 
 
 European partnerships 
 
The procedure for the adoption of the European Partnerships is included in the text of the 
Council regulation foreseeing their adoption.107 The Council adopts European 
Partnerships by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.108  EPs are 
intended to be the result of the Commission’s consultations with the candidate and 
potential candidate states, and from a legal point of view they are not agreements but 
unilateral acts.109 Despite implying a dialogue with the potential candidates and candidate 
countries, the latter were not always invited to participate in the drafting of the EPs.110 
The EPs, although adopted by the Council, are mainly the elaboration of the Commission, 
which is at the forefront when it comes to the establishment of the priorities.111 
                                                          
106 Some scholars define these internal norms as forms of ‘internal administrative rule-making’; while 
others define them as norms composing the ‘internal administrative law’. Despite the difference in 
terminology, these measures are an important tool for the administration to guide its own administrative 
procedures. See H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe and A.H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European 
Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), Chapter 16; and J.L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press 1983). 
107 Council Regulation No 533/2004 of 22 March 2004 on the establishment of European partnerships in 
the framework of the stabilisation and association process, OJ [2004] L 86/01, 24.03.2004. 
108 Article 2, Council Regulation No 533/2004 of 22 March 2004 on the establishment of European 
partnerships in the framework of the stabilisation and association process, OJ [2004] L 86/01, 24.03.2004. 
109 K. Inglis, ‘The Europe Agreements Compared in the Light of their Pre-accession Reorientation’, 37 
Common Market Law Review 2000, at 1184. 
110 D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-accession Conditionality in the Fields 
of Democracy and the Rule of Law (Alphen aan Den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008), at 75. 
111 K. Inglis, ‘The Pre-Accession Strategy and the Accession Partnerships’, in A. Ott and K. Inglis (eds.), 
Handbook on European Enlargement: A Commentary on the Enlargement Process (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser 
Press 2002), 103, at 108. 
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Furthermore, the Commission is not bound to any negotiating mandate in its 
consultations with the SAP countries. The key role granted to the Commission in drafting 
these documents further reinforces its position in the pre-accession process.112   
 
 Action plans 
 
The elaboration of action plans is in the hands of the Commission and – since recently – 
also of the EEAS, who act without any particular negotiating mandate. Action plans are 
non-legally binding instruments; thus, the legal requirements of the negotiating 
procedure of article 218 TFEU is by-passed.113 However, this approach might take a 
different turn in light of the latest discussions on the choice of legal base for action 
plans,114 and in light of the Court’s judgment in Council v. Commission which establishes 
the obligation to comply with the principles of conferral and institutional balance 
irrespective of whether the act negotiated with a third country is binding.115 The 
procedure for the adoption of action plans is currently spelled out in EEAS internal self-
imposed guidelines116 and in the Council Decisions concluding the agreements between 
the Union and each neighbouring state – at least to the extent that they regulate the 
procedure to be followed by the Union before the formal adoption of the action plan in the 
joint bodies.117  
 Theoretically, action plans should be drafted in collaboration between the EU and 
each ENP state, and it is the joint body set up by the agreements concluded by the EU with 
                                                          
112 D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-accession Conditionality in the Fields 
of Democracy and the Rule of Law (Alphen aan Den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008), at 75. 
113 M. Cremona, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: More than a Partnership?’ in M. Cremona (eds.), 
Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), 245, at 276. 
114 Section 3.1 on action plans.  
115 The case Council v. Commission discusses the obligation on the side of the Union to respect the principles 
of conferral and institutional balance for non-binding international agreements. Even if action plans are not 
strictly speaking non-binding international agreements, the obligation to respect a principled approach 
should extend to all forms of non-binding acts concluded with third states. The case will be further discussed 
under the heading ‘Memoranda of Understanding’. Case C-660/13 Council v. Commission, EU:C:2016:616, 
para. 46. 
116 EEAS, Non-Paper: Guidelines for Future ENP Action Plan 05.01.2012, Access to Documents request SG1 - 
Corporate Board Secretariat; EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request 
GESTDEM reference 2013/5084.  
117 E.g. ‘The position to be taken by the Community in the context of the Association Council and of the 
Association Committee, is to be defined by the Council, on the proposal of the Commission, or, if the case 
arises by the Commission, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Treaties’. Article 2(1), Council 
Decision 2006/356 of 14 February 2006 concerning the conclusion of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement 
establishing an Association between the Community and its Member States of the one part, and the Republic 
of Lebanon on the other part, OJ [2006] L 143/1, 30.05.2006.  
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each ENP country that endorses them as recommendations.118 However, to what extent 
the drafting of the action plans is done in collaboration with the third country is very case 
specific. With some countries there are real negotiations while with some others this is 
not an option since they do not even have the technical expertise to engage in such 
negotiations. When this is the case, the EU team can shape action plans in line with its 
willingness and political drive and appetite.119 Therefore, the negotiation of the action 
plans raises some doubts as to what extent the formal position of the third country is 
respected. For example, in the case of the first action plan concluded with Ukraine, Hillion 
writes that ‘the content of the drafts forwarded to the Ukrainian authorities, and the EU 
position during the ‘negotiations’ were essentially the product of the Commission’s own 
initiative’.120 Van Vooren writes that the Commission, in an effort to reinforce the idea that 
action plans are not treaty, steadily used the term ‘consultations’ between the institutions 
and the third countries instead of term ‘negotiations’.121 If on the one hand this choice was 
made to underline the ‘political nature’ of the process, on the other the term consultation 
places the third country in a position of subordination. The third country is consulted; it 
does not actively negotiate the act.  
 
 Progress reports 
 
The procedures regulating the drafting and the adoption of progress reports are entirely 
regulated by Commission’s (for the SAP) and EEAS’ (for the ENP) self-imposed 
guidelines.122 Progress reports are written in close cooperation with EU delegations in 
third countries, which are also responsible for preparing the first draft.123 Progress 
                                                          
118 EEAS, Non-Paper: Guidelines for Future ENP Action Plan 05.01.2012, Access to Documents request SG1 - 
Corporate Board Secretariat; EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request 
GESTDEM reference 2013/5084.  
119 Interview with Commission official from the Legal Service, 24.04.2015, e-mail exchange. 
120 C. Hillion, ‘The EU’s Neighbourhood Policy Towards Eastern Europe’, in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau 
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315. 
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122 EEAS, Non-Paper: Guidelines for Future ENP Action Plan 05.01.2012, Access to Documents request SG1 - 
Corporate Board Secretariat; EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request 
GESTDEM reference 2013/5084; European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, Guidance 
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123 EEAS, Non-Paper: Guidelines for Future ENP Action Plan 05.01.2012, Access to Documents request SG1 - 
Corporate Board Secretariat; EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request 
GESTDEM reference 2013/5084. 
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reports, however, undergo numerous reviews before they are made public, to the extent 
that EEAS and Commission officials in the delegations barely recognize their first draft 
once the reports are published.124 During the process of drafting progress reports 
numerous stakeholders are required to provide inputs at different stages in the 
process.125 The same reports specify that they are based on many sources which include: 
contributions from the governments, from the EU Member States, reports by the 
European Parliament and information from various international and non-governmental 
organisations.126 In this respect, it should be highlighted that decisions as to which 
associations should be consulted and whose suggestions should be accepted conceal 
political and value judgments. Overall, progress reports are the result of ingenious work 
on the part of the Commission and of the EEAS, which often found themselves in the 
position to fill with content criteria that they were required to monitor (e.g. the rule of 
law, democracy, etc.)127 by drawing inspiration also from international sources (e.g. the 
OECD).128 Furthermore, the Commission and the EEAS decide how to monitor compliance, 
leaving open the question as to why it chooses to use certain instruments as benchmarks. 
The discretion is also visible when comparing human rights compliance in the progress 
reports across the SAP countries. The progress reports cover almost all the same rights 




                                                          
124 Interviews with EEAS and Commission officials at the European Delegation in Sarajevo, 16.07.2013, 
Sarajevo. 
125 European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, Guidance Note Enlargement package 2015, 
Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2016/450.  
126 ‘The report is based on information gathered and analysed by the Commission. Many sources have been 
used, including contributions from the government of Albania, the EU Member States, European Parliament 
reports and information from various international and nongovernmental organisations.’ Commission Staff 
Working Document Albania 2014 Report of 8 October 2014, Accompanying the Commission 
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Package 2014, Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2013/5084. 
127 D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-accession Conditionality in the Fields 
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128 E.g. OECD (1999), “European Principles for Public Administration”, SIGMA Papers, No. 27, OECD 
Publishing. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kml60zwdr7h-en> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
129 See Annex I. 
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 Memoranda of Understanding 
 
The conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding should not differ too much from the 
conclusion of international agreements. In France v. Commission the Court made clear that 
the non-binding nature of an act cannot be utilised to avoid the principle of conferred 
power or institutional balance. 130 This approach was confirmed by the Court in Council v. 
Commission a case concerning the distribution of powers between the Council and the 
Commission as regards approving and authorizing the signature of an addendum to a MoU 
between the Union and Switzerland.131 The Court of Justice – in line with Advocate 
General Sharpston’s opinion –132 is of the view that the initial Council decision authorizing 
negotiations for a MoU does not extinguish the Council’s power under article 16(1) TEU 
to decide whether or not the Union should become a party to the instrument resulting 
from those negotiations and sign it.133 This is applicable even if the content of the non-
binding agreement negotiated by the Commission with a third country corresponds to the 
negotiating mandate given by the Council. The Court stresses how the signature of a non-
binding agreement entails the assessment by the Union of whether: 
 
‘the agreement still reflects its interest, as defined by the Council in particular in the 
decision to open negotiations on the conclusion of the agreement. That assessment 
requires, inter alia, verification of the actual content of the non-binding agreement 
resulting from negotiations with a third country […] and that content cannot be 
determined in advance or predicted when the decision to start such negotiations is 
made.’134 
 
Therefore, according to the Court the decision as to whether or not to approve and sign a 
non-binding international agreement with a third state belongs to the Council. However, 
practice shows that the procedure has not always been clear.  
If one takes a close look at the examples of MoUs within the wider neighbourhood 
context it is not always clear who was involved in the negotiations, who are the signatories 
of the documents, and for which subject areas this measure could be used. A MoU on a 
strategic partnership on energy was concluded by the Union with Egypt with the aim of 
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132 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 26 November 2015 on Case C-660/13 Council v. 
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gradually integrating Egypt’s energy market with that of the EU.135 The MoU was signed 
by the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, the 
Commissioner for Energy, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt. The signature of 
the Presidency of the Council of the European Union was foreseen but not made. 
Differently, a very similar MoU on a strategic partnership in the field of energy between 
the EU and Azerbaijan was eventually signed by the Presidency of the European Council, 
the President of the Commission and the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Contrary 
to these examples, the latest MoUs have been adopted internally as Commission 
implementing decisions. For example, the Commission – on the basis of a European 
Parliament and Council joint decision on macro financial assistance to Tunisia – adopted, 
in accordance with the examination procedure and in agreement with the Tunisian 
authorities,136 a MoU clearly spelling out the conditions for the provision of Union macro-
financial assistance to the third country (e.g. economic and financial conditions, structural 
reforms, etc.).137 Another example of a MoU concluded by the Union with an ENP state is 
the one between the EU and Belarus on a Mobility Partnership.138 The MoU was adopted 
as a Commission Decision using as legal base articles 49 TFEU and 17 TEU.139 The actual 
text of the MoUs is found in the annexes of the decisions.  
This post-Lisbon practice, does not seem to fit comfortably with the Court’s decision 
in Council v. Commission. In the case of the Swiss MoU discussed in Council v. Commission 
the Council did not explicitly empower the Commission to adopt the addendum; it only 
granted the Commission the power to negotiate it.140 However, in the case of the MoUs 
granting macro financial assistance to Tunisia and Ukraine, the Council – together with 
                                                          
135 Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Partnership on Energy between the European Union and 
the Arab Republic of Egypt, available at: <http://eeas.europa.eu/egypt/docs/mou_energy_eu-
egypt_en.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
136 Comitology examination procedure of Article 5 Regulation No. 182/2011 of the European Parliament 
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Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, OJ [2011] L55/13, 28.02.2011.  
137 Article 3(1), Decision (EU) 534/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
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the Parliament – empowered the Commission to adopt such act.141 Does this difference 
have any implication in respect of the approach taken by the Court? In my view the answer 
remains unclear. The macro financial assistance MoUs have political and legal 
consequences for the Union (and possibly the Member States); thus, in accordance with 
the Court’s line of argument, the Council is under the obligation to check whether the 
content of the agreement and any relevant constraints have been respected by the 
Commission during the negotiations (before the Union signs it). However, if the joint 
Council and Parliament decisions (empowering the Commission to adopt the MoU) are 
interpreted as to imply that the Council has lost its prerogative to decide if the instrument 
resulting from the negotiations is in line with its mandate, then the Commission can adopt 
MoUs without the final approval of the Council. Whether this is the case or not, other 
questions also still remain unanswered: is the comitology examination procedure enough 
to guarantee Council supervision? What about the Parliament? Shouldn’t it also have the 
obligation to check whether the Commission respected the relevant constraints in the 
final deal?  
Despite the debate over the correct distribution of powers between the Commission 
and the Council, this discussion highlights how the lack of clear rules as to the exercise of 
power externally through administrative arrangements has the potential to create legal 
uncertainty within and outside the Union. For example, annulling the MoU between the 
Union and Belarus – due to the unclear rules – has the potential of delaying and potentially 
stopping the processes initiated by the EU to provide mobility for the citizens of Belarus.  
 
4.2 Financing the agenda for action: is there an easier way? 
 
 Commission implementing acts 
 
As established by the IPA II and ENI regulations, strategy papers and annual programming 
documents are Commission implementing acts (article 291 TFEU),142 and they are 
                                                          
141 Article 3(1), Decision (EU) 2015/601 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 April 2015 
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adopted in accordance with Comitology examination procedure.143 Annual Country 
Action Programmes both for the SAP and the ENP states are also adopted in accordance 
with Comitology examination procedure.144 The Comitology examination procedure 
requires that a qualified majority of the Committee members – either of the IPA II 
Committee or of the ENI Committee – approve the text of the documents. 145 As already 
mentioned, the IPA II and ENI regulatory frameworks are complemented by the 
regulation laying down common rules and procedures on the implementation of Union’s 
external financial assistance (Regulation No. 236/20114). In some cases, these three 
regulations communicate well with one another; in others the synergy tends to create 
confusion. For example, the annual action programmes are envisaged by Regulation No. 
236/20114; however, no reference to these instruments is found in IPA II and ENI. 
Alongside this regulatory framework, the Commission, together with the EEAS for the 
ENP, adopted internal guidelines on how to produce strategy papers and annual 
programming documents.146 The purpose of these guidelines is to complement the 
regulatory framework and other relevant references on aspects related to programming 
of financial assistance. Finally, the Commission also adopted two Commission 
implementing regulations establishing specific rules for the implementation of the IPA II 
financial assistance and the ENI cross-border projects.147 These documents regulate the 
                                                          
[2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014; and article 7, Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] 
L77/30, 15.03.2014.  
143 Article 5, Regulation (EU) No. 182/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council laying down the 
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144 Article 2, Regulation No 236/2014 of 11 March 2014 laying down common rules and procedures for the 
implementation of the Union's instruments for financing external action, OJ [2014] L77/95, 15.03.2014.   
145 Article 13, Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014; and 
article 15, Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014. 
146 IPA II Programming Guide (comprehensive set of guidance documents and tools) access to documents 
denied, Access to Documents request GESTDEM 2016/451; however, a Quick Guide to IPA II Programming 
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GESTDEM reference 2016/451, also available at: <http://abdigm.meb.gov.tr/projeler/ois/014.pdf> or 
<http://www.evropa.gov.rs/Documents/Home/DACU/12/78/248/ipa-quickguide_v0%202.pdf> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016); Instruction for the Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument 
(ENI) 2014-2020, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/ENI%20programming%20instructions.pdf (Consulted 
on 07.08.2016). 
147 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 447/2014 of 2 May 2014 on the specific rules for 
implementing Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an 
Instrument of pre-accession assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L 132/32, 03.05.2014; Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 897/2014 of 18 August 2014 laying down specific provisions for the implementation of 
cross-border cooperation programmes financed under Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European 
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actual methods of implementation of the funds, once strategy papers and annual action 
programmes are adopted.148  
 
4.3 Implementing sector specific objectives: the Commission’s way 
 
 Visa liberalisation 
 
The procedure for the adoption of Visa Liberalisation Action Plans for Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine and for the adoption of Visa Liberalisation Road Maps for the SAP countries 
is specified in the texts of the same documents, under the headline ‘methodology’.149 They 
are based on a ‘tailor made approach combined with good practice developed 
incrementally’.150 The needs identified in the VLAPs and Road Maps are assessed in the 
exploratory phase of the visa liberalisation dialogue, with a gap-analysis based on the 
compliance by partner countries with chapters 23 and 24 of the EU acquis.151 The 
exploratory phase takes into account both the EU ‘fact finding’ missions and the detailed 
information provided by the third countries governments related to the four blocks 
covered by the VLAPs and VL Road Maps.152 Neither the documents themselves, nor the 
access to document request specify whether other sources – despite the governmental 
ones – are used by the Union in collecting information during the ‘fact-finding’ missions. 
 The procedure used in order to draft visa liberalisation progress reports is also 
specified in the texts of the VLAPs and in the ones of the Road Maps and partly in the text 
of the progress reports themselves.153 The VLPRs evaluate the fulfilment of each set of 
benchmarks through on-site evaluations involving experts from EU Member states.154 To 
                                                          
Parliament and the Council establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument, OJ [2014] L 244/12, 
19.08.2014.  
148 The only provision dealing with programming is article 4 of the Commission Implementing Regulation 
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150 Visa Liberation Action Plan Methodology, application for access to documents – GESTDEM reference 
2016/453. 
151 VLAP Methodology, application for access to documents – GESTDEM reference 2016/453. 
152 EU-Georgia Visa Liberalisation Action Plan available at: <http://migration.commission.ge/files/vlap-
eng.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
153 The access to document request inquiring on the procedure of conducting VLPRs did not add anything 
to what is already stated in the documents themselves. 
154 The evaluation missions are focused on blocks that match the stage of advancement in implementation 
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that end, third countries are expected to provide detailed information, including relevant 
statistical data and financial plans to support the implementation of action plans.155 Also 
for progress reports neither the documents themselves, nor the access to document 
request specify whether sources – other than the governmental ones – are used by the 
Union in collecting information.156 
 
 Human rights impact assessments 
 
Human rights impact assessments for trade-related policy initiatives are to be adopted in 
accordance with the latest DG TRADE internal guidelines on the analysis of human rights 
impacts in impact assessment.157 The guidelines are self-imposed rules, and they are 
particularly detailed as to the methodology to be followed when carrying out impact 
assessments. They indicate the normative framework of human rights instruments to be 
used in order to carry out the analysis, the steps to be followed during the first screening 
phase, and the type of approach (quantitative and qualitative) to be adopted in the final 
phase of the analysis.158 The guidelines foresee consultations with stakeholders and 
recognise the link and possible overlap between HRIAs and the various administrative 
activities aimed at implementing overarching policy goals (e.g. ENP progress reports).159 
The ever-evolving administrative structures aimed at implementing the Union external 
                                                          
by the services of the Commission and the European External Action Service, including the EU Delegation 
to Georgia’. First Commission Progress Report on the Implementation by Georgia of the Action Plan on Visa 
Liberalisation of 15 November 2013, COM(2013) 808 final. 
155 EU-Moldova Visa Liberalisation Action Plan available at: <http://www.enpi-
info.eu/library/content/action-plan-visa-liberalisation-moldova> (Consulted on 07.08.2016); EU/Georgia 
Visa Liberalisation Action Plan available at: <http://migration.commission.ge/files/vlap-eng.pdf> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
156 The Kosovo VLPR specify that the report draws upon ‘reports submitted by the Kosovo government, 
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and submitted by Member States.’ Third Commission Report on Progress by Kosovo in fulfilling the 
requirements of the visa liberalization roadmap of 18 December 2015, COM(2015) 906 final. 
157 ‘Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy 
initiatives’, available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
158 ‘Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy 
initiatives’, available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016), 4-11. 
159 ‘Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy 
initiatives’, available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016), at 7. 
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action start to recognise one another across policies. Finally, the DG TRADE guidelines are 
further supported by the better regulation package.160   
 
5. Sectorial organisation, institution and structures 
 
The Commission, together with the EEAS, are the main bodies responsible for drafting the 
administrative activities implementing the SAP and the ENP. The Directorate General 
responsible for coordinating and implementing the ENP and the SAP is the Directorate 
General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Relations (DG NEAR).161 DG NEAR – 
alongside the EEAS – works closely with other Directorate Generals (DGs) in charge of 
thematic priorities (e.g. DG for Regional and Urban Policy, DG for Employment Social 
Affairs and Inclusion, DG for Agriculture and Rural Development, etc.) and with the 
Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), which 
is responsible for the implementation of the ENP financial support under the ENI. The 
Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) and DG TRADE, are 
responsible for the implementation of sector-specific policies like visa liberalisation and 
human rights impact assessments.  
The EEAS is a sui generis organ that is neither legislative nor judicial in nature; it 
constitutes a novel kind of administrative body. It is not a fully-fledged EU institution, but 
at the same time it is more than an agency or mere advisory body.162 The EEAS does not 
work in isolation: it is closely linked to the work of the High Representative by being 
placed under her authority and by assisting her in her various functions.163 The EEAS’ 
substantive powers can only be defined by looking at the definition of the HR’s 
mandate.164 The most strongly formulated tasks of the HR are those of conducting the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), coordinating the EU external action, 
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Stage after the Lisbon Treaty: External Action and the External Action Service’, in Global Administrative Law: 
The Case Book, edited by S. Cassese, B. Carotti, L. Casini, E. Cavalieri, and E. MacDonald, Institute for 
International Law and Justice, (IRPA and IILJ: New York 2012), at 21. 
163 Articles 1(3) and 2(1), Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of 
the European External Action Service (2010/427/EU). 
164 B. Van Vooren, ‘A Legal-Institutional Perspective on the European External Action Service’, 48 Common 
Market Law Review 2011, at 489. 
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ensuring its unity and effectiveness, implementing the decisions of the European Council, 
and finally proposing decisions in relation to the Common Security Defence Policy 
(CSDP).165   
The Commission is the main institution responsible for drafting the instruments 
implementing the SAP; nonetheless, the EEAS is also involved in the implementation of 
the Union’s policy towards the Western Balkans to the extent that it supports the 
coordination of the Union’s external action, and to the extent that it contains CFSP and 
CSDP aspects.166 The Commission and the EEAS work more closely in the implementation 
of the ENP. The ENP progress reports are Commission and EEAS documents; likewise, 
ENP strategy papers and annual programming documents – even if they are adopted as 
Commission Implementing Decisions – are Commission and EEAS documents. Moreover, 
the EEAS adopts internal guidelines for itself and the Commission on how to adopt ENP 
progress reports and action plans.167 Action plans are presented by the Commission to 
the Council, thus, it is rather striking that the guidelines on their adoption are adopted by 
the EEAS. The EEAS under article 9 of the decision establishing the service is empowered 
to prepare Commission Decisions regarding the development of the programming 
cycle.168 As already pointed out by Van Vooren, the power given to the EEAS, in the 
identification and prioritization of funding priorities aimed at implementing the Union’s 
policy objectives, entails significant policy discretion – well beyond the scope of the 
Meroni doctrine.169 The precise division of competences between the EEAS and the 
Commission when implementing the SAP and ENP is agreed in accordance with internal 
arrangements; however, this distribution is not always sharply delineated. The unclear 
division of tasks between the Commission and the EEAS is reflected in the administrative 
activities implementing the two wider neighbourhood policies. The Commission and the 
                                                          
165 See articles 18(2)(3), 26(2)(3), 27(1), and 42(4) TEU. 
166 See the EEAS website, ‘EU Relations with the Western Balkans’, available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/western_balkans/index_en.htm> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
167 EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2013/5084; 
EEAS, Non-Paper: Guidelines for Future ENP Action Plan 05.01.2012, Access to Documents request SG1 - 
Corporate Board Secretariat; EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request 
GESTDEM reference 2013/5084. 
168 Article 9, Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European 
External Action Service (2010/427/EU), L 201/30 [2010], 03.08.2010. 
169 B. Van Vooren, ‘A Legal-Institutional Perspective on the European External Action Service’, 48 Common 
Market Law Review 2011, at 491. 
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EEAS staff working on the SAP and ENP are organised between the headquarters in 
Brussels and the Union Delegations in third countries.170  
Alongside the Commission and the EEAS staff, there are other actors providing 
inputs to the drafting of the different administrative acts and measures implementing the 
Union’s wider neighbourhood policies. The ‘unbounded administration’171 taking part in 
the ENP decision making process varies from third countries’ governments, international 
organisations, civil society, and non-governmental organisations (international and 
local). All these actors are required – either by positive law or in accordance with 
administrative self-imposed guidelines –172 to participate at different stages and to 
different extents in the development and implementation of the SAP and ENP 
administrative acts and measures. The involvement of these actors is, however, not 
always proceduralised and harmonised. The Union administration creates with these 
actors information networks. The presence of this ‘unbounded administration’ raises 
some important questions as to the formal position of third countries in the decision 
making process,173 and to the role granted to civil society and international organisations. 
In other words: who is invited? To what extent is their view taken into consideration? 
Finally, it is important to point out how international organisations such as the 
United Nations (and its agencies), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and some international NGOs are 
external to the institutional set up of the Union but formally associated therewith by 
reasons of their common specific interests in the SAP and ENP countries.174 Alongside 
                                                          
170 Both an official from the EEAS and an official from the Commission working in Brussels on the ENP 
shared the view that despite internal arrangements on the division of tasks, their everyday work did not 
strictly follow the division of competences envisaged. Interviews conducted on 18.11.2013 and 19.11.2013, 
Brussels. The same holds true also for the Union delegations in third countries. During two interviews at 
the EU delegation in Sarajevo, it was clear that the staff of the delegation itself could differentiate between 
EEAS and Commission staff. Interviews conducted on 16.07.2013, Sarajevo.  
171 Curtin defines these actors as ‘administration unbounded’, i.e. ‘the practice of actors other than the 
administration as such being included in a process of reaching decisions’. D. Curtin, Executive Power of the 
European Union: Law, Practices, and Living Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009), at 19. 
172 E.g. article 4(5), Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30; and EEAS, 
Guidance Note ENP Package 2014 (section on sources, inputs and consultations), Access to Documents 
request GESTDEM reference 2013/5084. 
173 M. Maresceau, ‘Pre-accession’, in M. Cremona (eds.), The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2003), at 33.  
174 E.g. article 5(4), Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30; and EEAS, 
Guidance Note ENP Package 2014 (section on sources, inputs and consultations), Access to Documents 
request GESTDEM reference 2013/5084. 
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institutionalised forms of interaction, officials both in Brussels and in the EU delegations 
in third countries tend to create with these international actors epistemic communities 
which try to go beyond their formal professional role as a group. Finding themselves in a 
‘bubble’, individuals and groups interact, reason and judge within the boundaries of their 
established, albeit dynamic, knowledge. They are often able to determine common 
agendas – which are then reflected in the Union’s external administrative activities – with 
the aim of persuading decision makers in third countries to change their policy goals.175 
Given the global emphasis on knowledge in power, the episteme takes the appearance of 




This chapter described in detail the various administrative measures aimed at 
implementing the Union’s primary political choice towards its neighbouring states. The 
acts were grouped into three categories according to their main task. The three categories 
of instruments exemplify two different ways in which administrative power is exercised. 
The administrative power in setting an agenda for action (i.e. action plans, progress 
reports, MoUs, etc.) and in achieving sector-specific objectives (i.e. VLAPs, VLPRs, and 
HRIAs) is rather left unguided. Conversely, the administrative power financing the agenda 
for action (i.e. strategy papers and annual programming documents) is characterised by 
overregulation.  
 The regulatory gaps as to the procedures and parameters that the administration 
has to respect when setting the agenda for action and in implementing sector-specific 
objectives left the administration wide open to acting in a discretionary and unregulated 
fashion. Vague, general, or ambiguous parameters aimed at creating and guiding the 
administrative power inevitably grant the administration broad manoeuvring space.177 
Moreover, the lack of clear rules generates instability and uncertainty. The legal value and 
form of the administrative instruments was modified again and again over time: from 
                                                          
175 M.K.D. Cross, ‘Rethinking epistemic communities twenty years later’, 39 Review of International Studies 
2013, at 147.  
176 It is worth emphasising that epistemes that inform global governance are not simply reducible to the 
material power of and interests of dominant states, because they are embedded in institutions who 
participate in global politics. E. Adler and S. Bernstein, ‘Knowledge in power: the epistemic construction of 
global governance’, in M. Barnett and R. Duvall, Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2005), 294, at 317.  
177 R. B. Steward, ‘The Reformation of American Administrative Law’, 88 Harvard Law Review 1975, at 1676. 
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legally binding adopted according to formal procedures, to non-legally binding adopted 
informally, and then again to privilege bindingness and formality (e.g. for action plans and 
MoUs). Furthermore, regulatory lacunas incentivised the development of a thick net of 
self-imposed rules which often yielded paradoxical results. For example, the EEAS 
developed guidelines on how action plans should be prepared although formally they 
should be drafted and presented by the Commission to the Council. The approach taken 
by the legislator and the Council not to guide the exercise of administrative power in 
achieving the overall goals and the sector-specific goals of the SAP and the ENP seems to 
rest on two beliefs. The first of these is that greater flexibility is preferred over clear rules 
as to the way the Commission execute the Union’s objectives externally. The second is the 
belief that, despite the relevance of administration action, the realm of external relations 
is governed by politics. However, such beliefs are slowly being challenged. The dispute 
between the Council and the Commission as to who is empowered to adopt MoUs is one 
example.  
Conversely, the adoption of strategy papers and annual programming documents 
(instruments aimed at financing the agenda for action) is characterised by overregulation, 
which often seems to lead to greater confusion. Despite the poor bridges between the 
different instruments administering the IPA II and ENI regulatory frameworks, the 
abundant presence of vague objectives and priorities that should receive financial 
assistance does not help the administration in exercising its power in a linear manner. 
The bulk of regulations indicating to the Commission the exact steps to be taken in order 
to choose the projects to be financed promotes the idea that EU administration is bound 
by clear and ascertainable rules and are not engaged in the political process of adjusting 
a range of conflicting claims. As Chiti suggests, such an approach to ‘EU administrative 
action is contrary to the reality of contemporary administrative systems, which cannot 
escape the task of implementing open-ended legislations and of making choices among 
competing interests.’178  
The nature of the administrative power in implementing the SAP and the ENP (non-
linear, discretionary, and informal) should not be perceived as bad per se, especially 
within the context of a policy which is not strictly reliant on scientific choices. It should 
rather be recognised and guided by relevant rules and principles. Finally, the 
                                                          
178 E. Chiti, ‘Is EU Administrative Law Failing in Some of Its Crucial Tasks?’, European Law Journal, 
(forthcoming). 
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administrative power does not present significant differences as to how it is exercised in 
the SAP and ENP: it does not markedly reflect the difference in policy goals.179 The 
analysis commenced by this chapter as to the characteristics of the administrative power 
externally is completed by chapter III, which focuses on the addresses and impact of the 
administrative action.  
                                                          
179 As already discussed action plans are not always genuinely negotiated with third states, and the principle 
of joint ownership of the process is hardly reconcilable in that the monitoring process via progress reports 
is led by the Commission and the EEAS.  
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Chapter III: Who are the addresses of the external administrative power? 
Acknowledging the impact of external administrative acts and measures 
 
1. From the grammar to the pragmatics of external administrative action 
 
As already discussed in chapter I, the two foundational values of the administrative rule 
of law are driving the exercise of administrative power, and protecting individuals 
affected by it.1 Therefore, in order to fully understand how to guide administrative power 
and protect parties affected, it is essential to analyse its impact, and its addresses. The 
administrative power exercised by the Union in its external action clearly have an impact. 
However, at first glance, such impact seems to be legally irrelevant. In this respect, the 
study of the effects of the administrative power externally needs to bear in mind the 
specificities of the external relation’s domain;2 it might require moving from the ‘grammar 
to the pragmatics’ of the EU administrative action. The power exercised by the activities 
implementing the SAP and the ENP is capable of influencing the policy choices of the 
Union and of third counties and it incurs the risk of raising expectations about the Union’s 
future conduct. The administrative activities implementing the Union’s wider 
neighbourhood policies recreate processes that lead to the adoption of administrative and 
political decisions; they are themselves de facto administrative acts for third states, and 
they are likely to have an impact on the legally protected interests of natural and legal 
persons.  
 The aim of chapter III is to complete the analysis carried out by chapter II by 
empirically identifying the addressees and the impact of the administrative power in the 
SAP and ENP. It is about acknowledging the effects of the ever-increasing administrative 
power in EU external relations. In doing so, the chapter will also describe the de facto 
overarching administrative procedures that are concealed in the modes of foreign 
governance developed by the SAP and the ENP. The impact of the administrative activities 
is neither incidental nor unforeseeable; it is often the outcome of processes crystalised 
over time. The chapter will proceed as follows. First, it analyses with concrete examples 
                                                          
1 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration (London: Hart Publishing 2014), at 
325; H.P. Nehl, ‘Good Administration as procedural right and/or general principle?’, in H.C.H. Hofmann and 
A.H. Türk (eds.), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law Towards and Integrated Administration 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2009), 322, at 343; H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe and A.H. Türk, 
Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), 144-146 and 
149-151; P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), 250-252. 
2 Chapter I, section 4.3. 
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the impact that the administrative activities implementing the SAP and the ENP exercise 
on public power (both within the Union and in third states). Second, the chapter identifies 
and explains the impact that the same administrative activities exercise on natural and 
legal persons by presenting the cases that reached the CJEU in which individuals 
challenged the action (or better, the inaction) of the Commission.   
 
2. The effects of administrative power on the exercise of public authority  
 
The aim of this section is to determine the addresses and the impact of external 
administrative power on the exercise of public authority both within the Union and in the 
neighbouring states. The administrative acts implementing the SAP and the ENP can be 
grouped under two categories: preparatory acts and rule-making instruments (see 
summary tables at the end of the chapter). These categories are valid both internally and 
externally. Preparatory and rule-making instruments arguably belong to some of the most 
influential areas of administrative activity.3  Preparatory acts inform final decisions and 
indicate which topic shall be put on th e policy agenda; rule-making acts – as we will see 
throughout this section – serve different roles. They can ‘organise and systematise, even 
in some cases consolidate or codify, a body of legal rules emanating from diverse 
sources’;4 they may set out ‘uniform conditions for implementing legally binding acts’;5 
and they may indicate which projects the EU is committed to finance or the conditions of 
an MoU concluded with a third state.6 The study of the impact of the administrative power 
goes hand in hand with the study of the internal procedures underlying the two policies. 
 
2.1 In the Union 
 
This sub-section, in presenting the impact that the administrative activities implementing 
the SAP and the ENP have on the exercise of Union’s power, will also identify the 
administrative procedures underlying the two Union’s wider neighbourhood policies.  
                                                          
3 T. Larsson and J. Trondal, ‘Agenda setting in the European Commission: How the European Commission 
Structure and Influence the EU Agenda’, in: H.C.H. Hofmann and A.H. Türk (eds.), EU Administrative 
Governance (Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing 2006), 11-43. 
4 H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe and A.H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2013), at 539. 
5 Article 291 TFEU.  
6 E.g. Commission Implementing Decision of 16 July 2014 approving the Memorandum of Understanding 
between the European Union and Tunisia related to macro-financial assistance to Tunisia, 
C(2014)5176/F1; Commission Implementing Decision of 10 December 2014 adopting an Annual Country 
Action Programme for Montenegro for the year 2014, C(2014) 9387. 
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 Preparatory acts informing final decisions 
 
Progress reports, action plans, impact assessments, etc. are preparatory acts to the extent 
that they inform the adoption of later decisions (e.g. the granting of candidate status, 
opening of accession negotiations, starting negotiations for an agreement with a third 
state, etc.). They exercise pressure on the development of the Union’s power. Formally, 
they are not internal acts within a procedure leading to the adoption of a final act. 
However, over the years the Union, by making constant use of these measures, has 
transformed them into internal acts within de facto procedures, which in most cases lead 
to the adoption of formal decisions.  
SAP progress reports are preparatory acts to the extent that they are used as 
reference documents by the Council in order to determine the next steps to be taken in 
the relations between the Union and each SAP state. This is even more so now that the 
enlargement process is becoming more and more proceduralised. For example, the 
granting of candidate status now represents a new procedural step before opening 
accession negotiations.7 In other words, obtaining candidate status does not 
automatically imply the opening of accession negotiations. The Commission Opinion on 
the accession of Albania to the European Union contains a list of key priorities that needs 
to be fulfilled by the latter in order to commence accession negotiations.8 The key 
priorities identified by the Commission Opinion are monitored by yearly progress 
reports.9 The Council, based on the findings of the progress reports, decided to grant 
candidate status to Albania10 and will later decide when to open accession negotiations.11  
ENP action plans and progress reports are preparatory documents indicating the 
next steps to be taken in the policy implementation framework for each neighbouring 
                                                          
7 On the 24 June 2014 Albania was granted candidate status, whilst as of today (07.08.2016) Albania as not 
yet started accession negotiations. See the following footnotes for reference documents.  
8 Commission Opinion on Albania's application for membership of the European Union of 9 November 2010, 
COM(2010) 680, at. 11. 
9E.g. Commission Progress Report on Albania accompanying the EU Enlargement Strategy of 10 November 
2015, SWD(2015) 213 final. 
10 At the Luxembourg General Affairs Council meeting of 24 June 2014 the EU Member States have agreed – 
based on the recommendation by the European Commission included in the Report from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament on Albania’s Progress in the Fight Against Corruption and 
Organised Crime and in the Judicial Reform of 4 June 2014, COM(2014) 331 final – to grant EU candidate 
status to Albania. 3326th Council meeting General Affairs Luxembourg, 24 June 2014, 11198/14. 
11 ‘Recalling its earlier Council conclusions, including those of June 2014, the Council reiterates that Albania 
will need to meet the five key priorities for the opening of accession negotiations, and that the Commission 
is invited to report, in addition to its 2016 Report, in a comprehensive and detailed manner, on Albania's 
progress on the key priorities.’ Council Conclusion on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association 
Process of 15 December 2015, 15356/15. 
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state. Action plans have been used in order to adopt other administrative acts like visa 
liberalisation action plans, which are based on their Justice and Home Affairs section.12 
Moreover, they have been used by the Commission as reference documents in order to 
suggest to the Council the adoption of domestic legislation, internal EU legislation, or 
bilateral agreements. Examples of this type would be the Galileo agreement with 
Ukraine13 or the Visa Facilitation Agreements in general.14 Action plans are also used as 
legal base for the conclusion of Memoranda of Understandings.15 Thus, in accordance with 
post-Lisbon practice, they might be used as legal base for the adoption of Commission 
decisions and Commission implementing decisions.16 Finally, action plans have also been 
used to justify the conclusion of agreements with ENP states.17 Exploratory MoUs are also 
preparatory documents to the extent that they prepare the ground for concrete 
collaborative actions between the Union and third states.18 
                                                          
12 ‘The Justice and Home Affairs section of the EU-Republic of Moldova ENP Action Plan, in place since 2005, 
provides the overall framework for EU-Republic of Moldova cooperation in the area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice (JLS)’, Visa Liberalisation Action Plan with Moldova, available at: <http://www.enpi-
info.eu/library/content/action-plan-visa-liberalisation-moldova> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
13 The objective of the Galileo Agreement is to encourage, facilitate and enhance cooperation between the 
Union and Ukraine in Civil Global Navigation Satellite System. The agreement entered into force on the 1 
December 2013. However, the official website of the Union does not provide clear indication as to its 
publication on the official journal. 
14 M. Cremona, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: More than a Partnership?’ in M. Cremona (eds.), 
Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxofrd: Oxford University Press 2008) 245, at 276. 
15 E.g. EU-Azerbaijan Action Plan: ‘Implement and monitor regularly the level of implementation of the 
Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the European 
Union and the Republic of Azerbaijan in the field of energy.’; and its respecting Memorandum of 
Understanding: ‘[…] the EU and Azerbaijan have decided to step up their energy co-operation and that EU-
Azerbaijan Action Plan includes energy-related actions and objectives aimed at the gradual convergence of 
EU and Azerbaijan's energy legislation and integration of their respective energy markets.’ EU-Azerbaijan 
Action Plan, available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/azerbaijan_enp_ap_final_en.pdf> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016). 
16 Chapter II, section 4.1.  
17 ‘In July 2005, the EU-Morocco Association Council adopted an Action Plan of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy including a specific provision having the objective of the further liberalisation of 
trade in agricultural products, processed agricultural products, fish and fishery products.’ Council Decision 
of 8 March 2012 on the conclusion of an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the 
European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricultural 
products, processed agricultural products, fish and fishery products, the replacement of Protocols 1, 2 and 
3 and their Annexes and amendments to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association 
between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, 
of the other part (2012/497/EU), OJ [2012] L 241/2, 07.09.2012. 
18 ‘Both sides will set up cooperation in the areas of energy technology and exchange of expertise, including 
technical support for the EU-Azerbaijan Strategic Partnership in energy. The possibilities for cooperation 
in this field (to be defined jointly) include: twinning of future Azerbaijan regulatory bodies with EU 
regulatory bodies in the field of energy; introduction of modern European technology into the Azerbaijan 
energy sector; exchange expertise regarding security and safety in the field of energy.’ Memorandum of 
Understanding on a Strategic Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Azerbaijan in 
the fields of Energy, available at: 
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The same analysis holds true also for Visa Liberalisation Action Plans and Visa 
Liberalisation Progress Reports. They are preparatory acts to the extent that they lead to 
the adoption of a final decision: removing the third state from the list of countries whose 
citizens must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders. Moreover, 
they work as safeguards in making sure that all required reforms are carried out by the 
neighbouring states before enjoying visa-free regime. VLAPs are drafted, the Commission 
closely monitors their implementation through its VLPRs, and finally suggests to the 
Council and the European Parliament to adopt a single case measure delisting the third 
state – once it has successfully adopted all the necessary reforms. The adoption of VLAPs 
and VLPRs de facto proceduralises the process leading to the acceptance of a third state 
in the Union visa-free regime. The preamble of the regulation de-listing the Republic of 
Moldova from the list of countries whose citizens must be in possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders clearly shows the link between the VLAPs and the final 
decision of delisting: 
 
‘[…] the Commission considers that the Republic of Moldova meets all the benchmarks 
set out in the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan.’19 
 
Human rights impact assessments are preparatory documents to the extent that 
they provide a structured approach to gathering and analysing evidence before the 
European Commission proposes a new policy initiative.20  Impact Assessments, with their 
section on human rights, are Commission staff working documents which accompany the 
Commission’s recommendations for a Council Decision authorising the opening of 
negotiations of an agreements between the EU and a third state.21 The Union has over the 
years proceduralised the adoption of HRIAs as a necessary step before adopting an 
agreement with a third state. The obligation to adopt HRIAs has been so far a matter of 
                                                          
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/international/regional/caucasus_central_asia/memorandum
/doc/mou_azerbaijan_en.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
19 Regulation (EU) No 259/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of 
visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, OJ 
[2014] L 105/9, 08.04.2014. 
20 ‘Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy 
initiatives’, available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
21 Commission Staff Working Document of 12 February 2014 on ‘Impact Assessment Report on the EU-
Myanmar/Burma Investment Relations accompanying the recommendation for a Council Decision 
authorising the opening of negotiations on an agreement between the European Union and 
Myanmar/Burma on investment protection’, COM(2014) 84 final. 
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discretion of the Commission which has imposed on itself internal guidelines.22 However, 
the General Court, in a recent case that will be discussed in section 3 of this chapter, seems 
to have introduced an obligation on the side of the institutions to carry out human rights 
impact assessments before concluding an agreement with a third state.23 In other words, 
the Court in the Front Polisario case seems to have crystalized a de facto procedure by 
imposing on Union institutions an obligation to carry out a human rights impact 
assessment before concluding an agreement. 
Figure 1 tries to visualize the impact of the administrative instruments 
implementing the SAP and the ENP described so far. The latter are preparatory acts 
leading to either single-case decisions or to new policy implementation measures within 
de facto procedures. 
 











Progress reports, action plans, impact assessments, etc. not only fulfill a preparatory 
function within the de facto procedures just explained; they are also used as reference 
documents for the adoption of other EU acts. In other words, they are also instrumental 
                                                          
22 Chapter II, section 3.3. 
23 ‘[T]he Council must examine, carefully and impartially, all the relevant facts in order to ensure that the 
production of goods for export is not conducted to the detriment of the population of the territory 
concerned, or entails infringements of fundamental rights, including, in particular, the rights to human 
dignity, to life and to the integrity of the person (Articles 1 to 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), the 
prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 5 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), the freedom to 
choose an occupation and right to engage in work (Article 15 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), the 
freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), the right to property 
(Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), the right to fair and just working conditions and the 
prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights).’ Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 
228. 
Preparatory Acts 
- SAP Progress Reports 
- ENP Action Plans 
- VLAPs and VL Progress 
Reports 
- HRIAs 
Council Conclusions may 
be an intermediate step 
before the final act or 
they may contain 
intermediate decisions. 




- Opening of accession 
negotiations 
- Granting benefits  
- De-listing a third 
country from the EU’s 
visa regime 
- Open negotiations for a 
new agreement 
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for the achievement of other Union administrative and legislative activities. Hereby, some 
examples are presented. 
European partnerships, action plans and progress reports inform and steer the 
strategising and programming of financial assistance for both the SAP and the ENP. They 
are used in order to legitimise the Commission’s choices in the distribution of financial 
assistance funds. Both IPA II and the ENI (as their predecessors IPA and ENPI)24 make a 
clear reference in their policy framework article to the SAP and ENP instruments as being 
sources for guiding the programming of financial assistance.25 For both EU wider 
neighbourhood policies we see that the programming of financial assistance is to take 
duly into account the administrative activities aimed at setting the agenda for the Union’s 
action. The impact of the agenda setting instruments on the programming of financial 
assistance for both the SAP and the ENP is then concretized in their respective 
programming documents.  
The Indicative Strategy Paper for Montenegro (2014-2010) clearly states that: 
 
‘The planning of IPA II assistance for the period 2014-2020 will seek to support the 
implementation of the […] priorities identified in […] the annual Progress Reports 
prepared by the European Commission.’26 
 
Furthermore, progress reports are used as indicators in order to monitor the achievement 
of the objectives identified by the same strategy paper and by the Annual Country Action 
Programme.27 For example, the new IPA II Indicative Strategy Paper for Montenegro for 
                                                          
24 Article 5, Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA), OJ [2006] L 210/82, 31.07.2006; article 3, Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 laying down general provisions establishing a 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, OJ [2006] L 310/1, 09.11.2006.  
25 ‘Assistance under this Regulation shall be provided in accordance with the enlargement policy framework 
defined by the European Council and the Council and shall take due account of the Communication on the 
Enlargement Strategy and the Progress Reports comprised in the annual enlargement package of the 
Commission, as well as of the relevant resolutions of the European Parliament.’ Article 4, Regulation (EU) 
No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument 
for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014; ‘The partnership and cooperation 
agreements, the association agreements and other existing or future agreements that establish a 
relationship with partner countries, corresponding Commission communications, European Council 
conclusions, and Council conclusions, […], constitute the overall policy framework of this Regulation for 
programming and implementing Union support under this Regulation. The key points of reference for 
setting the priorities for Union support under this Regulation and for the assessment of progress as outlined 
in article 2(3) shall be: action plans or other equivalent jointly agreed documents such as the association 
agendas […].’ Article 3, Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014. 
26 Commission Implementing Decision of 18 August 2014 adopting an Indicative Strategy Paper for 
Montenegro (2014-2020), C(2014) 5771. 
27 E.g. ‘The progress reports referred to in Article 4 of the IPA II Regulation shall be taken as a point of 
reference in the assessment of the results of IPA II assistance.’ Commission Implementing Decision of 10 
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the years 2014-2020 states that the Commission progress reports for Montenegro will be 
used – not only as source to identify the priorities for action – but also as sources for the 
indicators to be used in order to monitor whether financial assistance achieved its goals.28 
The Single Support Framework for Georgia (2014-2017) states that the choice of sectors 
of intervention: 
 
‘[…] are in line with the Association Agreement, the Association Agenda, the DCFTA 
and the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan and build upon the progress that Georgia has 
made towards the implementation of the ENP Action Plan priorities.’29  
 
Likewise, the Annual Action Programme for Georgia states that: 
 
‘The action draws its objectives from key features of the current Georgia-EU policy 
dialogue which includes […] the Association Agreement (AA), expected to be signed 
in June 2014 and the Association Agenda.’30 
 
Under the previous ENPI Regulation, progress reports had a peculiar role in the 
‘more for more’ policy in the years 2011-2013. In the context of financial support, the 
Commission decided to set up a specific programme both for the eastern (EAPIC) and 
southern (SPRING) neighbours that would allocate extra financial support only to those 
neighbours taking clear and concrete steps on political reforms. In this context progress 
reports played a significant role. EAPIC and SPRING are two Commission Implementing 
Decisions based on article 13 of the ENPI Regulation.31 Both Commission Implementing 
Decisions stated that the funding available for the programmes will be allocated to 
different partner countries based on the assessment carried out (among others) in the 
most recent ENP progress reports:  
 
‘The assessment will rely inter alia on the most recent ENP Progress Reports, on the 
EU's own evaluation of the most recent developments and on indicators compiled by 
international organisations.’32  
                                                          
December 2014 adopting an Annual Country Action Programme for Montenegro for the year 2014, C(2014) 
9387. 
28 E.g. see Indicative Strategy Paper for Montenegro (2014-2020), adopted on 18.08.2014, 42-43. Available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20140919-csp-montenegro.pdf 
(Consulted on 07.08.2015). 
29 Commission Implementing Decision of 11 June 2014 adopting a Single Support Framework for Georgia 
(2014-2017), C(2014)3994. 
30 Commission Implementing Decision of 14 July 2014 adopting the Annual Action Programme 2014 in 
favour of Georgia to be financed from the general budget of the European Union, C(2014) 5020. 
31 Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 laying 
down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), OJ 
[2006] L310/1, 09.11.2006. 
32 Commission Implementing Decision of 26 June 2012 on ‘the Eastern Partnership Integration and 
Cooperation programme 2012-2013 in favour of the Eastern Neighbourhood to be financed under article 
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The ENP progress reports drafted by the Commission and the EEAS were, thus, used as a 
clear source of information in order to determine how to distribute funding to the ENP 
countries based on the ‘more for more’ principle. This idea of providing more support to 
the ENP state depending on their performance for multi-country umbrella programmes 
like the EAPIC and SPRING has been reintroduced also by the new ENI Regulation which 
(differently from article 13 ENPI) in its article 4(2) makes a clear reference to progress 
reports. 
 
‘[The] share shall be determined according to the progress made by partner countries 
in building deep and sustainable democracy, also taking into account their progress 
in implementing agreed reform objectives contributing to the attainment of that goal. 
The progress of partner countries shall be regularly assessed, in particular by means 
of ENP progress reports which include trends as compared to previous years.’33  
 
Finally, the last two examples of this section try to show how also informal 
administrative activities, conducted with the aim of implementing the Union’s external 
action, can have an impact on the exercise of the Union’s power even when they are not 
tied to de facto procedures. The first example is from the SAP while the second is from the 
ENP. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) concluded by the EU with Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was signed in 2008, and it establishes of a sub-committee on Justice and 
Home Affairs.34 The sub-committee is envisaged in order to have a structured forum 
where the EU institutions and the third country government could debate on crucial 
issues linked to the enhancement of the rule of law. The entrance into force of the SAA 
between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina was postponed until 2015. The Commission 
in 2011, while awaiting the entrance into force of the SAA, decided to establish a structural 
dialogue on Justice in order to cover the issues that should have been covered by the JHA 
sub-committee.35 However, differently from what was foreseen by the SAA for the JHA 
                                                          
19 08 01 03 of the general budget of the European Union’, C(2012) 4170 final; Commission Implementing 
Decision of 26 September 2011 on ‘Support for partnership, reforms and inclusive growth (SPRING) 2011-
2012 in favour of the southern Neighbourhood region to be financed under article 19 of the general budget 
of the European Union’, C(2011)6828. 
33 Article 4(2), Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014. 
34 See website of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina dealing with EU integration and structures 
under the SAP. Available at: 
<http://www.dei.gov.ba/dei/bih_eu/sporazum/strukture/default.aspx?id=9816&langTag=en-US> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2015). The SAA concluded by the Union with Bosnia contains in its article 78 a JHA 
clause. 
35 For more information on the structural dialogue between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina, see: 
<http://europa.ba/Default.aspx?id=87&lang=EN> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
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committee, the structural dialogue guaranteed the participation of non-state actors 
(NGOs, civil society, international organizations, etc.) in the process. Now that the SAA 
with Bosnia and Herzegovina has finally entered into force, and the subcommittee on JHA 
is now established,36 the question still remains as to what role will be given to non-state 
actors that have so far contributed to the structural dialogue. 
The second example is taken from the Front Polisario case.37  In the case, the 
applicant (the Front Polisario)38 explains how the administrative activities of the 
Commission are a clear indication that the agreement between the EU and Morocco will 
also be applicable to the territory of the West Sahara. In other words, the nationalist 
movement claims that the numerous preparatory documents produced by the 
Commission before the conclusion of the agreement are a clear indication that the latter 
will also be applicable to the territory of the West Sahara. The documents referred to by 
the Front Polisario are the ones that prove the numerous visits by the Directorate General 
for Health and Food Safety (DG SANCO) on the territory of West Sahara in order to 
establish whether the Moroccan authorities respect sanitary norms, and the list of 
Moroccan exporters agreed upon in the association agreement with Morocco, which 
includes a total of 140 enterprises which are established on the territory of West Sahara.39 
Preparatory acts have the effect of increasing the predictability of how the Union intends 
to implement its policies towards third countries. Preparatory acts often signal the 
direction in which the Union’s action is intended to be developed.  
 
 Rule-making acts: looking beyond technicalities  
 
The administrative activities implementing the SAP and ENP aimed at strategising and 
programming financial assistance can formally be categorised as ‘subordinate rule-
making’ acts.40 The Commission implementing regulations on the specific rules 
implementing IPA II and the cross-border cooperation programmes financed under ENI 
                                                          
36 See European Council website: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2015/04/21-bih-conclusion-stabilisation-association-agreement/ (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
37 A detailed account of the case is provided in the next section of this chapter. 
38 The Front Polisario is a nationalist movement for the liberation of West Sahara born in 1973 to fight the 
Spanish occupation and subsequently engaged in the fight against the new occupiers – Mauritania and 
Morocco. In the past 25 years the movement has been at the forefront of the UN negotiations over the 
juridical status of the region. 
39 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, paras 79 and 80. 
40 H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe and A.H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2012), Chapter 15. 
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are clear examples of Commission rule-making activities establishing uniform conditions 
for the implementation of IPA II and ENI.41 These rule-making acts affect the exercise of 
Union’s public power to the extent that they indicate in detail the rules and procedures to 
be followed when implementing financial support covering, among others, financial 
management, monitoring, evaluation and reporting, transparency and visibility.42 
Multi-annual strategy papers and annual programming documents are Commission 
implementing decisions aimed at regulating how the disbursement of the Union’s 
financial assistance will be managed for each neighbouring state. The actual text of the 
Commission implementing decisions adopting the multi-annual strategy papers for each 
SAP and ENP state is a sole article which states that the indicative strategy paper for a 
specific country is adopted and can be found attached to the decision.43 The text of the 
Commission implementing decisions adopting the country annual action programme for 
each SAP and ENP state regulates in three to four articles the maximum financial 
contribution, the budget-implementation modalities, and the possibility of the 
responsible authorizing office to adopt non-substantial changes to the decision itself.44 If 
the actual text of the Commission implementing decisions is not very detailed as to the 
programming of financial assistance, the actual substance of the acts can be found in their 
annexes. The annexes do not seem to fit comfortably the definition of implementing acts;45 
however, they are more than preparatory measures since they set mandatory guidelines 
as to how financial assistance shall be disbursed for each SAP and ENP country.  
                                                          
41 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 447/2014 of 2 May 2014 on the specific rules for 
implementing Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an 
Instrument of pre-accession assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L 132/32, 03.05.2014; Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 897/2014 of 18 August 2014 laying down specific provisions for the implementation of 
cross-border cooperation programmes financed under Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European 
Parliament and the Council establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument, OJ [2014] L 244/12, 
19.08.2014. 
42 Article 1, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 447/2014 of 2 May 2014 on the specific rules 
for implementing Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing 
an Instrument of pre-accession assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L 132/32, 03.05.2014. 
43 E.g. ‘Sole Article The Indicative Strategy Paper for Montenegro for the period 2014-2020 attached to the 
present Decision is hereby adopted.’, Commission Implementing Decision of 18 August 2014 adopting an 
Indicative Strategy Paper for Montenegro (2014-2020), C(2014) 5771; Commission Implementing Decision 
of 11 June 2014 adopting a Single Support Framework for Georgia (2014-2017), C(2014)3994. 
44 E.g. Commission Implementing Decision of 10 December 2014 adopting an Annual Country Action 
Programme for Montenegro for the year 2014, C(2014) 9387; Commission Implementing Decision of 14 
July 2014 adopting the Annual Action Programme 2014 in favour of Georgia to be financed from the general 
budget of the European Union, C(2014) 5020. 
45 Article 291 TFEU establishes that the Commission is granted implementing powers ‘where uniform 
conditions for implementing legally binding acts are needed’.  
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Despite this lack of clarity, the annexes have a significant impact on the exercise of 
Union’s power. The multi-annual strategy documents indicate the priorities and 
objectives of financial assistance (e.g. LGBT support, promotion of reconciliation, 
capacity-building measures for improving law enforcement, etc.); they select the 
indicators to monitor and review performance and they establish the means of 
verification.46 Moreover, the annual action programmes also indicate the specific 
arrangements to disburse financial assistance (e.g. budget support, direct management 
by the EU delegation, indirect management by the IPA II beneficiaries, etc.).47 Multi-
annual and annual priorities for EU financial assistance for each neighbouring state are 
both final acts and preparatory acts. They are final acts in as far as they establish how 
financial assistance shall be disbursed for each SAP and ENP states, whereas they are also 
preparatory acts since based on them other acts will be adopted (e.g. call for tendering, 
grant proposal, budget support, etc.). Figure 2 at page 88 tries to sketch the main 
procedural steps of the financial cycle for each neighbouring state. 
The choices taken by the Commission as to which project and area of cooperation to 
finance are not neutral. As already explained in chapter II, the administration is granted 
significant discretion in selecting which project receives financial support.48 Such 
discretion does not lack impact. An interesting case which was decided by the Court in 
2004 exemplifies the relevance of the power granted to the administration in making such 
choices. The applicants to the case – B. Zaoui, L. Zaoui and D. Zaoui – are relatives of Mrs. 
Zaoui, who died on 27 March 2002 when a Palestinian terrorist carried out an attack on a 
hotel in Israel.49 The applicants affirm that the education in the Palestinian territories in 
the West Bank and in the Gaza strip ‘is the certain and direct causes of the attack which 
cost Mrs Zaoui her life, since that education incites individuals to hatred and terrorism’.50 
In this respect, they brought an action for compensation for damages (article 340 TFEU 
ex-article 288 read in conjunction with article 266 ex-article 233) against the Commission 
                                                          
46 E.g. the annex of Commission Implementing Decision of 18 August 2014 adopting an Indicative Strategy 
Paper for Montenegro (2014-2020), C(2014) 5771; and the annex of Commission Implementing Decision 
of 11 June 2014 adopting a Single Support Framework for Georgia (2014-2017), C(2014)3994. 
47 E.g. the annex of Commission Implementing Decision of 10 December 2014 adopting an Annual Country 
Action Programme for Montenegro for the year 2014, C(2014) 9387; and the annex of Commission 
Implementing Decision of 14 July 2014 adopting the Annual Action Programme 2014 in favour of Georgia 
to be financed from the general budget of the European Union, C(2014) 5020. 
48 Chapter II, section 3.2. 
49 Case C-288/03 B. Zaoui, L. Zaoui and D. Zaoui v. Commission, EU:C:2004:633. 
50 Case T-73/03 B. Zaoui, L. Zaoui and D. Zaoui v. Commission, Application, Notice for the Official Journal. 
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claiming that the Commission, by choosing to participate financially, in the education 
programmes of Palestine is responsible for the damaged caused to them by the terrorist 
attract. According to the applicants, the defendant also infringed other provisions 
applicable to the financial support programmes.51 However, such infringements were not 
discussed by the Court since, according to the action for damage formula, a direct causal 
link could not be established between the harm suffered by the applicants and the action 
of the administration.52 Without entering into the merits of the case, what is important to 
highlight here is the fact that the choice of the Commission to fund educational projects in 
Palestine (rather than e.g. environmental ones) bears important consequence on the 
choices that the Union takes in respect of its external action. The author is not here 
suggesting that only technical and politically neutral projects should be finance by the 
Commission in implementing the Union’s external action. The author is only highlighting 
that the choice as to which projects to finance cannot be conceived as a purely technical 
endeavor. EU administrative law needs to openly face this challenge.  
Other two examples – taken from the Union’s Development Cooperation Policy – 
exemplify how the Commission’s choices as to which projects to finance are not deprived 
of impact. Back in 1988, the European Communities decided to finance a Nature Forest 
Management and Conservation Project in Uganda. The project was part of a wider 
programme of the World Bank. During the implementation of the project, approximately 
35,000 people were violently evicted from the region.53 The Commission denied 
responsibility since it was not the implementing agency. However, scholars have 
highlighted how the project itself was interlinked with the policy of eviction.54 Similarly, 
an EU-financed fauna-managing project aimed at addressing the problem of commercial 
poaching in the forests of the Congo basin caused the destruction of five hunting bases of 
the local population.55 The Court of Auditors special report clearly stated: 
                                                          
51 ‘Articles 6 and 177(2) of the EC Treaty, the principles of sound financial management, the agreements 
entered into between the Communities and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian 
refugees (UNRWA), Article 3 of Regulation No 1488/96/EC, and Amendment No 177 to the 2002 EC General 
Budget.’ Case T-73/03 B. Zaoui, L. Zaoui and D. Zaoui v. Commission, Application, Notice for the Official 
Journal. 
52 Case C-288/03 B. Zaoui, L. Zaoui and D. Zaoui v. Commission, EU:C:2004:633, para. 3. 
53 K. Schmalenbach, ‘Accountability: Who is judging the European Development Cooperation?’, 2 
Europarecht 2008, at 177.  
54 B. Simma, J.B. Aschenbrenner, C. Schulte, ‘Human Rights Considerations in the Development Co-operation 
Activities of the EC’, in P. Alston, M. Bustel, J. Heenan (eds.), The EU and Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1999), 570, at. 618. 
55 Court of Auditors, Special Report No. 6/2006 concerning the environmental aspects of the Commission’s 
development cooperation, together with the Commission’s replies, OJ [2006] C 235/18, 29.09.2006. 
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‘[…] the project designers failed to recognise that most of the local communities were 
also involved in hunting. Because of this, the project had not identified ways to assist 
them.’56 
 
These two examples not only stress the relevance of the Commission’s action, but 






















A final different example of rule-making activities implementing the ENP is the 
Commission Interpretative Notice on indication of origin of goods from the territories 
occupied by Israel since June 1967.58 This interpretative notice produced by the 
Commission aims at providing Member States, economic operators and consumers with 
the necessary information on the indication of origin of products originating from Israeli 
                                                          
56 Court of Auditors, Special Report No. 6/2006 concerning the environmental aspects of the Commission’s 
development cooperation, together with the Commission’s replies, OJ [2006] C 235/18, 29.09.2006. 
57 Section 3 of this chapter.  
58 Commission Interpretative Notice of 11 November 2015 on indication of origin of goods from the 
territories occupied by Israel since June 1967, C(2015) 7834 final.  
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settlements beyond Israel’s 1967 borders.59 The notice clarifies certain elements linked 
to the interpretation and the effective implementation of existing EU legislation. Although 
the interpretative notice states that it reflects the Commission's understanding of the 
relevant Union legislation, that it does not create any new legislative rules, and that its 
enforcement remains the primary responsibility of Member States, it still has the power 
to provide uniform rules on how the products originating in Israeli settlements beyond 
Israel’s 1967 borders shall be labeled. For example, even if the EU officially opposed 
sanctions, NGOs have used the guidelines for promoting boycotting campaigns.60 Here 
again, the author is not suggesting that the Commission Interpretative Notice should have 
not been adopted. The author is rather highlighting that the Notice cannot be conceived 
as a purely technical endeavor, which can be swiftly adopted and published only on the 
website of the EU Delegation to Israel.61 EU administrative law ought to embrace this 
reality.   
 
2.2 In the neighbourhood countries   
 
The process of transformation of Union policies towards its neighbours from the sphere 
of pure politics into a de facto proceduralised process, which clarifies the different steps 
that a third country has to fulfil in order to get closer to the Union, gives the impression 
to third states that the path towards building stronger ties with the EU is carried out in a 
transparent and predictable way. The fact that the instruments do not have as a clear 
addressee the third country should not mislead us. The instruments, even if addressed to 
e.g. the Council, have as main addressee the third country which should follow the 
suggestion made in the document, adopt the standards indicated in the latter, and address 
the lacks identified unless they want to trigger negative sanctions or renounce benefits.62 
Moreover, the guidance offered by progress reports, action plans, MoUs, etc. more often 
than not is to be followed by the neighbouring countries because the advantages of 
                                                          
59 Interpretative notes are examples of administrative rule-makings. See H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe and 
A.H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), at 
555.  
60 Interview with NGO activist from medico international, 26.06.2016 Berlin; also affirmed by NGO Monitor 
‘NGOs, EU "Product Labeling" and BDS Warfare: What Next?’ available at: http://www.ngo-
monitor.org/reports/ngos-eu-product-labeling-and-bds-warfare-what-next/ (Consulted on 07.08.2016).  
61 Interview with official working at Directorate General for Trade, 10.12.2015, Brussels.  
62 For example, adopting the standards and the legislation requested by the Visa Liberalisation Action Plans 
is a first fundamental step in order to obtain a visa liberalisation free regime. However, if lack of progress is 
registered in the way in which a third country implements its e.g. association agenda, the entrance into force 
of the Association Agreement might be postponed.  
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compliance outweigh the costs of non-compliance. Third states will simply have to follow 
the rules of the game and adopt the internationally recognised standards as indicated in 
the SAP and ENP implementing activities if they want to contract international dealings. 
 As already mentioned in chapter I, the adoption of administrative activities has the 
potential to limit the freedom of third states by gradually becoming ‘politically, socially 
and morally binding’ on them.63 The impact exercised by the Union’s administrative 
activities on the neighbouring states rests on the empirical insight that many acts can in 
the end effectively curtail third countries’ freedom in the same way as legally binding acts. 
One of the characteristics of the SAP and ENP administrative activities, as forms of 
technocratic regulations, is their tendency to blur positivist distinctions between non-
binding and binding obligations.64 For example, action plans aim both at supporting third 
states in implementing the agreement which they concluded with the Union, while at the 
same time advancing their relation with the EU under the umbrella framework 
established by the ENP. However, the documents do not make a clear distinction as to 
which standards must be adopted by the third states because they flow from obligations 
contained in their respective agreements with the EU, and ones which are only 
suggestions to further advance their relation with the Union. It is outside the scope of this 
thesis to determine under which conditions a third state is more inclined to adopt an ‘EU 
friendly’ agenda.65 The point in this instance is to show how in certain cases the 
instruments implementing the SAP and the ENP did have an impact on the exercise of 
third states’ power.    
 
 Preparatory acts: take it or leave it  
 
The instruments aimed at implementing both the SAP and the ENP are preparatory 
insofar as they assist third countries to evaluate a situation or circumstance and take 
appropriate action. They guide the third country in the transformation of general telos 
(i.e. membership or partnership) into more concrete acts applicable, at times, to single 
                                                          
63 K. Jacobsson, ‘Soft Regulation and the Subtle Transformation of States: The Case of EU Employment 
Policy’, 14 Journal of European Social Policy 2004, at 358.  
64 D.M. Leive, International Regulatory Regimes: Case Studies in Health, Meteorology, and Food (Lexington: 
Lexington Books 1976), at 561.  
65 F. Schimmelfenning, ‘Europeanization beyond Europe’, 7 Living Reviews in European Governance 2012; S. 
Lavenex, ‘EU External Governance in wider Europe’, 11 Journal of European Public Policy 2004, 680-700; O. 
Anastasakis, ‘The Europeanization of the Balkans’, 12 Brown Journal of World Affairs 2005, 77–88; D. 
Chandler, ‘The EU and Southeastern Europe: the rise of post-liberal governance’, 1 Third World Quarterly 
2010, 69-85. 
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case situations. The action suggested might be seen as constituting an invitation for the 
addressee to follow certain steps leading to, for example, the adoption of legislation or to 
the changing of their political agenda.66 Progress reports, European partnerships, action 
plans, impact assessments, etc. provide the Commission with a sophisticated system of 
reform promotion in the candidate and potential candidate countries.67 Hereby some 
examples of how the SAP and ENP administrative activities can work as preparatory acts 
for third countries to which they are directly (and indirectly addressed) will be presented.  
 Progress reports have an impact on how relations between the Union and third 
states develop. The reports of the Commission, as already discussed in this chapter, 
inform the Council as to the readiness of SAP states to, for example, start accession 
negotiations. It is in this context that the governments of third countries use progress 
reports in order to carefully address the lacks identified therein, with the hope that this 
will bring them closer to the Union. The Albanian National Action Plan for European 
Integration makes multiple references to the Commission progress report in order to plan 
its reforms agenda:  
 
‘Following the European Commission Progress Report 2015 on Albania, the Albanian 
Government has prepared an Action Plan to address short-term recommendations of 
this report.’  
 
‘The focus of the work of the Albanian Government has been to meet the obligations 
deriving from the Stabilisation and Association Agreement EU-Albania and in 
particular addressing the recommendations of the European Commission Progress 
Report 2015 for Albania.’ 
 
‘In accordance with the European Commission’s Report recommendations, Bank of 
Albania has set as priority in the field of economic criteria: 
- Implement effectively legislation against money laundering at all levels and 
further strengthen the national anti-money laundering and countering the 
financing of terrorism(AML/CFT) system; 
- Implement the action plan on acquisition of property by foreigners.’ 68 
 
In general, the evaluations contained in progress reports have the inevitable effect of 
preannouncing the steps that the Union might want to take towards a third state. For 
                                                          
66 This definition of preparatory acts is shaped around the meaning given by Hofmann, Rowe and Türk with 
regard of internal preparatory acts. H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe and A.H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy 
of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), at 546. 
67 D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-accession Conditionality in the Fields 
of Democracy and the Rule of Law (Alphen aan Den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008), at 80. 
68 Albanian National Plan for European Integration 2016 – 2020, January 2016, available at: 
<http://www.integrimi.gov.al/en/documents/strategic-documents/national-plan-for-european-
integration1455720883&page=1> (Consulted on 07.08.2016), at 21. 
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example, Croatian governmental officials affirmed in separate instances how their 
expectation that Croatia would join the Union earlier than 2014 did impact their decisions 
as to how, for instance, programme financial assistance.69 An Albanian governmental 
official also pointed out how the discrepancies between the positive signals given to them 
by the Commission and the steps taken by the Council in opening accession negotiations 
hindered the government’s strategic planning.70 
The function of progress reports, action plans, etc. as preparatory documents for 
third countries goes hand in hand with the programming of financial assistance. The 
priorities identified in the instruments establishing the agenda for action should normally 
become the target of Union financial support.71 Therefore, the disbursement of funds in 
the areas identified by progress reports, action plans, etc. is another important incentive 
for having those reforms on the government’s agenda. A concrete example with Albania 
is hereby provided. The progress report for Albania identifies a lack of improvement in 
the implementation of the public administration reform, and the implementation of the 
public administration reform is a key priority for EU membership.72  
 
‘As concerns public administration reform, Albania is moderately prepared. […] 
However, efforts are needed to achieve the objective of a professional and 
depoliticised public administration, to increase the financial and administrative 
capacity of local government units and to ensure effective implementation of the civil 
service law at local level.’73 
 
Consequently, the document programming the distribution of financial assistance to 
Albanian indicates that funds will be disbursed in order to support the public 
administration reform.  
 
                                                          
69 Interviews with Croatian government officials from the IPA operating structure, 18.05.2015 and 
19.05.2015, Zagreb. 
70 Interview with an Albanian government official from the ministry of Justice, 20.05.2015, Zagreb.  
71 Article 4, Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014; article 3, 
Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing 
a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014. 
72 In November 2013, a High Level Dialogue with Albania was launched to help maintaining focus on the EU 
integration process and to monitor reform progress under the key priorities identified for the opening of 
accession negotiations. The five priorities are:  reform of public administration, reform of judiciary, fight 
against corruption and organized crime and protection of human rights. 
73 Commission Staff Working Document Albania 2015 Report of 10 November 2015, Accompanying the 
Commission Communication on the EU Enlargement Strategy, SWD(2015) 213 final,  at 4. 
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‘Regarding the action to be supported, EU assistance will include technical assistance 
and capacity building for public administration reform and for democratic 
institutions, including the parliament the various independent institutions.’74 
 
It is in this context that the government of Albania found itself in the position of putting 
the implementation of the public administration reform on its governmental agenda – if 
it desired to make use of the funding.  
 
‘The Albanian Government is committed to the genuine reform of public 
administration, to treatment and assessment based on merit, and commitment to its 
employees, thus creating an effective and efficient institutional network that provides 
better services to citizens.’75 
 
Moreover, the latest IPA II regulation introduced the idea of budget support.76 According 
to the budget support strategy, financial support can only be provided to beneficiary 
countries which, among other point, must have adopted an appropriate sector reform 
plan on one of the topics identified in the Commission programming documents.77 
Therefore, if a SAP state wants to receive IPA II funding via the budget support 
mechanism, it needs to adopt a country strategy paper or a country action plan on the 
subjects identified in the Commission’s documents. If the third country refuses to adopt 
an action plan on a specific sector identified for budget support, IPA II financing could be 
blocked for that specific project.78  
The Commission within the SAP also developed new strategies which indicate to 
third countries what they should address when formulating their economic and fiscal 
policies.79 A recent example comes from Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the Commission, 
                                                          
74 Commission Implementing Decision of 18 August 2014 on ‘Indicative Strategy Paper for Albania (2014-
2020)’, C(2014) 5770, at 15.  
75 Albanian National Plan for European Integration 2016 – 2020, January 2016, at 20. 
76 European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, Quick Guide to IPA II Programming, Access 
to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2014/4443, also available at: 
<http://abdigm.meb.gov.tr/projeler/ois/014.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016), 54-56. 
77 The beneficiary countries have to fulfill four criteria in order to be entitled to budget support: ‘Stable 
macro-economic framework; Sound public financial management; Transparency and oversight of the 
budget; and National/sector policies and reforms.’ European Commission, Directorate General for 
Enlargement, Quick Guide to IPA II Programming, Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 
2014/4443, also available at: <http://abdigm.meb.gov.tr/projeler/ois/014.pdf> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016), at 54. 
78 See the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina available at: <http://eu-monitoring.ba/en/the-initiative-
warns-blocking-ipa-funds-does-not-punish-those-responsible-for-political-obstruction/> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016). 
79 The Commission developed a completely new instrument which was welcomed by the Council after its 
adoption. This pact is the first envisaged for the region. ‘The Council […] welcomes Commission initiatives 
to improve economic governance and strengthen competitiveness as well as stimulate economic growth. As 
an immediate action, it supports the launch on the ground of a "Compact for Growth", aimed at assisting the 
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in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development and the Embassy of the United States of America, 
decided to convene a major conference aimed at helping the economic recovery of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The conference proposed a concrete set of urgent measures which have 
now been endorsed in the ‘Compact for Growth and Jobs in Bosnia and Herzegovina’.80 
The likelihood that the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be able ignore such a 
document – endorsed as it is by all its major donors – when implementing its action on 
economic and fiscal policies seems rather low. Finally, action plans have been used 
externally for the implementation of concrete projects. For example, in Moldova the 
National Institute of Justice was set up under the framework of the EU-Moldova Action 
Plan.81 
 
 Rule-making acts: ‘accept terms and conditions’ 
 
The administrative activities aimed at implementing the SAP and the ENP may well 
constitute an initial step towards the adoption of legally binding measures in third states 
in so far as they are quite detailed as to which standard shall be used by third countries 
when passing legislation, if they wish to intensify their relations with the Union. The 
moment in which the content of the instruments can be found in the text of legally binging 
measures adopted by a third state, it becomes clear how they constitute forms of ‘extra 
territorial’ rule-making. Regulations using non-binding forms often proves highly 
effective in practice.82 The ability of progress reports, action plans, MoUs, etc. to serve a 
rule-making function in third states is sometimes correlated with the presence of 
legislative gaps in the legal systems of the countries to which they are directly or indirectly 
addressed. In some cases, third countries adopt the standards suggested by the 
administrative activities implementing the SAP and the ENP because the type of 
legislation suggested by the documents is actually missing in their own legal systems.83 
                                                          
BiH institutions in identifying concrete socio-economic structural reforms in order to reinvigorate the 
economy and spur the creation of jobs in the short to mid-term.’ Press Release, 3309th Council meeting 
Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg, 14 and 15 April 2014. 
80 Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Compact for Growth, Available at: 
<http://europa.ba/?page_id=547> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
81 A. Khvorostiankina, ‘Legislative approximation and application of EU law in Moldova’, in P. Romanov and 
P. Van Elsuwege (eds.), Legislative Approximation and Application of EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood 
of the European Union (Abington: Routledge 2014), 159, at. 176. 
82 Global Administrative Law, Concept and Working Definition, available at: 
<http://www.iilj.org/gal/GALworkingdefinition.asp> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
83 Interview with Georgian Ministry of Justice official, 1.03.2016, Berlin. 
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The tool-box for standard-setting created by the instruments implementing the SAP and 
the ENP includes traditional sources of international law,84 an ever-expanding set of soft 
law instruments,85 but also materials that on their face do not purport to set normative 
standards at all, including policy programmes for action,86 and even conditions attached 
to loans.87 
 European partnerships, key priorities and action plans establish a benchmarked 
roadmap in bringing about required reforms in order for neighbouring countries to get 
closer to the Union.88 Therefore, adopting the legislation required by those documents is 
the key, at least on paper, for both SAP and ENP partners to open accession negotiations 
or to conclude a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (the latest version of 
ENP agreements).89 Based on the European partnerships, SAP countries have to adopt 
their National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA).90 While on the one 
hand SAP states agreed to prepare themselves to cede part of their sovereignty to the EU 
                                                          
84 E.g. the EU-Armenia action plan establishes that Armenia should ‘Ensure ratification and implementation 
of the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment’, available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/armenia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016). 
85 E.g. the EU-Armenia action plan establishes that Armenia should ‘Cooperate on implementing the 
provisions of the OSCE Document on SALW, OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition and 
OSCE Best Practice Guide on SALW’, available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/armenia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016). 
86 E.g. the EU-Georgia Visa Liberalisation Action Plan establishes that Georgia should proceed with the  
‘[a]doption of the national lntegrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy and Action Plan, containing a 
timeframe and specific objectives for the further development of legislation, organisation, infrastructure, 
equipment, sufficient human and financial resources in the area of border management, as well as 
international cooperation’, available at: <http://migration.commission.ge/files/vlap-eng.pdf> (Consulted 
on 07.08.2016).  
87 Annex to the Commission Implementing decision of 18 May 2015 approving the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the European Union and Ukraine related to macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, 
C(2015) 3444 final. 
88 This is especially the case when a pro-European government comes to power. Interview with EU 
Commission official who worked at the EU Delegation in Turkey, 15.10.2014, Florence. 
89 The new generation of ENP association agreements has the objective of establishing gradual integration 
in the EU Internal Market by setting up a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA). At the heart of 
these DCFTAs lays the principle of market access conditionality according to which access to the EU internal 
market will only be granted if the partner country approximates its domestic legislation to a selected body 
of EU acquis. 
90 E.g. ‘In order to prepare for further integration with the European Union, the competent authorities in 
Albania should develop a plan with a timetable and specific measures to address the priorities of this 
European Partnership.’ Council Decision of 18 February 2008 on the principles, priorities and conditions 
contained in the European Partnership with Albania and repealing Decision 2006/54/EC (2008/210/EC), 
OJ [2008] L 80/1. See also M. Maresceau, ‘Pre-accession’, in M. Cremona (eds.), The Enlargment of the 
European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003), 9, at 31. 
 Who are the addresses of the external administrative power? 
96 
 
and thus are compelled to pass those reform and accept the standards in order to join,91 
the ENP states remain sovereign states without accession perspective – for the southern 
neighbours accession will never be an option since they do not qualify as European 
states.92 Despite this difference, the clauses on approximation of laws contained in the 
action plans are far-reaching and a basis for specific commitments; they require ENP 
countries to ensure that their legislation will be gradually made compatible with EU law.93  
 The reforms covered by the action plans include a wide range of policy areas ranging 
from transport, energy, conflict prevention, human rights, education, enterprise policy, 
etc. A close look at these documents shows that, besides covering a wide range of policy 
areas, they are quite specific as to which standards third countries are required to respect. 
For example, the EU-Jordan action plan requires Jordan (among others): 
 
‘To sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Monitoring and Information 
Centre (MIC) of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism.’ 
‘Further strengthen legal provisions and practices on freedom of assembly and 
association in compliance with international standards and in particular with the 
right to the freedom of association enshrined in the International Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).’ 
‘To review all legislation concerning children to ensure compliance with the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and other relevant international human 
rights instruments and standards.’ 
‘To continue working on the full implementation of the WTO agreement on the 
application of the sanitary and phytosanitary measures and actively participate in 
relevant international bodies (OIE, IPPC, and Codex Alimentarius)’.94 
 
The content of the action plans (and of the association agendas) is then transposed, in 
some cases, in government decrees. For example, the Georgia National Action Plan for the 
Implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agenda (Decree № 59 of the Government 
                                                          
91 Arguably also for the current SAP states accession seems a mirage (i.e. for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo and Macedonia).  
92 On 20 July 1987 Morocco applied for membership to the EU. However, the foreign ministers of the 
Community rejected the application since Morocco is not a European state. See point III, European 
Parliament, Legal Questions of Enlargement, available at:  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/23a2_en.htm#F7> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
93 M. Cremona, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: More than a Partnership?’ in M. Cremona (eds.), 
Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), 245, at 269. 
94 EU-Jordan Action Plan, available at 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/2013_jordan_action_plan_en.pdf> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016). 
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of Georgia 26 January 2015) indicates to transpose in national legislations the standards 
identified in the association agenda.95  
Another example is the SAP progress reports in the area of human rights compliance. 
The standards used by the Commission in order to monitor compliance by the SAP 
counties with human rights are numerous and varied, covering different instruments (e.g. 
regional and international). Progress reports are offering a clear indication as to which 
regional and international convention the SAP countries have to sign and ratify. Based on 
the Commission progress report, the Albanian government adopted an order addressing 
the recommendations made therewith. 
 
‘Based on the recommendations of the European Progress Report aiming at 
strengthening of respect to human rights in the prison system, it is approved the 
Action Plan “On recommendations of the European Commission Progress Report”, (by 
the order no. 10427 Prot. dated 23.04.2015), which addresses specific measures, 
according to well-defined deadlines.’96 
 
The author does not question whether the promotion and protection of human rights is a 
good or bad thing, but rather stresses the fact that progress reports work as standard- 
setting instruments for SAP countries and there is a lack of clear and coherent approach 
as to which international and regional human rights instruments third states need to 
comply with.97  
Visa Liberalisation Action Plans are the most powerful example of standard-setting 
instruments. They are presented in a way which seems to suggest that once the 
requirements spelled out in the plans are fulfilled by a third country, then a visa 
liberalisation regime would be established. VLAPs have rule-making function to the extent 
that they demand from third states specific legislative and policy reforms, as well as the 
respect of detailed benchmarks for implementation.98 SAP and ENP countries must 
                                                          
95 Available at: Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic integration, available at: 
<http://www.eu-nato.gov.ge/en/eu/association-agreement> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
96 Albanian National Plan for European Integration 2016 – 2020, January 2016, at 40. 
97 B. De Witte, ‘The EU and the International Legal Order: The Case of Human Rights’, in M. Evans and P. 
Koutrakos (eds.), Beyond the established legal orders: policy interconnections between the EU and the rest of 
the world (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2011), 127, at 139; J. Hughes and G. Sasse, ‘Monitoring the Monitors: EU 
Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in CEECs’, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues 
in Europe, Issue 1/2003, at 17. 
98 For example, the EU-Republic of Moldova Visa Liberalisation Action Plan requires (among others): 
- Consolidation of the legal framework for the issuing of machine readable biometric passports in full 
compliance with highest ICAO standards […], 
- Adoption of a National Migration Management Strategy for effective implementation of the legal 
framework for migration policy and an Action Plan, containing a timeframe, specific objectives, activities, 
results, performance indicators and sufficient human and financial resources; 
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achieve all the objectives established by their respective Road Maps and VLAPs if they 
wish enjoy a visa free regime. The objectives are legislative measures and specific 
benchmarks for effective implementation. For example, the Georgian VLAP requires: 
 
‘Consolidation, according to EU and international standards, of the legal and 
institutional framework on preventing fighting organized crime, together with 
national strategy and action Plan containing, within a clear time frame, specific 





‘Signature, ratification and transposition into national legislation of all relevant UN 
and Council of Europe conventions and respective protocols in the areas listed above 
and on the fight against terrorism, including: the 2005 Council of Europe Convention 
on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on 
the Financing of terrorism; the Hague Convention on Protection of Children (1996 
Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and 
Cooperation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of 
Children); the 2007 Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children 
against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse; the Additional Protocol to the Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption.’99 
 
Based on its VLAP, Moldova adopted and implemented more than 40 laws.100 Not all these 
laws have been peacefully accepted by the Moldovan society, and caused unprecedented 
civil protests. As experts have stated, without the EU pressure and promise of reward the 
Moldovan lawmakers would never have adopted the progressive Law ‘On ensuring 
Equality’ of 25 May 2012.101  
The latest Union practice of providing macro-financial assistance to the ENP states 
also represents a new mechanism of setting standards over the EU’s borrowers. The 
Union’s ability to deny funds or to suspend disbursement of a loan or credit implies that a 
failure to comply with the Union’s policy prescriptions, as set out in the European 
Parliament and Council Decisions providing macro financial assistance to the ENP states 
                                                          
- Adoption of relevant UN and Council of Europe conventions in the areas listed above and on fight against 
terrorism. 
Available at: <http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/action-plan-visa-liberalisation-moldova> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
99 EU-Georgia Visa Dialogue, Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation, available at: 
<http://migration.commission.ge/files/vlap-eng.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
100 A. Khvorostiankina, ‘Legislative approximation and application of EU law in Moldova’, in P. Romanov and 
P. Van Elsuwege (eds.), Legislative Approximation and Application of EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood 
of the European Union (Abington: Routledge 2014), 159, at. 170. 
101 V. Ursu, ‘How the European Union Persuaded Moldova to Fight Discrimination’, 12 September 2012. 
Available at: <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/how-european-union-persuaded-
moldova-fight-discrimination> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
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and in the Memoranda of Understanding agreed with the borrowing states,102  can result 
in enforcement. In other words, the third state could be denied macro-financial assistance 
due to its inability to fulfill the conditions set out in the MoUs concluded with the Union, 
without having the guarantee of being heard.103 The Union’s policy prescriptions are tied 
to the macro financial adjustments and structural reform programmes supported by the 
IMF. IMF conditionality forces governments to adopt local laws, reform governmental 
institutions, or refrain from taking actions that would otherwise be within their sovereign 
discretion.104 Although both the Union’s and IMF’s conditions are not formally imposed 
on states but are the products of state consent, critics rightly affirm that states are 
economically coerced into ceding their sovereign rights to govern their polities through 
conditionality.105 
 The administrative activities implementing the SAP and the ENP exercise a tangible 
pressure on the usage of public power, both within the Union and in third countries. The 
power cannot be discharged, despite its apparent non-legally binding nature. Internally, 
the external administrative power channel and influence important Union’s choices as to 
the development of its external relations. It informs single-case decisions, and it 
constitutes the basis for the adoption of political, administrative, and legislative acts. 
Furthermore, administrative acts serving a rule-making function internally produce 
undeniable impacts on the Union’s action in the world. Externally, the Union’s activities 
implementing the SAP and the ENP work as de facto administrative acts addressed to third 
states. Actual enforcement mechanisms are developed by the Union with the final goal of 
                                                          
102 ‘The Commission shall […] agree with the Ukrainian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and 
financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, to which the Union's macro-
financial assistance is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (‘the Memorandum 
of Understanding’) which shall include a timeframe for the fulfilment of those conditions. The economic 
policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the 
agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and 
structural reform programmes implemented by Ukraine, with the support of the IMF.’ Article 3(1), Decision 
(EU) 2015/601 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 April 2015 providing macro-financial 
assistance to Ukraine, OJ [2015] L100/1, 17.04.2015; Article 3(1), Decision (EU) 534/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 providing macro-financial assistance to the Republic of 
Tunisia, OJ [2015] L151/9, 21.05.2014. See also Chapter II, sections 3.1 and 4.1. 
103 E.g. see EU-Ukraine MoU on macro financial assistance at point 3: ‘The Commission will also continuously 
verify the financing needs of Ukraine and may reduce, suspend or cancel the assistance in case they have 
decreased fundamentally during the period of disbursement compared to the initial projections.’ 
Commission Implementing Decision of 18 May 2015 approving the Memorandum of Understanding 
between the European Union and Ukraine related to macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, 
C(2015)3444/F1. 
104 J. E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006), at. 242. 
105 D. Bradlow, ‘Stuffing New Wine Into Old Bottles: The Troubling case of the IMF’, 3 Journal of International 
Banking Regulation 2001. 
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encouraging third states to align their government agenda to the one suggested by the EU. 
In other words, third states have to adapt their reform and legislative plan in accordance 
with the guidelines provided to them by progress reports, action plans, MoUs, etc., unless 
they want to trigger sanctions or renounce to benefits. In some cases, the Union’s activities 
implementing the SAP and the ENP work as regulatory and standard-setting instruments 
for third states who adopt the measures contained in their text. The legal freedom for third 
states to refrain from following a merely conditioning act is often a mere fiction.106 
 
3. The effect of administrative power on individuals and legal persons 
 
The adoption of administrative acts implementing Union external action is not without 
consequences for natural and legal persons – who often are the first to be affected by the 
Union’s action, and who may be themselves the victims of abusive regimes. The Court of 
Justice of the European Union in the past years was faced with four interesting cases of 
natural and legal persons challenging the action (or inaction) of the Commission in the EU 
wider neighbourhood.107 Among many interesting aspects, the cases show that the 
activities implementing the Union’s wider neighbourhood policies are not neutral: they 
create expectations and provide a certain degree of certainty as to how the EU will 
implement its action in the neighbouring state. The question then becomes, of course, 
whether the Court’s approach should be deemed a satisfactory one – especially in light of 
the obligation on the side of the Union to respect the rule of law when acting externally, 
but this will be addressed by the next chapters. The aim of this section is solely to highlight 
the impact that these activities have on natural and legal persons.  
The first three cases that will be hereby presented deal with natural and legal 
persons challenging the inaction of the Commission. The applicants further claimed that 
the Union breached their legitimate expectations by departing from the numerous 
administrative activities implementing the Union external action.  
 
 
                                                          
106A. von Bogdandy, ‘Common principles for a plurality of orders: A study on public authority in European 
legal area’, 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 2014, at 988. 
107 See cases: Case T-346/03 Krikorian v. European Parliament, Council and Commission, EU:T:2003:348; 
Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner House Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights project v. 
Commission, EU:T:2006:97; Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418; Case C-
581/11 P Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:C:2012:466; Case T-512/12, Front Polisario v. Council of 
the European Union, EU:T:2015:953. 
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 No right, no legitimate expectation: human rights victims expecting EU action 
 
The first case sees as claimant Mr. Muhamad Mugraby, a Lebanese citizen who himself 
claims to have suffered human rights violations in his home country.108 The applicant filed 
an action for failure to act seeking a declaration that the Council and the Commission 
unlawfully omitted to take a decision on the applicant’s request concerning the adoption 
of measures against the Republic of Lebanon on account of the alleged violations by the 
latter of the applicant’s fundamental rights. Mr. Mugraby claims that the Community, the 
Commission and the Council have incurred non-contractual liability as a result of their 
failure to effectively utilise the available resources and instruments towards effective 
enforcement of the human right clause present in the Association Agreement concluded 
by the European Community and its Members with the Republic of Lebanon (the 
Association Agreement).109 In this respect, the General Court affirmed that the 
implementation of suspension mechanisms is a matter of discretion of the Commission, 
which excludes the right for an individual to require the Commission to take a position in 
that connection.110 The Court, however, does not provide any indication as to whether 
there are any limits to the Commission’s discretion. Moreover, Mr. Mugraby claimed to 
have developed:  
 
‘[…] strong and legitimate expectations that his fundamental rights would be protected 
by all the institutions of the European Union, including the courts of law, and that 
those institutions would hold the parties to the Association Agreement to their 
obligations.’111 [emphasis added] 
 
The question to be asked now is: how could Mr. Mugraby expect that the Union would 
suspend its relations with Lebanon due to the violations of human rights by the latter? He 
claims to have derived his legitimate expectations from the various public statements that 
the Commission and the Council have made in the context of the management of the 
European Union’s external policy, the respect of the Association Agreement, and in 
                                                          
108 Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418; Case C-581/11 P Mugraby v. Council 
and Commission, EU:C:2012:466. 
109 The available resources being: the suspension of aid granted by the Community to Lebanon in accordance 
to article 28 of the ENPI regulations, and the suspension of Community aid programs granted under the 
Association Agreement. 
110 ‘Therefore, it must be concluded that, taking account of the Commission’s discretion as regards the 
submission to the Council of a proposal under Article 28 of the ENPI Regulation, its failure to address such 
a proposal to the Council cannot be relied on in an action based on the third paragraph of Article 232 EC.’ 
Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418, paras 38-39. 
111 Case C-581/11 P Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:C:2012:466, para. 78. 
 Who are the addresses of the external administrative power? 
102 
 
relation to the protection of human rights.112 The General Court, however, observed that 
such assertions are:  
 
‘[…] not precise enough to identify, firstly, the conduct complained of with any 
certainty and, secondly, its possible unlawfulness. In any event, the applicant does not 
establish how he could acquire a right from those expectations.’113 [emphasis added] 
 
 No right, no legitimate expectation: human rights activists expecting to be believed 
 
The second case sees as applicants ‘a coalition of non-governmental organisations and 
Turkish citizens’.114 The coalition filed an application for the annulment of the 
Commission’s Regular Report of 5 November 2003 (the progress report) concerning 
Turkey’s progress towards accession, insofar as, according to the applicants, it contains a 
Commission decision refusing to make a recommendation to the Council concerning pre-
accession aid granted to Turkey and, rather, for a failure to act in that regard. The General 
Court reformulated their claim by stating that the applicants did not seek the annulment 
of the Regular Report as such, but of a Commission decision refusing to propose to the 
Council to take appropriate measures concerning the assistance granted to Turkey in light 
of its failure to comply with its pre-accession obligations.115 Before starting the lawsuit, 
the applicants contacted by letter the Commission to act in connection with Turkey’s 
breaches of pre-accession criteria.116 Nevertheless, the progress report on Turkey was 
adopted without mentioning the violations reported by the coalition of non-governmental 
organisations and Turkish citizens. The applicants succeeded neither in their claim for 
annulment nor in their claim for failure to act. Also in this case the General Court was clear 
in stating that: 
 
‘[…] the question as to whether an essential element for continuing to grant pre-
accession assistance is lacking or otherwise and, consequently, whether it is 
appropriate to propose that the Council apply Article 4 of Regulation No 390/2001 is 
a matter of discretion excluding the right, for an individual, to require the Commission 
                                                          
112 Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418, para. 52. 
113 Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418, para. 71; also confirmed on appeal 
Case C-581/11 P Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:C:2012:466, para. 27. 
114 Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner House Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights project v. 
Commission, EU:T:2006:97, para. 11. 
115 Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner House Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights project v. 
Commission, EU:T:2006:97, para. 34. 
116 Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner House Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights project v. 
Commission, EU:T:2006:97, para. 13. 
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to take a position in that connection or, where such a position exists, to bring an action 
for annulment against it.’117 [emphasis added] 
 
The General Court also in this case does not give any guidelines as to how the discretion 
should be exercised. The core of the dispute lies in the frustration on the side of the 
coalition not to have seen their views taken seriously once they contacted the 
Commission. The coalition expected that the latter, by virtue of its duty to monitor the 
pre-accession process, would have conducted more adequate research in respect of their 
allegations. The applicants claimed that the Union should have suspended financial 
assistance to Turkey due to its failures to respect its obligations as a candidate country 
for Union accession. The obligations were: making sufficient progress to satisfy the 
Copenhagen criteria concerning human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, 
and adopting the relevant acquis communautaire.118 
 
 No right, no legitimate expectation: expecting acknowledgement for past atrocities 
 
In the third case the applicants do not claim to derive their legitimate expectations from 
an administrative act but from a European Parliament resolution. However, the case is 
still interesting since it shows how the numerous acts characterising the EU external 
action might create expectations, and because it tells us something about the approach 
and criteria used by the Court in arguing the case. The applicants – Grégoire Krikorian, 
Suzanne Krikorian, and Euro-Arménie ASBL – brought an action for damages in which 
they seek compensation for the harm caused to them by the recognition of Turkey's status 
as a candidate for accession to the EU, despite the State refusal to acknowledge the 
genocide perpetrated in 1915 against the Armenians living in Turkey. In this respect, the 
applicants claimed that the defendant institutions – European Parliament, Council of the 
European Union, European Commission – blatantly failed to have regard to the resolution 
of the European Parliament of 18 June 1987 on a political solution to the Armenian 
question (the 1987 resolution). In that resolution, the Parliament declared that the 
Turkish Government's refusal to acknowledge that genocide constituted an 
                                                          
117 Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner House Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights project v. 
Commission, EU:T:2006:97, para. 50. 
118 The infringements were connected with the implementation of a project by Turkey for a pipeline linking 
the cities of Baku, Tblissi and Ceyhan to enable oil to be carried from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean. 
Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner House Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights project v. 
Commission, EU:T:2006:97, para. 13. 
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insurmountable obstacle to the examination of the Republic of Turkey's possible 
accession. According to the applicants, the 1987 resolution is a legal act which, in the same 
way as recommendations and opinions, can produce legal effects, and that it intends to 
publicly lay down a special condition for the Republic of Turkey's accession – namely the 
prior acknowledgement by that State of the genocide in question.119 It is in this context 
that the applicants argued that the 1987 resolution gave rise to a legitimate expectation 
on their part that the Parliament would exercise its right of veto on the Republic of 
Turkey's accession.120 The Court disposed that the 1987 resolution could not have given 
rise to a legitimate expectation, on the part of the applicants, since: 
 
‘[…] the 1987 resolution is a document containing declarations of a purely political 
nature, which may be amended by the Parliament at any time. It cannot therefore have 
binding legal consequences for its author nor, a fortiori, for the other defendant 
institutions.’121 [emphasis added] 
 
However, if instead of a European Parliament resolution the applicants in the last case 
would have relied on a Commission progress report – thus not a political document – 
would the conclusion of the Court be the same? Or would it have at least imposed on the 
Commission an obligation to state reasons as to why it decided to depart from its position 
as stated in the progress report? 
The three cases just discussed were not presented accurately by the applicants. 
Third countries’ citizens clearly cannot acquire a right as to how the Union should behave 
towards their own states; Mr. Mugraby was not precise enough in identifying how the 
Union’s conduct conflicted with his expectations; the coalition of Turkish citizens was 
confused as to the Union’s decision-making process; and in the last case the applicants 
relied on a political document instead of an administrative one for which – possibly – the 
Court would have used a different argument. Nevertheless, in these cases the Court 
ignored – or maybe thwarted? – the opportunity of going beyond a purely formalistic 
approach in favour of one that would take into account the social reality, the implication 
of the Union’s activities outside its borders, and the context in which the administrative 
activities operate. While it is true that Mr. Mugraby could have been much clearer as from 
                                                          
119 Case T-346/03 Krikorian v. European Parliament, Council and Commission, EU:T:2003:348, para. 6. 
120 The applicants stress that since the entrance into force of the Single European Act the Parliament had 
the power to object to the Republic of Turkey's accession; they state that the requirement of the assent of 
the Parliament is now laid down in article 49 of the Treaty on European Union. Case T-346/03 Krikorian v. 
European Parliament, Council and Commission, EU:T:2003:348, para. 7. 
121 Case T-346/03 Krikorian v. European Parliament, Council and Commission, EU:T:2003:348, para. 19. 
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which documents he developed strong and legitimate expectations, it is also true that both 
the General Court, and the Court on appeal, could have recognised how the numerous 
instruments aimed at implementing the Union external action, and particularly its action 
towards its neighbour, do have the effect of making third countries’ citizens believe that 
the protection of human rights is at the forefront of the Union’s action towards the rest of 
the world. As a matter of fact, human rights clauses are virtually present in all agreements 
concluded by the Union with third countries together with a so- called ‘suspension clause’, 
which allows for the suspension of the agreement in case one of the parties violates 
human rights. Nevertheless, despite the creation of enforcement mechanisms and of 
monitoring reports denouncing human rights violations, very little enforcement has taken 
place so far to punish those countries which violate them. The coalition of Turkish citizens 
in essence challenged how the progress report was drafted; they believed the 
Commission, in light of is pivotal role in the monitoring the pre-accession process, 
deliberately decided not to denounce the human rights violations they reported. 
Nevertheless, the Court did not even address this issue.  
 
 From reticence to recognition: the Front Polisario  
 
The Front Polisario case is different from the ones just analysed. This case underlines the 
relevance of external administrative activities as preparatory acts leading to a final 
decision within the de facto procedures developed by the Union. The function of the 
external administrative activities is recognised in light of the potential impact that final 
acts have on third states.122 In this case, the Front Polisario asked the General Court to 
annul the Council Decision on the adoption of an agreement in the form of exchange of 
letters between the EU and the Republic of Morocco. The agreement was aimed at 
modifying the Association Agreement already in force since 2000 between the Union and 
Morocco. In particular, it was trying to accelerate the process of trade liberalisation of 
agricultural products, process agricultural products, fish, and fish products. The 
agreement concluded by the Union with Morocco did not contain any reference in its text 
as to its application to the territory of West Sahara. The agreement was to apply to the 
territory of Morocco; however, there were no doubts that the agreement was going to be 
applicable also to the territory of West Sahara – where Morocco de facto exercises its 
                                                          
122 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953. 
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sovereignty.123 The General Court in this case recognises the impact that the Council 
Decision has on the territory of West Sahara and establishes that until the international 
status of the West Sahara remains undecided the Front Polisario, like the Republic of 
Morocco, must be considered as directly and individually concerned by the measure.124 
The approach taken by the Court is not undisputed, however, and it will be further 
discussed in chapter V. For the time being it is important to highlight the link between the 
recognised impact that the Council Decision has over the territory of the West Sahara, and 
the obligation on the side of the Union to carry out a human rights impact assessment 
when concluding an agreement with a third state.  
Towards the end of the case, the General Court established that EU institutions, even 
when enjoying a large margin of discretion – in this case deciding whether to conclude an 
agreement with a third state – have the obligation to comply with the duty of care.125 In 
other words, the institutions have an obligation to examine with impartiality all the issues 
relevant to the case before taking a decision. Particularly in the case at stake, the General 
Court stated that the Council has an obligation to examine all the elements of the case with 
the purpose of making sure that the activities of the Union do not have the effect of 
violating human rights in West Sahara.126 The Council, on the other hand, affirmed that 
the fact of having concluded an agreement with a third country does not make the Union 
                                                          
123 Chapter IV, section 5.2.2; see also E. Chiti, 'Le relazioni esterne dell’Unione e il diritto amministrativo 
europeo’ – Commento alla causa T-512/12 - Giud. rel. M.D. Gratsias - Front populaire pour la libération de 
la saguia-el-hamra et du rio de oro (Front Polisario) c. Consiglio dell’Unione europea, 2 Giornale di diritto 
amministrativo 2016, 231-238. 
124 ‘Those provisions produce effects on the legal position of the whole territory to which the agreement 
applies (and, therefore, the territory of Western Sahara controlled by the Kingdom of Morocco), in that they 
determine the conditions under which agricultural and fishery products may be exported from that 
territory to the European Union or may be imported from the European Union into the territory in question.’ 
Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 109 and paras 110-
111.  
125 ‘[J]udicial review must necessarily be limited to the question whether the competent EU institution, in 
this case the Council, by approving the conclusion of an agreement such as that approved by the contested 
decision, made manifest errors of assessment (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 June 1998 in Racke, 
C-162/96, ECR, EU:C:1998:293, paragraph 52). That being the case, in particular where EU institution 
enjoys a wide discretion, in order to verify whether it has committed a manifest error of assessment, the 
Courts of the European Union must verify whether it has examined carefully and impartially all the relevant 
facts of the individual case, facts which support the conclusions reached (judgments of 21 November 1991 
in Technische Universität München, C-269/90, ECR, EU:C:1991:438, paragraph 14, and 22 December 
2010 Gowan comércio Internacional e Servios, C-77/09, ECR, EU:C:2010:803, paragraph 57).’ Case T-512/12 
Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, paras 224 and 225. 
126 ‘[T]he Council must examine, carefully and impartially, all the relevant facts in order to ensure that the 
production of goods for export is not conducted to the detriment of the population of the territory 
concerned, or entails infringements of fundamental rights.’ Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the 
European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 228. For a more detailed account on the issue see chapter IV, section 
4.2. 
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responsible for the actions that might eventually be committed by the third state – 
whether or not they might imply human rights violations.127 The General Court, in 
answering to the Council, affirms that the: 
 
‘[…] argument is correct, but it ignores the fact that, if the European Union allows the 
export to its Member States of products originating in that other country which have 
been produced or obtained in conditions which do not respect the fundamental rights 
of the population of the territory from which they originate, it may indirectly 
encourage such infringements or profit from them.’128 
 
The answer of the General Court is straightforward. By recognizing the effect of the 
Union’s action, it becomes clear why imposing an obligation on the Union to carry out 
human rights impact assessments is essential. In other words, the Union, by allowing a 
third state to export its products to its Member States without making sure that the latter 
makes its products in compliance with human rights, indirectly encourages and takes 
advantage of human rights exploitations. Recognising the effect of the Union’s action in 
third states is an essential first step in understanding the function and relevance that 
human rights impact assessments have. If the EU institutions do not carry out human 
rights impact assessments before concluding an agreement with a third state, the Union 
might encourage and exploit human rights violations in third states. The General Court 
does not make a direct reference to human rights impact assessments; nonetheless the 
bottom-line message of the case is clear: in taking into account all the aspects of the case 
when concluding an agreement, the EU institution has to make sure that its action does 
not violates human rights. The next chapter of the thesis will better clarify how the Court 
derived this obligation on the side of the Union from the duty of care.  
In order to protect individuals affected by the exercise of external administrative 
power beyond the obvious obstacles, it is fundamental to frame its impact within the 
context of the Union external action. The expectations of Mr. Mugraby might not be 
defined as ‘legitimate’ under EU law and, thus, lack legal protection. However, other 
obligations imposed on the administration might come as a safety net in order to protect 
individuals from wrongfully relying on the administrative activities implementing the 
Union external action. Alongside the ‘Mr. Mugraby’ type of situation, the Front Polisario 
                                                          
127 ‘[T]he fact of having concluded an agreement with a non-member State does not and cannot make the 
European Union liable for any actions committed by that county, whether or not they correspond to 
infringements of fundamental rights.’ Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, 
EU:T:2015:953, para. 230. 
128 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 231. 
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case is an interesting example exemplifying how a legal person can also be directly 
impacted by the action (or rather inaction) of the Union administration. The Commission, 
by ignoring the role of the Front Polisario in West Sahara, indirectly encouraged violations 
of human rights in the territory. The Republic of Morocco does not administer the 
territory of West Sahara, but occupies it militarily. Therefore, no assurance is in place as 
to whether the products originated in West Sahara are made or obtained in conditions 
which respect the fundamental rights of the population of the territory. Overall, the 
impact that the administrative activities implementing the Union external action have on 
individuals should receive greater attention. 
 Finally, it is important to highlight how the cases just presented all deal with human 
rights violations. In other words, the applicants were either direct victims of human rights 
violations or joined their voices in order to denounce violations of human rights. This fact 
ought not to be neglected. Victims of human rights violations cannot appeal to their own 
state in order to demand justice. Their own state is the perpetrator of the very human 
rights violations they suffer. Mr. Mugraby, the coalition of Turkish citizens, the Armenians, 
and the Font Polisario by addressing their cases in front of the Court of Justice clearly 
indicate how they entrust the Union with the role of human rights protector, or at least 
how they expect the Union to take action in order to punish their state in case of human 
rights violations. Individuals derive their expectations by the net of instruments that the 
Union adopts in order to implement its external policies. The Union, by adopting progress 
reports denouncing human rights violations, by endorsing action plans which put at the 
fore front the importance of respecting human rights, by stating their willingness to 
conduct human rights impact assessments before concluding international agreements, 
and by investing funds in projects aimed at fostering the protection of human rights in a 
third country, cannot reasonably expect victims of human rights violations not to rely on 
these same instruments in order to seek Union’s intervention. These instruments increase 
the predictability of policy intervention. Finally, territories and populations with unclear 
status, like West Sahara, are particularly affected by Union’s action, despite the form it 
acquires, since the state which represents them at the Union level does not have any 









In light of the analysis so far carried out, it seems plausible to state that the activities 
described in chapter II are not without consequences. The power that they exercise is 
relevant and has the potential to affect the Union external action, the exercise of public 
power in third states, and natural and legal persons. The impact exercised by the activities 
implementing the SAP and the ENP expresses itself differently depending on the context. 
Internally, the activities have become over the years preparatory acts within de facto 
procedures leading to final outcomes. Moreover, in some cases they also have a clear rule-
making function. For example, they indicate which projects the EU is committed to 
financing, or they regulate the disbursement of macro financial assistance to third states. 
The role acquired by the administrative activities within the Union, as internal steps 
informing final decisions, cannot be without implications for natural and legal persons. 
For example, progress reports, by denouncing violations of human rights, raise the 
expectations of individuals that these acts will eventually inform the choice of the Council 
to sanction third states found in non-compliance with fundamental rights.129 The same 
reasoning holds true for Visa Liberalisation Action Plans, and the expectation that once all 
the criteria established therewith are fulfilled, then the Union will grant a visa 
liberalisation free regime to third states. Furthermore, financing certain projects might 
have direct impacts on the rights of local population. Finally, administrative activities 
have a significant impact on third states, which have to follow and adopt the guidance and 
rules contained in the documents, unless they want to trigger sanction or to renounce 
benefits. Identifying the addresses and the impact of the administrative activities 
implementing the Union’s external action is important to better understand which 
principles derived from the administrative rule of law internally are best suited to guide 
the exercise of administrative power externally and to protect those affected by it. 
 EU external relations’ strategic interests and objectives are political decisions. 
However, the administrative activities executing and informing the Union’s external 
                                                          
129 The latest generation of Stabilisation and Association Agreements foresee their possible suspension in 
case of ‘non-compliance’ with human rights. E.g. Article 133 of the SAA with Montenegro states that: ‘Either 
Party may (1) suspend this Agreement, (2) with immediate effect, (3) in the event of non-compliance by the 
other Party of one of the essential elements of this Agreement.’ Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Montenegro, of the other part, OJ [2010] L 108/3, 29.4.2010. I. Vianello, ‘Guaranteeing the respect for 
Human Rights in EU External Relations: What role for Administrative Law?’, CLEER Paper Series, 
(forthcoming). 
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policies must be bound to the respect of the administrative rule of law.130 The study of EU 
administrative law in external relations ought to take into account the features that the 
external administrative power assumes (non-linear, discretionary and informal), and 
ought to identify those principles derived from the administrative rule of law which have 
the capacity of facing such fallacies. In particular, the application of the administrative 
rule of law externally ought to recognise and face the significant discretion left to the 
administration in balancing important political choices. Giving effect to the administrative 
rule of law externally also requires taking into account the impact that administrative 
power exercises on third countries, and on their natural and legal persons. Applying EU 
administrative law to the external domain ought to demand identifying ways to protect 
individuals and third states beyond what would be the obvious obstacles (e.g. the 
expectations are not legitimate, or third states are sovereign entities); it requires 
embracing a pragmatic and contextual approach that would take into account the pivotal 
role that the Union plays in some third states. The key tension in this process is the mixed 
nature of EU external policies; namely, they are political processes which often rest on 
administrative mechanisms producing legal consequences. 
                                                          
130 The fact that the impact of the administrative activities is not limited to the external world, but it also 
influences the Union’s internal decision-making, is just another reason for pushing the Union to seek means 
to bind the exercise of external administrative to the rule of law. 
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European Union and upon its ratification by the Constituent National Assembly.’ Annex to Commission 
Implementing Decision of 16 July 2014 approving the Memorandum of Understanding between the 
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Chapter IV: The administrative rule of law applied to the Union external action 
The rule of law form paper to the reality of the EU wider neighbourhood policies 
 
1. Which principles and rules give effect to the administrative rule of law externally? 
 
The power exercised by the Union administration in external relations has started to 
create anxiety as to its features and impacts. Despite these concerns, clear means have not 
yet been sought to make sure that the exercise of administrative power respects the 
administrative rule of law. It is now, therefore, crucial to take seriously the reality 
described so far by this thesis and frame it within the larger context of EU administrative 
law. This type of analysis is especially important – as already explained in detail in chapter 
I – after the entrance into force of the Treaty of Lisbon which makes clear that the Union, 
when acting on the international scene, shall not only promote the principles that inspired 
its own creation, among others the rule of law, but shall also respect them in the 
development and implementation of its action. The traditional forces which for the past 
have stimulated the process of giving effect to the Union’s administrative rule of law 
internally (the Court and the legislator);1 need now to be supported in their task of giving 
effect to the administrative rule of law externally. The present chapter aims at developing 
an analytical framework for the purpose of enhancing the respect of the Union’s 
administrative rule of law in the development and implementation of the Union’s external 
action.  
 
1.1 The choice of principles 
 
The CJEU has been able over the years to Europeanise the rule of law by using as starting 
point the legal traditions of the Member States.2 When paraphrasing the famous Les Verts 
judgment it seems possible to state that the Community was said to comply with the rule 
of law because it allegedly offered a comprehensive set of legal remedies and procedures 
                                                          
1 Administrative law scholars agree that both the Court and the Union legislature have established an 
administrative rule of law applicable to the various components of the EU administrative system. E. Chiti, 
‘Is EU Administrative Law Failing in Some of Its Crucial Tasks?’, European Law Journal, (forthcoming); C. 
Harlow and R. Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration (London: Hart Publishing 2014), at 
325. 
2 A. Arnull, ‘The Rule of Law in the European Union’, in A. Arnull and D. Wincott (eds.), Accountability and 
Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002), 239, at 254; L. Pech, ‘A Union 
Founded on the Rule of Law: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of EU Law’, 
6 European Constitutional Law Review 2010, at 365; T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2006), 5-6. 
The administrative rule of law applied to the Union external action 
116 
 
with the aim of ensuring that its institutions – including Member States – adopt measures 
in conformity with EU law, and that natural and legal persons are able to challenge 
(directly or indirectly) the legality of any act which affects their Community rights.3 A 
remarkable development of the Court’s more recent case law lies in linking explicitly the 
rule of law to the respect by the Union of more substantive requirements – i.e. general 
principles of laws.4 General principles derive from the rule of law and their respect gives 
effect to the latter.5 Some of the principles articulating the rule of law have an impact 
primarily on legislative institutions; while others are aimed at administrative action. The 
changing requirements and conditions for implementing EU policies have pushed the 
CJEU to develop, in parallel to the constitutional law principles, also administrative law 
specific principles: ‘[t]he rule of law tradition naturally fed into and informed the 
development of EU Administrative law.’6  
Therefore, the Union’s legal order already offers a set of administrative principles 
aimed at guiding and protecting affected parties from the exercise of administrative 
power. However, the application of these principles and rules externally mostly moves in 
uncharted territory.7 Therefore, in order to identify which principles have the potential 
to give effect to the rule of law externally, it is necessary to look internally for those that 
in comparable situations have the potential to guide the exercise of administrative power. 
In other words, the methodology demands starting from commonalities of fact-patterns 
between the internal and external domain to determine which principles might be 
relevant. The principles selected by this chapter in order to give effect to the 
                                                          
3 Case 294/83 Les Verts v. Parliament, EU:C:1986:166, para. 23. 
4 ‘The European Community is a… Community based on the rule of law in which its institutions are subject 
to judicial review of the compatibility of its acts with the Treaty and with the general principles of law which 
include fundamental rights.’ Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, EU:C:2002:462, para. 
38. Compliance with general principles, including fundamental rights, goes back to the Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft case; however, in that case the CJEU did not make an explicit link to the respect of the 
rule of law. See Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle Getreide, 
EU:C:1970:114. 
5 Advocate General Sharpston in her opinion on the case Paul Miles and Others v. European Schools stated 
that by upholding important principles of Community law the Community ensures that it remains one that 
is based on the rule of law. ‘I respectfully applaud the Court’s willingness, in Zwartveld, to have regard to 
the teleology of the Treaties and to insist on its jurisdiction to uphold important principles of Community 
law, thereby ensuring that the European Communities continued to be a ‘Community based on the rule of 
law.’ Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 16 December 2010, Case C-196/09 Paul Miles and 
Others Robert Watson MacDonald v. European Schools, EU:C:2010:777, para. 71. 
6 P. Craig, ‘EU Administrative Law and Tradition’, in M. Ruffert (eds.), Administrative Law in Europe: Between 
Common Principles and National Traditions (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 2013), 155, at 161.  
7 Chapter I, section 4.3. 
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administrative rule of law externally are the ones that in comparable situations would be 
applicable to the internal domain.  
A narrow definition of the administrative rule of law implies that: 
 
‘[…] administrative implementation occurs within the framework established by 
legislation, that subordinate legislation may be made by the administrative branch 
only where there is an enabling power in primary (Treaty) law or in European 
secondary legislation, and that such subordinate legislation must be within 
substantive limits and conform with procedural requirements of higher law.’ 8  
 
Alongside this strict definition, the Court has developed other principles and rules directly 
relevant to the administrative function like the duty to state reasons, the duty of care and 
participatory procedures.9 These legal parameters are now firmly rooted in the EU legal 
system,10 and they are elaborated by legal doctrine in order to provide a reliable and 
useful yardstick for administrative conduct.11 This understanding of the rule of law will 
be used as a starting point in order to develop the features that the principle acquires 
when guiding and constraining the exercise of power externally.12 Without denying the 
relevance of maintaining the rule of law within its less-disputed realm, this chapter will 
question its ability to frame the most recent evolutions of public power. Giving effect to 
the administrative rule of law in external relations means studying the extension of its 
principles into the darker corners of governance.  
In light of the features, functions, addresses and impacts that the external 
administrative power exercise externally, the following principles have been selected in 
order to give effect to the administrative rule of law when the Union develops and 
                                                          
8 H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe and A.H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2013), at 150. 
9 See among others: article 13(2) TEU, article 296 TFEU; Cases T-211/02 Tieland Signal Ltd v. Commission, 
EU:T:2002:232, para 37; Case T-95/96 Gestevisión Telecinco v. Commission, EU:T:1998:206, para 53; Joined 
cases 142/84 and 156/84 BAT and Reynolds v. Commission, EU:C:1987:490, para 20; Case 46/87 Hoechst v. 
Commission, EU:C:1989:337, summary point 1; Case 85/87 Dow Benelux v. Commission, EU:C:1989:379.  
10 The principles derived from the administrative rule of law can be found in the Treaties, in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, and in the jurisprudence of the Court. These provisions are complemented by 
secondary legislation applicable in particular sectors or in relation to specific questions (e.g. access to 
documents). 
11 See among others: C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2014); H.P. Nehl, Principles of Administraive Procedures in EC Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 
1999), H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe and A.H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013); J. Schwarze, European Administrative Law, (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell 2006); M.P. Chiti (eds.), Diritto amministrativo europeo, (Milano: Giuffrè 2013); P. Craig, EU 
Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012). 
12 The author is aware that the definition of the rule of law as developed by the CJEU is not satisfactory; 
however, for the purpose of this thesis it will be used since it is the one enforced by the Court and recognised 
by the Union legal system. See introduction and chapter I for the complete reasoning behind this choice.  
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implements its external action: legality, the duty to state reasons, the duty of care, and the 
guarantee of participatory procedures. The choice of principles, besides addressing the 
features and the impact that the external administrative power exercises, also attempts 
to be comprehensive in upholding the two fundamental functions of the administrative 
rule of law: rationality of outcomes and individual protection.13 The formality of the 
administrative decision-making process, coupled with the opportunity for participation 
of natural and legal persons within the process, are ranked among the values commonly 
recognized by any modern system of governance committed to the rule of law.14 
Participatory processes emphasise the protective function of the rule of law, whereas 
legality, the duty of care and the duty to state reasons constitute process standards in 
ensuring the rationality of the procedure’s final outcome.15 However, as will become clear 
from this chapter, the distinction is not always sharp. The interplay among the four 
selected principles has the potential to work both towards the achievement of better 
outcomes, as well as protect affected parties. In Fuller’s theory too, there is an intuition 
that if we respect the formality of a procedure, we will likely find ourselves relatively 
safeguarded against more substantive assaults.16 
 Hereby the choice of the principles will be presented. However, the single choices 
will be further discussed throughout the chapter. 
 
 Legality: According to the principle of legality, the public administration must act 
under and within the law. As discussed in chapter II, administrative power in the SAP 
and ENP is exercised in a non-linear manner in that administrative action is not always 
framed within parameters established by the legislator. It is in this context that the 
                                                          
13 The enhancement of procedural rules likely to lead to adequate outcomes is a requirement mandated by 
the rule of law to the extent that material justice – substantive quality of the decision – is a value to be upheld 
beyond formal correctness of the procedures. The improvement of procedural rules guaranteeing 
participatory procedures is a requirement mandated by the rule of law to the extent that no one should be 
subject to a penalty or serious loss resulting from public action without being offered the opportunity to 
put forth their views of the facts. J. Mendes, ‘Rule of Law and Participation: A Normative Analysis of 
Internationalised Rulemaking as Composite Procedures’, Jean Monnet Working Paper Series, JMWP 13/13, 
at 17; J. Waldron, ‘The rule of law and the importance of procedure’, in J.E. Fleming (eds.), Getting to the Rule 
of Law (New York: New York University Press 2011), at 16 and at 22. 
14 H.P. Nehl, Principles of Administraive Procedures in EC Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 1999), at 21. 
15 H.P. Nehl, ‘Good Administration as procedural right and/or general principle?’, in H.C.H. Hofmann and 
A.H. Türk (eds.), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law Towards and Integrated Administration 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2009), 322, at 349. 
16 ‘To judge [people’s] action by unpublished or retrospective laws…is to convey to [them] your indifference 
to [their] power to self-determination.’ L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press 
1969), at 162. See also J. Waldron, ‘The rule of law and the importance of procedure’, in J.E. Fleming (eds.), 
Getting to the Rule of Law (New York: New York University Press 2011), at 14-16. 
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principle of legality is chosen as a fundamental pillar in guaranteeing that 
administrative actors conduct their duties within power and for a proper purpose.17  
 Duty to state reasons and the duty of care: Internally, the wide discretionary powers 
granted to the administration in choosing the most appropriate policy measures is 
coupled with a duty to place itself in the best possible conditions when assessing the 
propriety of the decision.18 In this respect, the duty to state reasons and the duty of 
care are administrative procedures, derived from the administrative rule of law, aimed 
at controlling the Commission’s power of appraisal.19 As discussed in chapters II and 
III, the administration, in implementing the SAP and the ENP, enjoys significant 
discretion. The discretion enjoyed by the Commission when implementing the EU 
wider neighbourhood policies does not simply refer to a situation in which the 
administration enjoys a broad margin of manoeuvre; it also indicates the task granted 
to the Commission of balancing between different public interests.20 Such relevant task 
has to be acknowledged in the application of the duty to state reasons and of the duty 
of care to the external administrative action of the Union. Finally, the duty to state 
reasons, by explaining and justifying an action taken in the exercise of authority, has 
the potential to protect individuals during the administrative processes of the SAP and 
ENP.  
 Participation: Participation can generally be defined as the ability of natural and legal 
persons to take part in the decision-making process.21 Participatory procedures on the 
one hand serve the function of controlling the exercise of administrative discretion; on 
the other, they rest on dignitary considerations. Imposing specific standards and a 
reform agenda on third states in exchange for macro financial assistance is not like 
deciding what to do about a rabid animal; it requires paying attention to the point of 
                                                          
17 H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe and A.H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2013), at 150. 
18 H.P. Nehl, Principles of Administraive Procedures in EC Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 1999), at 116. 
19 ‘[W]here the Community institutions have such a power of appraisal, respect for the rights guaranteed by 
the Community legal order in administrative procedures is of even more fundamental importance. Those 
guarantees include, in particular, the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially 
all the relevant aspects of the individual case, the right of the person concerned to make his views known 
and to have an adequately reasoned decision. Only in this way can the Court verify whether the factual and 
legal elements upon which the exercise of the power of appraisal depends were present.’ Case C-269/90 
Hauptzollamt München-Mitte v. Technische Universität München, EU:C:1991:438, para. 14. H.P. Nehl, 
Principles of Administrative Procedures in EC Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 1999), at 108. 
20 For example, when choosing which project to finance; see chapter III, section 2.1. 
21 Among others see M.P. Chiti, Partecipazione popolare e pubblica amministrazione (Pisa: Pacini Editore 
1997), 34-35. 
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view of the third state. It is about respecting the personality of the entity the Union is 
dealing with.22 As discussed in chapter III, the net of administrative activities 
implementing the SAP and the ENP have the potential of affecting third states as well 
as natural and legal persons. Therefore, granting the possibility to affected parties to 
put forward their argumentation can really do justice to the value we place on the 
respect of the rule of law in its protective function. Participation can take the form of 
‘participation at large’, and of individual rights granted to holders of legally protected 
interests who are affected by the outcome of a decision.23 Finally, participation plays 
an important role in respect of external administrative activities since it guarantees 
that in a system such as the EU external relations, where the mechanisms of judicial 
review are insufficient, stakeholders can have their views heard.24  
 
At a first glance, the decision to exclude the principle of good administration from the 
choice of principles may seem odd. However, the principle does not seem to fit 
comfortably within the analysis carried out by this chapter. The principle of good 
administration overlaps with the rule of law; however, its meaning is still ambiguous. The 
principle, as many sustain, does not denote a specific procedural principle with a 
particular content and legal effect of its own.25 The Court’s case law does not treat it as an 
autonomous principle; it is, instead, often associated with other principles, rights and 
duties (e.g. the duty of care).26 Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) titled 
‘the right to good administration’ does not seem to diverge from this understanding of the 
principle, although it might have further complicated its terminological and conceptual 
                                                          
22 J. Waldron, ‘The rule of law and the importance of procedure’, in J.E. Fleming (eds.), Getting to the Rule of 
Law (New York: New York University Press 2011), at 16 and at 22. 
23 J. Mendes, Participation in EU Rule-Making: A Rights-Based Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2011), 28-29. 
24 Chapter I, section 4.3 and chapter V, section 2.1. 
25 H.P. Nehl, ‘Good Administration as procedural right and/or general principle?’, in H.C.H. Hofmann and 
A.H. Türk (eds.), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law Towards and Integrated Administration 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2009), 322-351; F. T. Banfi, ‘Il diritto ad una buona 
amministrazione’, in M. Chiti e G. Greco (eds.), Trattato di diritto amministrativo, Tomo I, (Milano: Giuffrè 
2003), 49-50; J. Mendes, ‘Good Administration in EU law and the European Code of Good Administrative 
Behaviour’, EUI Working Papers Series, Department of Law, LAW 2009/09, at 3. 
26 Case 32/62 Alvis v. Council of the EEC, EU:C:1963:15, para. 1; Case C-255/90, Burban v. Parliament 
EU:C:1992:153, paras 7 and 12; Case T-167/94 Nölle v. Council and Commission, EU:T:1995:169, para. 53. 
H.P. Nehl, ‘Good Administration as procedural right and/or general principle?’, in H.C.H. Hofmann and A.H. 
Türk (eds.), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law Towards and Integrated Administration (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing 2009), 327-338. 
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framework.27 One novelty of article 41 CFR consists in raising good administration to a 
general category under which a whole set of subjective rights may be subsumed with the 
intention of limiting arbitrary administrative conduct in the Union.28 However, the set of 
rights and principles subsumed by article 41 CFR are already protected by the Union legal 
order, that is, either by the Treaties or by the jurisprudence of the Court.29 The meaning 
of good administration as an independent right still remains obscure.30 Therefore, its 
application in an uncharted territory – like the one of external relations – becomes 
particularly problematic. What is, however, interesting to highlight in respect of article 41 
CFR, is the lack of clarity as to whether it would even be applicable to the Union’s 
administrative external action.  
Article 41 CFR is positioned under the heading ‘Citizens’ rights’ even if the wording 
of the article refers to ‘[e]very person’. Therefore, there seems to be lack of clarity as to 
whether the right is granted to every person or only to Union citizens. The commentary 
on the Charter does not seem to shed light on the issue. If on the one hand the commentary 
states that article 41 is particularly remarkable for its general nature that makes it 
applicable to every person independently of their nationality or citizenship; on the other, 
it states that the article must be related for the modalities of its application to the specific 
provisions of articles 42 and 43 CFR.31 Articles 42 and 43 CFR are applicable to '[a]ny 
citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office 
in a Member State'. Does this mean that the wording ‘any individual’ of article 41 is 
actually limited to the place of residence or to the registered office? If this is the case, why 
wasn’t the same wording of articles 42 and 43 CFR used also for article 41 CFR? Would 
such an interpretation imply that the action of the Union administration cannot harm 
those outside the boundaries of the Union? Or, more generally, would such interpretation 
                                                          
27 Article 41, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ [2000] C364/1, 18.12.2000 
(hereafter CFR); J. Mendes, ‘Good Administration in EU law and the European Code of Good Administrative 
Behaviour’, EUI Working Papers Series, Department of Law, LAW 2009/09, at 4. 
28 L. Azoulai, ‘Le principe de bonne administration’, in J-B. Auby, J. Dutheil de La Rochère (eds.), Droit 
Administratif Européen, (Bruxelles: Bruylant 2007), 496-511; quoted by J. Mendes, ‘Good Administration in 
EU law and the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour’, EUI Working Papers Series, Department 
of Law, LAW 2009/09, at 3. 
29 P. Craig, ‘Article 41 – Right to Good Administration’, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. Ward, The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights A Commentary, (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014), 1069-1098. 
30 J. Mendes, ‘Good Administration in EU law and the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour’, EUI 
Working Papers Series, Department of Law, LAW 2009/09, at 3. 
31 Commentary on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, June 2006, 328-333. Available 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016). 
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imply the absence of administrative action externally? The unclear formulation of article 
41 CFR represents a genuine lacuna in the Union legal system in as far as it does not openly 
face the impact of EU administrative action externally. 
 
1.2 Are there implementing arrangements operationalising the principles externally? 
 
Once the key principles giving effect to the administrative rule of law externally have been 
chosen, the next step requires identifying the implementing arrangements in place (or 
which ought to be in place) with the aim of articulating their application within the 
external relations context. Identifying the implementing arrangements that 
operationalize the principles is a fundamental step in order for them to serve their 
functions also when framing the Union’s external relations. The change in interlocutors 
from the internal to the external domain demands thinking about the operationalization 
of the principles in this new context. For example, the application of the duty to hear the 
other side has so far manly regulated the relation between the Member States and the 
Union; and between national or Union authorities and persons under their jurisdiction. 
Therefore, implementing arrangements are necessary for the duty to hear the other side 
to serve its function also when regulating the relations between the Union and third 
states, including their natural and legal persons. Even among internal policies, case law 
varies as to the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for the duty to hear the other 
side to be applicable.32 In some cases, the implementing arrangements operationalising 
the principles externally are to be found scattered in different documents (e.g. the Court’s 
case law, Ombudsman decisions, secondary law, self-imposed guidelines, etc.); while in 
other situations their ‘construction’ might be necessary.33  
 The lack of driving forces determined to give effect to the administrative rule of law 
externally does not imply a complete vacuum of norms. For example, the application of 
the duty of care externally was recently operationalized by the General Court in the Front 
Polisario case.34 As it will become clear later in the chapter, the General Court in this case 
                                                          
32 The case law on the duty to hear the other side varies according to policy area. In this respect, different 
approaches are taken as to whether the right to be heard is accorded only where the contested measure is 
initiated against a claimant; or where there is an individual measure that adversely affects a person. P. Craig, 
EU Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), at 290. 
33 The duties that the administration ought to respect when acting externally should apply as a matter of 
principle not only when specifically envisaged. However, their operationalisation through internal 
implementing arrangements shows that out-of-court procedures are developing in order to give effect to 
the rule of law when the Union acts externally. 
34 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953. 
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established that the respect of the duty of care externally implies that the Council has an 
obligation to examine carefully and impartially whether the action of the Union in third 
states can potentially violate human rights.35 Furthermore, the numerous self-imposed 
rules aimed at regulating how progress reports, action plans, human rights impact 
assessments, etc. need to be adopted, seem to fill a normative gap in the development of 
the two policies. The administration, over the years, in managing the growing complexity 
of the relations governing the Union and its neighbours had to impose on itself some 
internal guidelines as to how to adopt all the administrative acts implementing the two 
policies. The complexity and the level of details of the internal guidelines have increased 
over time.36 However, in the absence of implementing arrangements aimed at 
operationalising the administrative principles externally, several questions need to be 
answered: Does this absence present a genuine lacuna in the legal system? Ought new 
implementing arrangements to be constructed? If the ‘construction’ of implementing 
arrangements ought to be envisaged, the chapter uses as a starting point the function of 
the principles internally and makes some suggestions as to what ought to be envisaged 
when applied in the external relation domain.  
 
1.3 The interconnected sources giving effect to the administrative rule of law externally  
 
This chapter takes a broad approach to the different sources that have so far tried to guide 
the exercise of administrative power externally. The implementing arrangements in place 
aimed at operationalising the principles giving effect to the administrative rule of law 
externally are to be found scattered in primary law, secondary law, the jurisprudence of 
the Court, decisions of the Ombudsman and in self-imposed guidelines. The chapter in its 
analysis also uses the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour (ECGAB).37 The 
Code is a non-legally binding instrument proposed by the European Ombudsman in 1999 
to European institutions, agencies and bodies as a blue- print for the adoption of their own 
                                                          
35 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 225. 
36 A comparison between the Enlargement package of 2012 with the one of 2015 clearly shows a substantial 
effort made by DG NEAR to clarify the procedure and methodology that needs to be adopted when compiling 
progress reports. European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, Guidance Note Enlargement 
Package 2012, Access to documents request GESTDEM Reference 2013/3857; European Commission, 
Directorate General for Enlargement, Guidance Note Enlargement package 2015, Access to Documents 
request GESTDEM reference 2016/450. 
37 European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, available at: 
<http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/resources/code.faces#/page/1> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
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codes of conduct.38 It aims at concretising the rules and principles against which the 
Ombudsman could assess cases of maladministration, providing a guide for the staff of 
Union institutions and bodies regarding their relationship with the public, and informing 
individuals about the standards and rights of administration they may expect.39 
 The different sources have different legal implications for administration. Primary 
and secondary legislation, as well as the jurisprudence of the Court may impose legally 
binding obligations on the exercise of administrative power. Non-legal rules and decisions 
of the Ombudsman, for their part, define standards of conduct that the administration is 
invited to respect. Despite this difference, the chapter tries to provide a pragmatic picture 
as to how the administrative rule of law could be respected externally through the 
interconnection of all different sources: primary and secondary legislation, case law of the 
Court, decisions of the Ombudsman, and self-imposed guidelines. Such a comprehensive 
approach helps to structure the encounter between administrative law and policies which 
have so far been running mainly on European Council and Council conclusions, self-
imposed rules, and crystallised practice. The chapter now continues in its analysis by 
taking into consideration each principle presented in section 1.1 separately.  
 The following proposals as to how legality, the duty to state reasons, the duty of care 
and participation ought to be applied externally are intended as blueprints of possible 
ways in which the meeting between administrative law and external relations could be 
structured, with the final goal of upholding the rule of law in the way the Union develops 
and implements its external action. The scheme used for each principle proceeds as 
follows. First, it identifies the meaning and the functions that each of the selected 
principles have internally (with a view to further explaining why they have been chosen 
for the external domain); second, it checks whether implementing arrangements are in 
place operationalising the principles externally; and finally, it evaluates the current state 
of art by questioning whether new implementing arrangements ought to be envisaged for 
the full operationalisation of the principle in the external relation context.  
 
 
                                                          
38 The European Parliament endorsed it in 2001 by adopting resolution A5-0245/2001. 
39 For a detail account on the ECGAB see J. Mendes, ‘Good Administration in EU law and the European Code 
of Good Administrative Behaviour’, EUI Working Papers Series, Department of Law, LAW 2009/09 – 
published in French: J. Mendes, ‘La Bonne Administration en Droit Communautaire et le Code Européen de 
Bonne Conduite Administrative’, 131 Revue Française d’Administration Publique, 2009, 555-571. 
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2. Legality of administrative action 
 
2.1 The principle internally: any chance of failing in its function externally? 
 
The requirement of legality of administrative action includes a number of specific 
elements: acting within powers;40 acting in conformity with legally mandated 
procedures;41 correct exercise of discretion;42 and responding to justified legal claims.43 
Article 236(2) TFEU, dealing with the review of legality of acts adopted by the EU 
institutions having legal effects, makes the application of these elements explicit.44 The 
CJEU stated that ‘any intervention by the public authorities must have a legal basis and be 
justified on the grounds laid down by law’.45 Therefore, the administration must respect 
the primacy of legislation and conform to the stipulations contained in it. The office of the 
European Ombudsman has also defined ‘lawfulness’ in article 4 of its European Code of 
Good Administrative Behaviour (ECGAB). Article 4 ECGAB states the following:  
 
‘The official shall act according to law and apply the rules and procedures laid down 
in EU legislation. The official shall in particular take care to ensure that decisions 
which affect the rights or interests of individuals have a basis in law and that their 
content complies with the law.’ Article 4 ECGAB.’ 
 
 As analysed in chapter II, the administration, in implementing the EU wider 
neighbourhood policies, is confronted with a general lack of basic parameters for the 
exercise of its power.46 Much of the action of the administration in the SAP and the ENP is 
regulated by European Council Conclusions, Council Conclusions, or by administrative 
self-regulations rather than by positive law. Does the lack of primary and secondary law 
                                                          
40 Article 13(2) TEU establishes that ‘Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on 
it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them. The 
institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation.’  
41 The Court stated in relation to the satisfaction of the right of defence that respect for it ‘must […] be 
ensured not only in administrative procedures which may lead to the imposition of penalties but also during 
preliminary inquiry procedures such as investigation which may be decisive in providing evidence of the 
unlawful nature of conduct engaged in by undertaking for which they may be liable.’ Case 46/87 Hoechst v. 
Commission EU:C:1989:337. 
42 The CJEU has established the broad principle that where ‘the administration enjoys a wide margin of 
discretion […] the Court is confined to examining whether the exercise of such a discretion contains a 
manifest error or constitutes a misuse of power or whether the administrative authority in question did not 
clearly exceed the bounds of its discretion.’ Case 55/75 Balkan Import Export GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Berlin 
Packhof, EU:C:1976:8, para. 8. 
43 H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe and A.H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2013), at 151. 
44 ‘[…] lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the 
Treaties of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers.’ Article 263(2) TFEU.  
45 Case 46/87 Hoechst v. Commission EU:C:1989:337, summary point 3; see also article 13(2) TEU. 
46 Chapter II, section 2.1. 
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imply that the principle of legality fails in its function externally? In the context of the EU 
wider neighbourhood policies the principle of legality of administrative action does not 
follow the same dynamics of the principle of legality internally; however, that does not 
mean that it lacks purpose. The administrative power exercised by the Union in 
implementing the SAP and the ENP is not completely without guidelines; rather, it finds 
its basic parameters mainly outside primary and secondary legislation. 
 
2.2 Implementing arrangements in the external domain: scarcity does not mean absence 
 
The principle of legality when applied in the realm of the EU wider neighbourhood ought 
to be stretched in order to include, alongside positive law, other typologies of acts aimed 
at guaranteeing that the action of the administration is exercised within the boundaries 
established by the Union’s system of external governance and international law sources. 
This section aims at challenging the assumption that legality, in its operationalisation 
externally, is confined to the law as contained in primary and secondary legislation. 
 
 As operationalised by the Court and by the European Ombudsman 
 
The legality of external administrative action has been operationalised by the European 
Ombudsman. The three cases that will be hereby presented all deal with complainants 
asking the Ombudsman to establish whether the action or inaction of the Commission in 
the exercise of its administrative power externally amounted to maladministration. 
Specifically, the claimants wanted to ascertain whether the Commission did not respect 
its obligations to follow certain rules when acting externally in accordance with article 4 
entitled ‘lawfulness’ of the ECGAB. The European Ombudsman was able in few instances 
to offer some guidance as to the boundaries that need to be respected by the 
administrative power when acting externally.47 
 In the first case, the claimant stated that the Commission had not respected its legal 
obligations in the way it developed the ‘National Parks Rehabilitation Project’ in southern 
Ethiopia. The legal obligations derived from the EU Development policy, the IV Lomé 
Convention, the OECD guidelines on resettlement, and international human rights 
agreements. The claimant listed a series of flaws in the way the Commission had 
                                                          
47 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration, (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014), 
80-84; A. Tsadiras, ‘Unravelling Ariadne’s Thread: the European Ombudsman’s Investigative Powers’, 45 
Common Market Law Review 2008, 757-770.  
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implemented the project (e.g. insufficient attention was given to cultural and social issues, 
lack of consultation with affected people, etc.).48 Against this background, the 
Ombudsman checked whether the Commission in the implementation of the Ethiopian 
project had taken due account of the values that became essential in the EU development 
policy (i.e. cultural and social values through grass roots community participation), and 
whether it had complied with international law (in this case Human Rights 
Conventions).49 In respect to the first point, the Ombudsman noted that environmental, 
cultural and social values have become essential values in the EU development co-
operation policy, and that the IV Lomé Convention has made social issues a priority in the 
design, appraisal, execution and evaluation of any project.50 Accordingly, he affirmed that 
‘the implementation of any project has to take due account of the existing cultural and 
social milieu, by means of community participation at a grass root level’.51 Therefore, the 
Ombudsman seems to have used the values of the policy to determine the procedural 
obligations that need to be respected by the Commission when implementing its projects. 
As to the second point, the Ombudsman, by referencing to the case law of the Court of 
Justice, stated that ‘EU development co-operation, as any other EU policy, has to be 
consistent with existing international law obligations’.52 Moreover, he stated that the 
same IV Lomé Convention outlines the importance of this principle in the context of 
respect for human rights.53 In the case at stake the human rights obligation to which the 
complainant was referring to are the one stemming from the UN International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  The Ombudsman, in assessing whether the 
Commission complied with the principle of legality in developing and applying the 
                                                          
48 Decision on 26 October 2000 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 530/98/JMA against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB. 
49 Decision on 26 October 2000 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 530/98/JMA against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, points 2.3-2.5. 
50 Articles 36, 142 and 144 of the IV Lomé Convention. 
51 Decision on 26 October 2000 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 530/98/JMA against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, point 2.3. 
52 Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigations, EU:C:1992:453, para 9; see also, C-162/96 A. Racke GmbH 
& Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, EU:C:1998:293, para 45; Decision on 26 October 2000 of the European 
Ombudsman on complaint 530/98/JMA against the European Commission, external relations, breach of 
Article 4 ECGAB, point 2.4.  
53 Article 5(2) of the IV Lomé Convention, Decision on 26 October 2000 of the European Ombudsman on 
complaint 530/98/JMA against the European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, 
point 2.4. 
The administrative rule of law applied to the Union external action 
128 
 
project, checked if it respected the values of the policy (and their engrained procedures) 
as well as international law.54 
 In the second case, the complainant alleged that, in the face of serious human rights 
violations by the Republic of Vietnam, the Commission failed to use its power to suspend 
the Cooperation Agreement with Vietnam.55 In this context, the Ombudsman started his 
analysis with the text of the agreement in order to determine whether there were any 
guidelines for the implementation of the clause. Given that there were no such guidelines, 
the Ombudsman then turned to the Treaties of the European Union which again did not 
specify how the human rights clauses should be implemented.56 However, the lack of 
binding rules did not stop the Ombudsman in his analysis. On the contrary, he stated that 
even if the Community legislator seemingly intended to confer a large degree of discretion 
upon the Commission for the interpretation and application of the clause, this did not 
imply a complete absence of legal limits.57 In this context the Commission set out various 
principles for the operationalization of the human rights clause in its 1995 Commission 
Communication.58 Thus, the Ombudsman assessed the legality of the inaction by the 
Commission against the principles outlined in the 1995 Commission Communication.59 In 
both these first two cases, the Ombudsman found the action and the inaction of the 
Commission to be lawful.  
 The third case concerns the alleged failure of the Commission to carry out a human 
rights impact assessment (HR impact assessment) during the negotiations for a free trade 
agreement (FTA) between the EU and Vietnam.60 In this case the Ombudsman decided 
that although there was no express and specific legally binding requirement to carry out 
an HR impact assessment during the negotiations for an FTA with Vietnam, it would 
nonetheless be in the spirit of article 21(1)(2) TEU to carry out an HR impact 
                                                          
54 Decision on 26 October 2000 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 530/98/JMA against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, point 2.5. 
55 Decision on 28 June 2005 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 933/2004/JMA against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB. 
56 Decision on 28 June 2005 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 933/2004/JMA against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, point 1.5. 
57 Decision on 28 June 2005 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 933/2004/JMA against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, point 1.6. 
58 Commission Communication of 23 May 1995, ‘Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Principles and Human 
Rights in Agreement between the Community and Third Countries’, COM 23/1995. 
59 Decision on 28 June 2005 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 933/2004/JMA against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, point 1.6. 
60 Decision on 26 February 2016 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 1409/2014/JN against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, Duty of care. 
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assessment.61 Moreover, she62 stated that it would also be consistent both with the 
Commission's current practice of carrying out HR impact assessments and with the 2012 
Human Rights Action Plan.63 On the other hand, the Commission is of the view that since 
the negotiations with Vietnam took place under the legal framework established for the 
Association of South-Eastern Nations FTA (ASEAN FTA), the 2009 ASEAN Sustainability 
Impact Assessment was still valid and relevant in a bilateral context. The regional impact 
assessment provided country-level details and addressed the impact on individual 
countries.64 Furthermore, the Commission argued that: 
 
 ‘Articles 21 TEU and 207 TFEU do not mandate a specific procedural instrument such 
as an HR impact assessment. Therefore, the EU institutions enjoy a wide margin of 
discretion in ensuring the general policy objective of consistency between different 
areas of external action’.65 
 
The Commission warned against the possible retroactive application of a requirement to 
carry out an HR impact assessment. It noted that the Council authorised the negotiations 
with ASEAN FTA (including Vietnam) in April 2007, and that the bilateral negotiations 
with Vietnam were conducted in the framework of the 2007 authorisation, while the 
Commission submitted its new practice of systematically including its HR impact 
assessments in 2011.66 It is in this context that the Ombudsman made it clear that the 
respect for human rights cannot be subjected to considerations of mere convenience.67 
Thus, she found that the Commission's refusal to carry out an HR impact assessment 
constituted an instance of maladministration in breach of article 4 ECGAB. The lack of 
hard-law measures did not prevent the Ombudsman from deriving procedural 
                                                          
61 Decision on 26 February 2016 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 1409/2014/JN against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, Duty of care, point 24. 
62 On the 1 October 2013 Emily O’Reilly took office as European Ombudsman as successor of Nikiforos 
Diamandouros. 
63 The 2012 Action Plan requires the Commission to incorporate human rights in all impact assessment 
when conducting negotiations on trade agreements that have significant economic, social and 
environmental impacts. Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, Council 
Document 11855/12, 25 June 2012; Decision on 26 February 2016 of the European Ombudsman on 
complaint 1409/2014/JN against the European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, 
Duty of care, point 25. 
64 Decision on 26 February 2016 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 1409/2014/JN against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, Duty of care, point 3. 
65 Decision on 26 February 2016 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 1409/2014/JN against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, Duty of care, point 12. 
66 Decision on 26 February 2016 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 1409/2014/JN against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, Duty of care, point 14. 
67 Decision on 26 February 2016 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 1409/2014/JN against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, Duty of care, point 26. 
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obligations. On the contrary, if there had been hard law establishing the obligation then 
perhaps the retroactivity argument would have had a greater weight; but because the 
Ombudsman was concerned with the Commission’s own self-regulatory practice it was 
easier to establish that the obligation to carry out HRIA should be applied retrospectively.  
 According to the Ombudsman, the power of the administration in external relations 
is not unbounded. The cases provide guidance as to the boundaries that need to be 
respected by the administrative power when acting externally, also in the absence of 
legally binding rules. When assessing whether the administration is in breach of article 4 
ECGAB, the Ombudsman considered the following points: whether the administration has 
the responsibility to exercise a specific power; and whether the administration has to 
follow procedures – explicitly provided or implied – aimed at limiting the Commission’s 
discretion or aimed at protecting values of overarching importance. If the primary and 
secondary law in place (which shall always be the starting point of the analysis) are not 
sufficient in determining the lawfulness of the action of the administration because they 
are silent as to how the administration shall carry out its tasks, then the door was opened 
by the Ombudsman to the values underpinning the policy; its consistency with 
international law;68 the spirit of the articles dealing with the external action of the 
Union;69 administrative self-regulations;70 and the action plans adopted by the Council in 
areas dealing with the external action of the Union.71   
 
 As operationalised by internal rules72  
 
The scarcity of legally mandated rules aimed at guiding and constraining the exercise of 
administrative power in the Union’ wider neighbourhood policies is accompanied by the 
values underpinning the policies and by an increasing body of self-imposed guidelines 
developed by the administration. Over time the Commission and the EEAS have imposed 
on themselves rules as to how they should exercise their own power in implementing the 
                                                          
68 E.g. Human rights agreements like the UN International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. 
69 E.g. Article 21(1)(2) TEU. 
70 E.g. Commission Communication of 23 May 1995, ‘Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Principles and 
Human Rights in Agreement between the Community and Third Countries’, COM 23/1995. 
71 Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, Council Document 11855/12, 25 
June 2012. 
72 Internal rules under this heading (and the following ones throughout the chapter) include: administrative 
self-imposed guidelines, European Parliament resolutions, European Council conclusions, and Council 
conclusions.  
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EU wider neighbourhood policies. An overview of all the documents shows the presence 
of procedural guidelines as to how the administrative power should be carried out. This 
internal framework exemplifies the need of the administration to find ways of 
constraining its own power in the absence of given rules.  As it will become clear later in 
this chapter, this self-imposed rules, not only try to reflect the values underpinning the 
SAP and the ENP, but also operationalise some important principles of EU administrative 
law.   
 The essential values underpinning the SAP and the ENP can be found in various 
sources: Treaties articles, financial assistance regulations, self-imposed guidelines, etc.73 
The two overarching values underpinning the SAP are: conditionality and differentiation. 
Under the conditionality principle the EU’s commitment and assistance to the SAP states 
are matched by a genuine commitment of the third countries’ governments to make 
necessary reforms to advance its relations with the Union.74 The principle of 
conditionality can either be enforced through negative sanctions or positive incentives. 
Particularly in the case of the SAP, the principle derives its significance primarily through 
incentives offered in case of compliance.75 The Union’s commitment to the SAP states also 
reflects the particular stage of development of each county; it is tailored to its specific 
needs.76 The final goal for the SAP states is accession; however, the road to achieve the 
final goal may be tailor-made to the needs of each country. Besides these two overarching 
values, several others are tied to specific administrative activities. For example, while 
compiling progress reports the Commission should ensure ‘consistency and a fair 
assessment across all the reports’.77  
                                                          
73 E.g. Article 8 TEU; Preamble (point 4) of Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] 
L77/13, 15.03.2014; Preamble (point 5) Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 
15.03.2014. 
74 Commission Communication of 21 May 2003, ‘The Western Balkans and European Integration’, 
COM(2003) 285 final, at 3. 
75 C. Pippan, ‘The Rocky Road to Europe: The EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western 
Balkans and the Principle of Conditionality’, 9 European Foreign Affairs Review 2004, at 240; G. Pentassuglia, 
‘The EU and the Protection of Minorities: The Case of Eastern Europe’, 12 European Journal of International 
Law 2001, at 25. 
76 Commission Communication of 21 May 2003, ‘The Western Balkans and European Integration’, 
COM(2003) 285 final, at 3; article 4: ‘Assistance shall be differentiated in scope and intensity according to 
needs, commitment to reforms and progress in implementing those reforms.’ Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument for Pre-
accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014. 
77 European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, Guidance Note Enlargement package 2015, 
Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2016/450. 
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 The two main values underlying the ENP are joint ownership and differentiation.78 
These two underpinning values have been reinforced by the latest Commission 
Communication on the review of the ENP.79 The ENP is based on the joint ownership of 
the process, i.e. that the EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its 
partners; instead, they will be defined by common consent and will vary from country to 
country. Differentiation within the ENP acquires a diverse meaning compared to the SAP. 
While for the SAP the common goal is accession, differentiation in the ENP also implies 
that the ambition of each partnership will depend on the third country’s geographical 
location, political and economic situation, relations with the Union and the neighbouring 
countries, reform programmes, and perceived interests in the context of the ENP.80 
Differentiation is also linked to conditionality. More integration in the EU market and 
more financial assistance is granted to ENP countries that show particular willingness to 
respect the Union’s funding values.81 The two overarching values underlying the ENP 
become particularly relevant for the content of action plans. The guidance notice on how 
to draft action plans indicates the importance of respecting joint ownership by building 
them in accordance with the partner’s reform plan and its particular circumstances.82 As 
for the SAP, also for the ENP: alongside overarching values, several others are linked to 
the adoption of the single administrative acts. ENP progress reports shall be objective.83 
The ENI strategy papers and programming documents shall be coherent with the Union’s 
external policy objectives and principles; they shall guarantee coherence between 
                                                          
78 Communication from the Commission of 12 May 2004 on ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’, COM(2004) 
373 final. 
79 ‘Differentiation and greater mutual ownership will be the hallmark of the new ENP, recognizing that not 
all partners aspire to EU rules and standards, and reflecting the wishes of each country concerning the 
nature and focus of its partnership with the EU.’ Joint Communication of 18 November 2015, ‘Review of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy’, JOIN(2015) 50 final, at 2.  
80 Communication from the Commission of 12 May 2004, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’, COM(2004) 
373 final, at 8. 
81 The Commission made explicit the conditionality attached to shared values, and the resulting priorities 
identified in the Action Plans in its Communication of 12 May 2004, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’, 
COM(2004) 373 final, at 13. See also M. Cremona, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: More than a 
Partnership?’ in M. Cremona (eds.), Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2008), 244, 283-285. 
82 EEAS, Non-Paper: Guidelines for Future ENP Action Plan 05.01.2012, Access to Documents request SG1 - 
Corporate Board Secretariat; Joint Communication of 18 November 2015, ‘Review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy’, JOIN(2015) 50 final, at 2. 
83 EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2013/5084. 
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different financial instruments and the action of other donors; and they should be aligned 
to corresponding national or local strategy.84   
 Internal self-imposed guidelines provide for the procedural regime that needs to be 
followed by the Commission and the EEAS when implementing the SAP and the ENP. For 
example, the latest Guidance note for the 2015 Enlargement Package, in indicating the 
sources which shall be used by the Commission in drafting progress reports, specifies 
which actors shall be consulted.85 Similarly, also the guidelines for future ENP action plans 
envisage a consultation process ‘[t]he Delegations in the respective ENP partner country 
and headquarters will also hold consultations with civil society in the respective ENP 
partner country prior to the start of negotiations’.86 The same holds true also for internal 
documents indicating how programming of financial assistance under the ENI and IPA II 
regulations should be carried out. The Instructions for the Programming of the ENI 2014-
2020 specify the procedures to be followed by the Commission and the EEAS when 
programming financial assistance for ENP countries, as well as for those with no action 
plan or association agenda (currently Belarus, Syria and Libya).87 The IPA II Quick Guide 
also specify that extensive consultations between the Commission, the EU delegations, the 
beneficiaries and the wider donor community (including civil society and non-state 
stakeholders) need to be carried out in the preparation phase of country action 
programmes.88  
 
                                                          
84 See article 4(5) and points 13, 14, 16, 18 of the preamble of Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), 
OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014; EEAS and European Commission, Directorate General for Development and 
Cooperation – EuropeAid, Strategic Priorities 2014-2020 and Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2017 
European Neighbourhood-wide measures, Access to Documents request SG1 - Corporate Board Secretariat. 
85 Among others: country authorities, international organisations, NGOs, think tanks, local organisations, 
etc. European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, Guidance Note Enlargement package 2015, 
Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2016/450. 
86 EEAS, Non-Paper: Guidelines for Future ENP Action Plan 05.01.2012, Access to Documents request SG1 - 
Corporate Board Secretariat; EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request 
GESTDEM reference 2013/5084.  
87 ‘The formulation of an EU specific CSP [Country Strategy Paper] implies a prior assessment of the 
situation in the country and the national policies and implementation plans as well as the relations with the 
EU. This assessment will need to be carried out by the Delegations, in consultation with key actors, including 
civil society and private sector […].’ Instruction for the Programming of the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI) 2014-2020, available at: 
<https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/ENI%20programming%20instructions.pdf> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
88 European Commission, Directorate General Enlargement, Quick Guide to IPA II Programming, Access to 
Documents request GESTDEM reference 2016/451, also available at: 
<http://abdigm.meb.gov.tr/projeler/ois/014.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016), at 25. 
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2.3 Evaluating the state of art: time for some stretching? 
 
If on the one hand the definition of legality seems to be straightforward and as such is 
applicable in highly positivist traditions of legislative guidance of public power, on the 
other this same definition seems less obvious in dynamic and constant developing legal 
orders such as that of the European Union. Administrative power, when exercised 
externally, is often carried out through non-legally binding acts, which, despite their 
relevance, do not find a clear basis in primary and secondary legislation. The lack of 
legislative guidance does not imply a total lack of rules aimed at constraining the exercise 
of administrative power. The procedural and substantive structures developed by self-
imposed guidelines implementing the SAP and the ENP are an example. The application 
of the principle of legality externally has been operationalised by the Ombudsman in 
order to face the challenges posed by the external realm. The Ombudsman stretched the 
definition of legality of administrative action to include international law, the respect of 
procedures deriving from the essential values underling a policy, Council’s acts, and 
Commission crystallised practice, particularly if these are aimed at guaranteeing the 
Union’s compliance with values of overarching importance. This approach should be 
praised because it recognises the existence of a relevant power which cannot be left 
unguided. It selects a series of identifiable and policy-relevant parameters both from EU 
and international sources, which have the potential of driving the exercise of 
administrative power externally.  
Finally, an important element of legality of administrative action, namely, 
responding to individual claims, ought to be addressed. Natural and legal persons do 
contact the Commission in order to provide the latter with information concerning, for 
example, the human rights situation in their countries or whether Member States fail to 
comply with their obligations under the agreement. Mr. Mugraby and the coalition of 
Turkish citizens are just two examples.89 Informal communication is rather frequent.90 
Nevertheless, no internal rules regulate such correspondence. The Commission is under 
no obligation to take into account individual complaints, since it is under no duty to take 
                                                          
89 Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418; Case C-581/11 P Mugraby v. Council 
and Commission, EU:C:2012:466; Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner House Research, and The Kurdish 
Human Rights project v. Commission, EU:T:2006:97. 
90 During the author’s traineeship at the European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement (Unit 
Albania), individuals did contact the Commission complaining about e.g. the fact that Italy did not remove 
specific customs duties as envisaged by the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the Union and 
Albania.  
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action in case neighbourhood countries fail to comply with their obligations under the 
agreements concluded with the Union.91 However, as the Court acknowledged in the 
Mugraby case, the Commission is granted a significant power in monitoring the 
compliance by third states with the obligations contained in the agreements. According to 
the Court: 
 
‘[…] it follows from Article 17(1) TEU that the Commission, as guardian of the EU and 
FEU Treaties and of the agreements concluded under them, must ensure the correct 
implementation by a third State of the obligations which it has assumed under an 
agreement concluded with the European Union, using the means provided for by that 
agreement or by the decisions taken pursuant thereto’.92  
 
Therefore, it can be argued that the Commission, in light of its significant role as guardian 
of the agreements and of its monitoring duties under the SAP and ENP framework, ought 
to respect its internal guidelines ‘on the treatment of individual complaints in respect of 
infringements of Union law’ also when handling individual complaints from citizens of the 
SAP and ENP states.93 
 
3. Duty to state reasons 
 
3.1 The principle internally: it is not all about transparency  
 
The duty to state reasons is a legally mandated procedure included in the Treaties and it 
is applicable exclusively to legal acts. Legal acts include legislative acts and administrative 
acts having legal effects.94 Article 296 TFEU clearly states: 
 
‘Legal acts shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any 
proposals, initiatives, recommendations, requests or opinions required by the 
Treaties.’  
 
The Court has been interpreting the substance of the duty in a fairly flexible manner. In 
its early case law the Court took a rather mild approach, simply demanding that reasons 
shall explain ‘in a concise but clear and relevant manner the principal issues of law and of 
fact upon which the decision is based.’95 However, over the years the General Court in Asia 
                                                          
91 Case T-54/99 max.mobil Telekommunikation Service GmbH v. Commission, EU:T:2002:20, paras 70-72. 
92 Case C-581/11 P Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:C:2012:466, para. 68. 
93 Commission Communication of 11 December 2002, ‘Better Monitoring of the Application of Community 
Law’, COM(2002) 725 final, at 13. 
94 P. Craig, ‘Article 41 – Right to Good Administration’, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. Ward, The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights A Commentary, (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014), 1074. 
95 Case 24/62 Germany v. Council, [1963] ECR 36, at 69. 
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Motor France II expanded the meaning of the word ‘reason’ to cover reasoning;96 to shrink 
it again in Omega Air to reasons that would clearly disclose the essential objectives 
pursued by the institution without excessively requiring to make ‘specific statement of 
reasons for the various technical choices made.’97 The Court over the years has converted 
the principle ‘from a very mild, essentially procedural requirement into a very draconian, 
substantive one’ and then again – at its wish – into its former mildness.98 In this context, 
Shapiro argued that the Court in interpreting the duty to state reasons has been ‘heavily 
influenced by the most basically procedural root of the giving reason requirement – the 
desire of transparency in government affairs’.99 A more comprehensive interpretation of 
the principle ought to be welcomed, especially in its operationalisation externally.  
 The operationalisation of the duty to state reasons externally displays a significance 
of its own. It is not simply a legally mandated procedure for legal acts; it has the potential 
to improve the rationality of the administrative action and of protecting individuals 
during the administrative processes executing the Union’s external policies. The duty to 
state reasons combines two fundamental functions that administrative action ought to 
respect: the rationality of the decisions and individual protection. The duty has the 
potential to improve the quality of the final outcome by forcing the administration to 
explain its choices, and of respecting the persons affected by a measure by explaining and 
justifying an action taken in the exercise of authority.100  This ought to be particularly the 
case if the persons affected might not be able to challenge the measure – either due to its 





                                                          
96 See C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration (Oxford: Hart Publishing 
2014), at 73 on Case T-7/92 Asia Motor France and others v. Commission, EU:T:1993:52. 
97 Joined cases C-27 and 122/00 Omega Air and others, EU:C:2002:161, para. 47.  
98 M. Shapiro and A.S. Sweet, On Law, Politics and Judicialization (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003), at 
240.   
99 M. Shapiro and A.S. Sweet, On Law, Politics and Judicialization (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003), at 
235. See also C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2014), at 74.  
100 D.J. Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1997), at 432. 
101 D.J. Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1997), 430 - 438; P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), at 341. 
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3.2 Implementing arrangements in the external domain: a genuine lacuna 
 
 As operationalised by the Court and by the European Ombudsman 
 
The Court’s case law and the decisions of the European Ombudsman do not provide any 
guidance as to the operationalisation of the duty to state reasons in the context of the 
administrative activities implementing the SAP and the ENP.102  
 
 As operationalised by internal rules   
 
The duty to state reasons seems to have been operationalised by the Commission when 
drafting financial assistance strategy papers and programming documents. As already 
discussed in chapter II and III, these documents are adopted as Commission implementing 
decisions; thus, they have to comply with the duty to state reasons by virtue of article 296 
TFEU which applies to legal acts. However, a close look at the documents reveals that the 
actual statement of reasons, which are normally contained in the preamble of the 
implementing decisions, are instead spelled out in the text of the annexes of the decisions. 
The annexes are the actual Commission documents strategising and programming 
financial assistance. In doing so, the Commission explains in detail the reasons for the 
choices made both in terms of the substantial area to be financed and the methodology 
used for the disbursement of funds.103 The operationalization of the duty to state reasons 
cannot be found in respect of the documents aimed at setting the agenda for action, and 
for those aimed at implementing sector specific goals.  
 In light of the absence of rules operationalising and acknowledging the relevance of 
the of the duty to state reasons externally, the next section – by using as a starting point 
the functions attributed to the duty to state reasons – will explain why the respect of such 
a duty is relevant for the exercise of administrative power externally and it will suggest 
how it ought to be operationalised. 
 
                                                          
102 The reasons are rather obvious. Most of the activities are not legal acts, and they do not take the form of 
a decision – despite being indirectly addressed to third states (Chapter III, section 2.2). 
103 E.g. Commission Implementing Decision of 18 August 2014 adopting an Indicative Strategy Paper for 
Montenegro (2014-2020), C(2014) 5771; Commission Implementing Decision of 10 December 2014 
adopting an Annual Country Action Programme for Montenegro for the year 2014, C(2014) 9387; 
Commission Implementing Decision of 11 June 2014 adopting a Single Support Framework for Georgia 
(2014-2017), C(2014)3994; Commission Implementing Decision of 14 July 2014 adopting the Annual 
Action Programme 2014 in favour of Georgia to be financed from the general budget of the European Union, 
C(2014) 5020. 
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3.3 Evaluating the state of art: the importance of taking a more holistic approach 
 
The statement of reasons contributes to ensuring that all the relevant circumstances are 
duly balanced and taken into account when taking a decision.104 The official who knows 
that his or her evaluation will have to be justified will try to make better choices.105 The 
duty to state reasons ought to disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning 
followed by the institution in reaching a specific evaluation, and this may have beneficial 
effects on the rationality of the final decision. By stating reasons, the administration 
avoids being blamed for acting in an informal and discretionary fashion. Discretion shall 
not necessarily be banned, but even discretionary decisions shall be based on reasons that 
can be explained.106 As the Ombudsman stated: 
 
‘[…] discretionary power is not the same as dictatorial or arbitrary power. A public 
authority must always have good reasons for choosing one course of action rather 
than another. A normal part of exercising a discretionary power is to explain the 
reasons why a particular course of action has been chosen.’107 
 
Imposing on the administration the obligation to state reasons when exercising its power 
not only poses some limits on its discretion since it would be forced to justify the reasons 
for its choices; but also supports the protection of affected parties. The duty to state 
reasons allows interested parties to overlook how the Commission applies its obligations 
under the two policies and allows them to decide if they have a claim in contesting official 
determinations. This is particularly valid for individual complaints. Affected parties might 
not have a right to a final outcome and might not be able to challenge the final decisions. 
However, the duty to state reason is about protecting them within the process leading to 
the final outcome. Some examples will be hereby presented in order to exemplify how the 
duty to state reasons has the potential to improve the rationality and efficiency of the 
administrative process, and to protect individuals within the context of the SAP and ENP.  
                                                          
104 J. Mendes, Participation in EU Rule-Making: A Right-Based Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2011), at. 249. 
105 In Fuller’s words: ‘I also believe that when men are compelled to explain and justify their decisions, the 
effect will generally be to pull those decisions towards goodness, by whatever standards if ultimate 
goodness there are.’ L.L. Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Hart’, 71 Harvard Law Review 
1959, at 630. 
106 P.M. Shane, ‘The Rule of Law and the Inevitability of Discretion’, 36 Harvard Journal of Law and Public 
Policy 2013, at 23.  
107 Decision on 18 November 1998 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 995/98/OV against the 
European Commission, right of establishment and freedom to provide services, breach of articles 4, 18, 19 
and 22 ECGAB, point 1.7. 
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 In the context of the EU wider neighborhood policies, the quality of the decisions 
taken by the Commission and the EEAS is particularly important because of the influence 
that the administrative activities implementing the two policies have on the exercise of 
public power – both within the Union and in the neighbouring states.108 In its progress 
reports the Commission makes precise overall evaluations has to the level of compliance 
by SAP states with, among others, the Copenhagen political criteria for accession.109 Based 
on these documents the Council decides the next steps to take in the relations between 
the Union and the neighbouring states, and the neighbouring states use these documents 
as preparatory and rule-making acts.110 In light of the impacts that these final evaluations 
have both within the Union and in third states, reasons ought to be stated not only as to 
how the Commission reached such an overall evaluation, but also as to why certain 
standards have been used to make the assessment. Based on which criteria has the 
Commission chosen the human rights standards against which compliance with the 
Copenhagen political criteria has to be evaluated? If on the one hand, there is uniformity 
as to the rights monitored by the progress reports for each Western Balkan country, on 
the other hand, there is a clear discrepancy as to the standards used by the Commission 
in order to determine their compliance.111 Particularly, the Commission in the context of 
the SAP ought to explain the standards it chooses when monitoring criteria which are not 
covered by the acquis. This reasoning becomes all the more important for the ENPs which 
– instead of the acquis – need to use commonly agreed-upon standards to monitor 
compliance.112  
 Visa liberalisation action plans and progress reports are another example. The latter 
are used as reference documents to justify the Council and EU Parliament decisions to 
grant visa free regimes to third countries.113 VLAP and VLPRs use numerous standards in 
                                                          
108 Chapter III, section 2. 
109 E.g. ‘Albania is moderately prepared with the reform of its public administration. Good progress has been 
made in areas falling under the key priority on public administration reform, especially with the adoption 
of a comprehensive reform strategy and a new Code of Administrative Procedures. However, further efforts 
are needed also in the areas outside the scope of this key priority, especially on improving policy 
development and coordination, and the capacity of administrative courts.’ Commission Progress Report on 
Albania accompanying the EU Enlargement Strategy of 10 November 2015, SWD(2015) 213 final. 
110 Chapter III, section 2.  
111 Annex I. 
112 The acquis can be used in the context of the SAP since the final goal is accession.  
113 Regulation (EU) No 259/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of 
visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, OJ 
[2014] L 105/9, 08.04.2014. 
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order to prepare Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in joining the EU free visa regime. For 
example, the International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) standards need to be adopted 
by these three countries in order to secure identity management; however, no where it is 
stated why these standards have been chosen for such a purpose.114 In light of the impact 
that these standards have both for the third states, which are to adopt them, and for the 
Union, which is to make sure that such standards are effective in securing identity 
management, it is fundamental for the Commission to explain the rationality of its choice. 
The effectiveness of administrative action, in relation to these two examples, will hardly 
be jeopardized by the obligation to state reasons since the they can be valid for more 
countries and for several years.  
 The administration, when acting externally, ought to state reasons as to why it would 
depart from its own acts. For example, the Commission ought to start stating reasons as 
to why, despite reporting on human rights violation in third countries, it does not suggest 
to the Council to take action, or as to why it does not carry out a human rights impact 
assessment before negotiating an agreement with a third state despite self-imposed 
guidelines and Council documents indicating that this is a mandatory procedure.115 
Reasons ought to be stated particularly when these acts are publicly available, since they 
are capable of raising expectations of individuals who themselves might suffer human 
rights violations. In this respect, the obligation to state reasons becomes all the more 
important when individuals directly address the administration, raising doubts as to the 
way in which it exercised its discretion.116 In two of the four cases discussed in the 
previous chapter the complainants, contacted the Commission before deciding to bring 
their claims to the Court. The complainants claimed that the Union failed to act by not 
suspending the agreement between the EU and Lebanon, and by not suspending financial 
                                                          
114 The ICAO standards appear in all the Visa Liberalisation Progress reports with Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia. See European Commission, Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs, International 
Affairs, Enlargement, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/international-affairs/enlargement/index_en.htm> (Consulted on 07.08.2016).  
115 E.g. the 2012 Action Plan requires the Commission to incorporate human rights in all Impact Assessment 
when conducting negotiations on trade agreements that have significant economic, social and 
environmental impacts. Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, Council 
Document 11855/12, 25 June 2012; the European Commission ‘Trade for all, towards a more responsible 
trade and investment policy’ strategy also stress the importance of carrying out impact assessments, 
(October 2015), at 18, 23 and 26, available at: 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
116 ‘Reasons are given to negotiate, establish, repair, affirm, or deny relationships.’ J.L. Mashaw, 'Reasoned 
Administration: The European Union, the United States, and the Project of Democratic Governance', Yale 
Law School Faculty Scholarship Series, 1.1.2007, at 102. 
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assistance to Turkey due to human rights violations in those countries.117 In these cases, 
is it possible to affirm that the Commission’s responses to Mr. Mugraby and the coalition 
of Turkish citizens were adequate enough as to prevent them from initiating a lawsuit? 
Were the answers adequate enough that expectations would not be raised on the side of 
the applicants? Did the Commission react to the substantive submissions made by 
interested parties in an adequate manner? Providing reasons to third countries’ citizens 
as to why the Commission decides not to suggest to the Council to take action in respect 
of failure by a third state to comply with e.g. human rights will help individuals to decide 
whether they have a real claim in contesting official (or absent) determinations.    
 As already argued above at the end of the section on legality, the Commissions in 
handling individual complaints by non-EU citizens ought to respect its internal guidelines 
‘on the treatment of individual complaints in respect of infringements of Union law’.118 
The Commission internal guidelines on how to better monitor the application of Union 
law maintains that the relations with complainants should be conducted: 
 
‘[…] in accordance with its code of good administrative conduct, under which 
complainants are entitled to receive reply in line with their expectations, even if these 
exceed the Commission’s prerogatives;’ not only ‘are careful reasons given’ but also 
‘useful practical advice’ on alternative means of readdress for complaints.119 
 
A complete answer helps individuals to fully understand the reasons why the 
administration decided to act in a certain manner. Ultimately, by stating reasons, the 
administration allows interested parties to review how the Commission implements its 
obligations under the SAP and the ENP,120 and tries to prevent individuals from 
developing expectations that the Union will always follow and be consistent with its own 
acts. The obligation to respect the rule of law when the Union implements its external 
                                                          
117 Chapter II, section 3 discussing Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418; Case 
C-581/11 P Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:C:2012:466; Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner 
House Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights project v. Commission, EU:T:2006:97. 
118 Commission Communication of 11 December 2002, ‘Better Monitoring of the Application of Community 
Law’, COM(2002) 725 final. 
119 Commission Communication of 11 December 2002, ‘Better Monitoring of the Application of Community 
Law’, COM(2002) 725 final, at 13. 
120 This function of the duty to state reason was recognised by the Court – in a completely different context 
– in Rewe-Zentrale. ‘In imposing upon the Commission the obligation to state reasons for its decisions, 
Article 190 is not taking mere formal considerations into account but seeks to give an opportunity to […] all 
interested nationals of ascertaining the circumstances in which the Commission has applied the Treaty.’ 
Case 24/62 Germany v. Council, EU:C:1963:14, at 69; Case 37/83 Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Direktor Der 
Landwirtschaftskammer Rheinland, EU:C:1984:89; Case 22/70 Commission v. Council, EU:C:1971:32, at 42; 
Case C-370/07 Commission v. Council, EU:C:2009:590, para. 42. 
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action ought to demand from the administration to state reasons as to the rationality of 
its evaluations, particularly when approached by natural and legal persons. 
 Finally, the duty to state reasons might also play a role between the Union and third 
states. In the administrative phase of the SAP and ENP, the obligation to respect the rule 
of law when the Union acts externally ought to impose an obligation on the administrative 
power not to treat third states arbitrarily. Explaining and justifying an action taken in the 
exercise of authority shows respect for the parties affected by a measure.121 This should 
particularly be the case in unbalanced power relationships based on conditionality.122 For 
example, giving reasons as to why more or less is granted to a third state can help the 
third country itself as well as the other neighbours feel that they are treated fairly in their 
conditional relation with the Union. Neighboring states, by receiving reasons as to why 
the Union decided to grant, or not to grant, benefits, see that their cases have been dealt 
with properly and according to authoritative standards.123 This approach might have the 
potential of reconciling the tension between the principle of conditionality and joint 
ownership as founding values of the ENP. In other words, it is hard to reconcile true joint 
ownership with the unequal relationship implied by conditionality, especially if third 
states have the feeling that they are being treated unfairly.124 Conditionality is essentially 
based on the idea of a deal, or a bargain which might not necessarily work well in a ‘joint 
ownership’ environment.125 However, if the bargaining process is carried out according 
to authoritative standards, then third states might feel that the relation – even if 
conditional – is based on fair grounds.  
 Reason giving alone does not necessarily burden the administration or provide 
opportunities for harassment through legal adversarialism; on the contrary, it might 
prevent adversarialism. It might be enough, in justifying a decision, to show that claims 
and arguments put forward have been looked at; that some of them are irreconcilable; 
and that finally a course has been settled on which is rational, reasonable, and in good 
                                                          
121 D.J. Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1997), 430-438; P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), at 341. 
122 Section 5.2.3 of this chapter.  
123 D.J. Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1997), at 433. 
124 M. Cremona, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: More than a Partnership?’ in M. Cremona (eds.), 
Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), 244, at 282. 
125 J. Kelley, ‘New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European 
Neighbourhood Policy’, 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 2006, at 36. 
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faith.126 Moreover, accommodations to practical necessity may be made. Article 18 of the 
ECGAB is a good example. It recognizes the broad requirement that reasons should be 
given at any time a decision affects the interests of private persons; yet, it demands that 
where a large number of people are affected similarly by a decision, an official must 
supplement a standardised statement.127  
 
4. Duty of care 
 
4.1 The principle internally: counterbalancing the wide margins of discretion 
 
Over the years the CJEU has developed the duty of diligent examination as a procedural 
guarantee to counterbalance the wide margin of discretion that the Commission enjoys in 
proceedings resulting in administrative rules involving complex evaluations.128 It might in 
fact be argued that the wider the margin of discretion enjoyed by the administration, the 
more demanding the procedural constraints stemming from the duty of care should be. 
The duty of care requires institutions to make decisions on the basis of complete 
knowledge of all the relevant facts, thereby guarding against arbitrary decisions.129 The 
case law of the CJEU seems to suggest that the duty of care is mainly a tool to revise the 
factual basis of the administrative decision. The General Court refers to the duty of care 
as an obligation on the side of the Commission to ‘to gather, in a diligent manner, the 
factual elements necessary for the exercise of its broad discretion’;130 and to take ‘account 
                                                          
126 D.J. Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1997), 430-438. 
127 Article 18 ECGAB: ‘1. Every decision of the institution which may adversely affect the rights or interests 
of a private person shall state the grounds on which it is based by indicating clearly the relevant facts and 
the legal basis of the decision. […] 3. If it is not possible, because of the large number of persons concerned 
by similar decisions, to communicate in detail the grounds of the decision and where standard replies are 
therefore sent, the official shall subsequently provide the citizen who expressly requests it with an 
individual reasoning.’ 
128 In these cases, judicial review is confined to examining whether a manifest error has occurred. ‘[W]here 
the Community institutions have such a power of appraisal [involving complex technical evaluations], 
respect for the rights guaranteed by the Community legal order in administrative procedures is of even 
more fundamental importance. Those guarantees include, in particular, the duty of the competent 
institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case.’ Case C-
269/90 Hauptzollamt München-Mitte v. Technische Universität München, EU:C:1991:438, para 14; 
‘Compliance with the duty of the Commission to gather, in a diligent manner, the factual elements necessary 
for the exercise of its broad discretion as well as the review thereof by the European Union Courts are all 
the more important because the exercise of that discretion is only subject to a limited judicial review of the 
merits, confined to examining whether a manifest error has been committed.’ Case T-333/10 Animal 
Trading Company (ATC) BV and Others v. E Commission, EU:T:2013:451, para. 84. 
129 A. Türk, ‘Oversight of Administrative Rule Making: Judicial Review’, 19 European Law Journal 2013, at 
141. 
130 Case T-333/10 Animal Trading Company (ATC) BV and Others v. E Commission, EU:T:2013:451, para. 84. 
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of all the relevant circumstances and the facts of the matter with all due care’.131 
Moreover, in the TU München case, the Court made clear that whenever the Commission 
relies on a group to obtain the relevant information, it needs to ensure that the group has 
the necessary knowledge in the relevant field.132  
 The duty applies irrespective of whether the act under review is of individual or 
general scope. However, it is not an individual guarantee, nor does it arise from the right 
of sound administration.133 The General Court in Arizona Chemical highlighted how the 
duty of care is not only a principle aimed at limiting administrative discretion, but is also 
‘an essential and objective procedural requirement, imposed in the public interest’.134 As 
Mendes suggests, the Court by restricting the protective dimension of the duty has 
emphasised its objective dimension.135 In the areas of risk regulation the Court has 
operationalised the duty of care into the duty of excellence i.e. transparency and 
independence on guiding scientific assessment.136 The breach of such a duty can be 
invoked in Court by individuals directly and individually concerned.137   
 
4.2 Implementing arrangements in the external domain: gaining acceptance   
 
The duty of care plays a crucial role externally, since it has the potential of limiting the 
significant power of appraisal that the administration enjoys in implementing its external 
action. 
 
 As operationalised by the Court and by the European Ombudsman 
 
In the Front Polisario case, the General Court extended the respect of the duty of care to 
the external relations of the Union as a procedural guarantee that needs to be respected 
                                                          
131 Case T-443/11 Gold East Paper and Gold Huasheng Paper v. Council, EU:T:2014:774, para. 164. See also: 
Case T-369/03 Arizona Chemical and others v. Commission, EU:T:2005:458, para. 85. 
132 Case C-269/90 Hauptzollamt München-Mitte v. Technische Universität München, EU:C:1991:438, paras 
20-21. 
133 In the case T-Mobile, the Court of Justice strongly opposed the position of the General Court according to 
which the Commission’s obligation to undertake a diligent and impartial examination of a complaint would 
arise from the ‘right to sound administration of individual situations’. Case C-141/02 P, Commission v. T-
Mobile Austria GmbH, EU:C:2005:98, para. 72.  
134 Case T-369/03 Arizona Chemical and others v. Commission, EU:T:2005:458, para. 88. 
135 J. Mendes, ‘Discretion, care and public interests in the EU administration: probing the limits of law’, 53 
Common Market Law Review 2016, at 435. 
136 J. Mendes, ‘Discretion, care and public interests in the EU administration: probing the limits of law’, 53 
Common Market Law Review 2016, at 433. 
137 Case T-369/03 Arizona Chemical and others v. Commission, EU:T:2005:458, para. 88. 
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when the EU institutions enjoy a wide margin of appreciation – in this instance deciding 
whether to conclude an agreement with Morocco.138 According to the jurisprudence of the 
Court, the institutions of the Union enjoy a wide margin of discretion in the field of 
external economic relations.139 In the context of the case the Court affirms that the wide 
margin of appreciation is even more justified since the rules and principles of 
international law applicable to the case are complex and imprecise.140 In light of the wide 
margin of manoeuvre enjoyed by the Union institutions in deciding whether to conclude 
an agreement with Morocco, which will also be applicable over the disputed territory of 
West Sahara, the Court decided to limit its review to checking if the institutions committed 
a manifest error of assessment. The Court in this case, like in the ATC case, makes a link 
between its limited judicial review on the merits and the duty of care.141 In other words, 
the judge, in establishing whether the Council committed a manifest error of assessment, 
checked whether the institution took into account all the elements of the case. 
 
‘That being the case, in particular where EU institution enjoys a wide discretion, in 
order to verify whether it has committed a manifest error of assessment, the Courts 
of the European Union must verify whether it has examined carefully and impartially 
all the relevant facts of the individual case, facts which support the conclusions 
reached (judgments of 21 November 1991 in Technische Universität München, 
C-269/90, ECR, EU:C:1991:438, paragraph 14, and 22 December 2010 Gowan 
comércio Internacional e Servios, C-77/09, ECR, EU:C:2010:803, paragraph 57).’ 142  
 
 It is striking that the General Court, in extending the obligation to carefully examine 
all the elements of a case to the external actions of the Union, makes a direct reference to 
the foundational case TU München and Gowan comércio Internacional without 
determining whether this is a case of proceedings resulting in administrative rules 
involving complex evaluations.143 Instead, the Court connects the obligation to respect the 
duty of care to the impact that the agreement has on the population of West Sahara. It 
argues that even if the Charter of Fundamental Rights does not establish an absolute 
                                                          
138 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953; for a more detailed 
account see chapter III, section 3.  
139 ‘According to the case-law, the EU institutions enjoy a wide discretion in the field of external economic 
relations which covers the agreement referred to by the contested decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 
6 July 1995 in Odigitria v Council and Commission, T-572/93, ECR, EU:T:1995:131, paragraph 38).’ Case 
T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 164. 
140 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 224. 
141 Case T-333/10 Animal Trading Company (ATC) BV and Others v. E Commission, EU:T:2013:451, para. 84. 
142 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 225. 
143 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 225. 
The administrative rule of law applied to the Union external action 
146 
 
interdiction to conclude an agreement with Morocco, guaranteeing the protection of 
fundamental rights is of such importance that it constitutes a ‘question that the Council 
must examine before the approval of such an agreement’.144 The Council has an obligation 
to examine all the elements of the case with impartiality, in order to make sure that the 
Union’s actions do not have the effect of violating human rights before concluding an 
agreement.145 The General Court seems to adapt the core function of the duty of care to 
the context of the case. Despite the emphasis on limited judicial review, the Court, in 
verifying whether the duty of care was compiled with, concretely suggested to the Council 
what it ought to have investigated and did not. The Court identified a list of rights which 
the Council should have taken into account when deciding whether to conclude the 
agreement.146 It is also interesting to notice how the Court applies the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the Union to the external action of the Union without questioning 
its territorial application.  
 In this specific case the decision of the Court to expand the duty of care could be 
related to the current Union’s commitment to conduct a human rights impact assessment 
before the Union concludes an agreement with a third state.147 The Court, by indicating 
with clarity which human rights the agreement could not infringe, is indirectly telling the 
Commission which potential violations should be reviewed by its human rights impact 
                                                          
144 ‘In that connection, although it is true, as stated in paragraph 146 above, that it does not follow from the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, relied on by the applicant in its third plea, that the European Union is subject 
to an absolute prohibition on concluding an agreement which may be applicable on disputed territory, the 
fact remains that the protection of fundamental rights of the population of such a territory is of particular 
importance and is, therefore, a question that the Council must examine before the approval of such an 
agreement.’ Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 227. 
145 ‘[T]he Council must examine, carefully and impartially, all the relevant facts in order to ensure that the 
production of goods for export is not conducted to the detriment of the population of the territory 
concerned, or entails infringements of fundamental rights […].’ Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of 
the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 228. 
146 ‘[T]he rights to human dignity, to life and to the integrity of the person (Articles 1 to 3 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights), the prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 5 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights), the freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work (Article 15 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights), the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), 
the right to property (Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), the right to fair and just working 
conditions and the prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Articles 31 and 32 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights).’ Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, 
EU:T:2015:953, para. 228. 
147 Action Plan, ‘Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’, Council Document 
11855/12, 25 June 2012; European Commission, ‘Trade for all, towards a more responsible trade and 
investment policy strategy’, (October 2015), at 18, 23 and 26, available at: 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
DG TRADE itself established guidelines as to how to carry out Human Rights impact assessments ‘Guidelines 
on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy initiatives’, available 
at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
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assessments. In the Schrems case as well, the Court argued in favour of limiting the 
Commission’s discretion when fundamental rights are at stake.148  It is undeniable that 
the context of the Schrems case is very distant from the one discussed by this thesis: the 
rights at stake were those of EU citizens and there was a direct causal relationship 
between the Decision of the Commission allowing data flows between the European 
Union and the United States and the breach of the protection of personal data. 
Nevertheless, the framing of the Union’s institutions duties where fundamental rights are 
concerned seems to demand a stricter understanding of what is provided in law.149 
 
 As operationalised by internal rules 
 
Overall, self-imposed guidelines try to operationalise the duty of care by underscoring the 
importance of gathering complete and objective evidence. The Guidance Notice on how to 
draft ENP progress reports states that ‘authors are responsible for ensuring that facts 
mentioned in the reports are based on solid, rather than anecdotal evidence’.150 The same 
is also stated in the 2015 Enlargement Guidance Notice on how to draft progress 
reports.151 The guidance notices also offer a few inputs as to how information structures 
should be formed. They stress the importance of being based on the ‘widest possible array 
of sources’152 and stress that ‘[i]nformation received from the governments of the 
countries concerned should be confirmed where appropriate through other sources.’153 
                                                          
148 ‘In this regard, it must be stated that, in view of, first, the important role played by the protection of 
personal data in the light of the fundamental right to respect for private life and, secondly, the large number 
of persons whose fundamental rights are liable to be infringed where personal data is transferred to a third 
country not ensuring an adequate level of protection, the Commission’s discretion as to the adequacy of the 
level of protection ensured by a third country is reduced, with the result that review of the requirements 
stemming from Article 25 of Directive 95/46, read in the light of the Charter, should be strict (see, by 
analogy, judgment in Digital Rights Ireland and Others, C-293/12 and C-594/12, EU:C:2014:238, 
paragraphs 47 and 48).’ Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner and Digital 
Rights Ireland Ltd, EU:C:2015:650, para. 78. 
149 The Court argues that even if ‘[i]t is true that neither Article 25(2) of Directive 95/46 nor any other 
provision of the directive contains a definition of the concept of an adequate level of protection’; still ‘it is 
incumbent upon the Commission, after it has adopted a decision pursuant to Article 25(6) of Directive 
95/46, to check periodically whether the finding relating to the adequacy of the level of protection ensured 
by the third country in question is still factually and legally justified. Such a check is required, in any event, 
when evidence gives rise to a doubt in that regard.’ Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection 
Commissioner and Digital Rights Ireland Ltd, EU:C:2015:650, paras 70 and 76. 
150 EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2013/5084. 
151 ‘Country units are responsible for ensuring that all facts mentioned in the reports are based on solid, not 
anecdotal evidence.’ European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, Guidance Note 
Enlargement package 2015, Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2016/450. 
152 EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2013/5084 
153 European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, Guidance Note Enlargement package 2015, 
Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2016/450. 
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Both guidance notices stress the importance of carrying out consultation ‘in order to 
ensure transparency and objectivity’ of the reports;154  however, no specific guidelines 
are offered as to procedures to be followed. The Guidelines on the analysis of human 
rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy initiatives also underlines 
the importance of gathering evidence-based information.155 In this respect, it praises the 
use of different sources and particularly stakeholder consultation as a crucial element of 
the assessment of possible human rights impacts.156 The choice of the General Court in 
the Front Polisario case to use the Union Charter of Fundamental Rights as a benchmark 
to determine if the action of the EU has the effect of violating human rights in third states 
is rather limited, especially when compared to the list of human rights instruments 
offered by the Commission DG TRADE’s guideline on the conduct of HRIAs. Alongside the 
European human rights instruments, the guidelines also suggest human rights standards 
of a more international breadth.157 
 
4.3 Evaluating the state of art: in search for a broader conception  
 
Internally, the administrative activities implementing the SAP and the ENP are, to a 
certain extent, a concretization of the duty of care. In other words, progress reports, action 
plans, impact assessments, etc. are internally preparatory acts before reaching final 
decisions (see fig. 1 chapter III). By adopting these instruments, the Union demonstrates 
that it has taken all the facts into account before reaching a final outcome (e.g. granting 
candidate status, or visa-free regime). The General Court in the Front Polisario case has 
indirectly hardened the obligation on the side of the Union to carry out human rights 
impact assessments since by adopting them the Union respects the duty of care when 
concluding an agreement with third countries. More broadly, the case opens the door for 
                                                          
154 EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2013/5084. 
155 Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy 
initiatives’, available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016), at 9. 
156 Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy 
initiatives’, available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016), 9-10. 
157 Among others: the core UN human rights conventions, the fundamental ILO conventions on core labour 
standards, the European Convention on Human Rights (which applies to members of the Council of Europe) 
and other regional human rights conventions, as well as, where appropriate, customary international law. 
European Commission, Directorate General for Trade, ‘Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts 
in impact assessments for trade-related policy initiatives’, at 5, available at: 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016).  
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recognising the importance that administrative activities play internally as preparatory 
acts. The legality of the final act – in this case a Council decision concluding an agreement 
with a third state – requires the prior adoption of a human rights impact assessment. By 
analogy, the adoption of progress reports, impact assessments, action plans, etc. becomes 
a fundamental procedural step for the fulfilment of the duty of care in adopting final acts 
(e.g. Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council de-listing a third country 
from the EU’s visa regime).158 
The respect of the duty of care within the realm of the EU external policies should 
not stop here. The external rule of law ought to impose an obligation on the side of the 
Commission and of the EEAS to draft progress reports, human rights impact assessments, 
strategy papers, programming documents, etc. with all due care required. Particularly, the 
duty of care ought to be respected when the administrative activities function as 
regulatory acts for third states, and when they have an impact on natural and legal 
persons. Even if the Union’s institutions cannot be responsible for the actions of third 
states, the impact that these same documents have on them as regulatory and standard- 
setting documents cannot be neglected. It is the same structure and operation of the SAP 
and the ENP which encourages third states, though positive incentives and negative 
sanctions, to use these documents as regulatory and standard-setting acts.159 
Furthermore, as already discussed in chapter III, the Commission, in choosing which 
policy areas and projects should receive funding in third countries (e.g. projects aimed at 
supporting woman’s empowerment, or at improving living conditions for Roma children; 
projects aimed at improving road transport, or on rail transport),160 enjoys significant 
discretion which de facto conceals political considerations potentially affecting natural 
and legal persons.161 In this context, the duty of care ought to be respected, not only in 
                                                          
158 Chapter III, section 2.1. 
159 Chapter III, section 2.2; and more generally A. von Bogdandy, ‘Common principles for a plurality of 
orders: A study on public authority in European legal area’, 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 
2014, at 988.  
160 E.g. Strategy papers define the priorities for action towards meeting the general and specific objectives 
defined in articles 1 and 2 of IPA II regulation in the relevant policy area listed in article 3 of the same 
regulation. Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.3.2014. Indicative 
Strategy papers for the SAP states cover a list of areas which require financial assistance: democracy and 
governance; rule of law and fundamental rights; environment and climate change; transport; 
competiveness; education, employment and social policies; agriculture and rural development; and 
territorial cooperation. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/news_corner/key-
documents/index_en.htm?key_document=080126248ca659ce> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
161 Chapter III, section 2.1. 
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light of the discretion granted to the Commission in making complex evaluations but also 
in light of the impact that the administrative activities might have on the local population 
and on third states.  
Progress reports, action plans, MoUs, VLAP, VLPRs, human rights impact 
assessments, strategy papers and programming documents might not always require 
technical evaluations; however, the complexity of the analysis rests on the ability of the 
administration to gather a correct and balanced picture of the situation in third states. 
They require the Commission and the EEAS to have an in-depth understanding of a third 
country whose language they often do not even speak. The administration needs to make 
complex evaluations as to, for example, the existence of a functioning market economy in 
third states, or its capacity to cope with the pressure of market forces within the Union. It 
is enough to take a look at the table of content of a progress report to realise the 
complexity of the evaluations the Commission is required to undertake.162 Likewise, 
action plans and the macro-financial assistance MoUs provide a list of structural reforms 
that each neighbouring country needs to adopt if they want to get closer to the Union or 
if they want to receive financial assistance. The policy fields that these reforms cover vary 
from the judiciary, to transport, to financial sector, to energy, etc.163  
 In light of the above, the duty of care ought not to be limited to a careful examination 
of facts; it ought to be extended to a careful examination of the structure of collecting 
information. The complexity of the evaluation rests on the ability of the administration to 
collect accurate information and obtain an objective and realistic vision of the situation in 
third countries. If it is true that the self-imposed guidelines as to how to draft the 
administrative activities implementing the SAP and the ENP try to operationalise the duty 
of care, it is also correct to state that it still leaves a significant level of discretion to the 
Commission and the EEAS as to how to build their information structures in order to 
ensure the respect of objectivity.164 As Harlow underlines ‘a substantial administrative 
discretion with important political implications is concealed in these evaluations [i.e. 
                                                          
162 E.g. Commission Staff Working Document Progress Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina accompanying 
the EU Enlargement Strategy of 10 November 2015, SWD(2015) 214 final. 
163 See as an example the action plan concluded with Armenia, available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/armenia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016); and Commission Implementing Decision of 18 May 2015 approving the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the European Union and Ukraine related to macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, 
C(2015)3444/F1. 
164 Objectivity is a value to be upheld by the administration when conducting its analysis. E.g. EEAS, Guidance 
Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2013/5084. 
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building information structures], which should be subjected to the controls of 
administrative law’.165 Therefore, the question remains open as to whether the duty of 
care should also imply that the way in which the factual information is collected should 
be done in accordance with the principles and rules guiding the exercise of administrative 
power externally. 
 A broader conception of the duty of care, as Mendes describes it, ought to demand 
that discretionary decisions are not only technically accurate but also inclusive and fair in 
so far as they ‘ought to concretize, the values and principles of the legal order that ground 
and bind the authority to adopt them’.166 In other words, the administration, in making 
discretionary choices, ought to be guided by legal criteria (e.g. enabling legal norms, the 
mandate of the decision maker, and the values and principles which underpin the legal 
order). The Court of Justice seems to timidly concretise this idea in the area of risk 
regulation:  
 
‘[…] the duty of diligence is primarily an essential and objective procedural 
requirement, imposed in the public interest by legislation meeting the requirements 
of scientific objectivity and based on the principles of excellence, transparency and 
independence.’167 
 
The idea of broadening the conception of the duty of care is consequently also about 
overseeing how the structure of collecting information has been conceived. It should not 
be enough for decisions to be technically accurate; the administration should also make 
sure that the process leading to their adoption respects and concretizes legally protected 
interests ‘that, by force of law, ought to be balanced, protected and pursued’.168 The way 
and methodology in which information are collected may vitiate the final decision. The 
Ombudsman in this context has made a distinctive contribution in structuring 
administrative discretion in developing information structures. The complainants to the 
case claimed that the public interests of ‘environmental sustainability’ and the ‘human 
rights of local communities of agro-fuel producing countries’ were not sufficiently taken 
into account in the Commission’s energy policy, thus endangering the objectivity of the 
                                                          
165 C. Harlow, ‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values’, 17 The European Journal of 
International Law 2006, at 202. 
166 J. Mendes, ‘Discretion, care and public interests in the EU administration: probing the limits of law’, 53 
Common Market Law Review 2016, at 442. 
167 Case T-369/03 Arizona Chemical and others v. Commission, EU:T:2005:458, para. 88. 
168 J. Mendes, ‘Discretion, care and public interests in the EU administration: probing the limits of law’, 53 
Common Market Law Review 2016, at 450. 
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advice given and the impartiality of the Commission’s decisions – from policy definition 
to its implementation.169 It is against this background that the Ombudsman, reacting 
against the predominance of commercial interests, asked the Commission to specifically 
indicate whether there are any mechanisms that ensure the objectivity of the opinions on 
which the Commission relies when making policy choices; second, whether the public 
consultations and advisory groups are ‘intended to, and actually ensure that sufficient 
attention is given to the issues of public interest raised by the complainant’;170  and finally, 
the extent to which the Commission takes into account various external inputs into 
decision-making.171  
 This broader conception of the duty of care becomes all the more important in the 
Union’s wider neighbourhood policies which foresee numerous evaluations which should 
take into account the widest possible array of information. The complexities of the 
analysis undertaken by the administration externally do not only lay in the 
complicatedness of the analysis, but especially on the ability to gather the correct 
information on the ground. The information to be gathered is not of a scientific nature; 
rather, it needs to be collected by the Commission and the EEAS by communicating with 
stakeholders and relevant international organisations. Thus, as suggested above, in 
developing information structures the administration ought to take into account enabling 
legal norms, its mandate, and the values and principles underpinning the policies. The 
norms that the administration ought to take into account when developing information 
structures in the SAP and ENP are not all to be found in legal acts; nevertheless, their 
guiding power cannot be disregarded since they are the main parameters for the exercise 
of administrative power.172 This understanding of the duty of care has the potential to 
ensure participatory processes for potentially affected parties. If the Union is under the 
obligation to respect human rights when acting externally, such an underlying value of 
the Union’s external action needs to be taken into account by the administration when 
                                                          
169 Decision on 9 July 2013 of the European Ombudsman closing its inquiry into complaint 
1151/2008/(DK)ANA against the European Commission, energy, breach of Articles 8 and 9 ECGAB. 
170 Decision on 9 July 2013 of the European Ombudsman closing its inquiry into complaint 
1151/2008/(DK)ANA against the European Commission, energy, breach of Articles 8 and 9 ECGAB. 
171 Decision on 9 July 2013 of the European Ombudsman closing its inquiry into complaint 
1151/2008/(DK)ANA against the European Commission, energy, breach of Articles 8 and 9 ECGAB, point 
40. J. Mendes, ‘Discretion, care and public interests in the EU administration: probing the limits of law’, 53 
Common Market Law Review 2016, 444-449. 
172 Chapter II, section 2; and section 2 of this chapter. 
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building information structures.173 Therefore, the Commission under the duty of care 
ought to be required to consult with local populations potentially affected by a project 
before deciding to finance it. Such approach could result in foreseeing possible evictions 
which violate human rights of local population.174  
  Finally, the duty of care in the EU wider neighbourhood context ought to play a role 
also in case of individual complaints. Although the Commission cannot be compelled to 
conduct an investigation based on individual complaints, the framework established by 
the SAP and the ENP ought to require to carefully examine the factual and legal particulars 
brought to the Commission’s notice by individuals in order to decide whether they 
disclose information based upon which the Union should take action.175 This statement 
implies that the Commission’s discretionary power as to whether it wholly or partially 
rejects the complaint remains untouched, provided that the Commission examine 
carefully the factual and legal particulars brought to its notice by the complainant.176 The 
Commission and the EEAS should, according to their mandate, constantly monitor the SAP 
and ENP states in order to check their compliance with accession criteria or with their 
respective action plans.177 In this respect, third parties may provide valuable information 
on the basis of which the Commission might decide to start investigations. In other words, 
the coalition of non-governmental organisations of Turkish citizens should not have been 
dismissed by the Commission before it even inquired into whether their claims were 
founded. The framework established by the SAP and the ENP ought to impose a stronger 
obligation on the side of the Commission to analyse with due care individual complaints. 
More generally, the principle of careful examination in external relations should require 
                                                          
173 Among others: Article 3(5), 21(1), 21(2)(b) and (3) TEU; Case C-263/14 European Parliament v. Council 
of the European Union, EU:C:2016:435, para. 47; Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European 
Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 227. 
174 Chapter III, section 2.1 and section 2.1 of this chapter. 
175 By analogy: 'although the Commission cannot be compelled to conduct an investigation, the procedural 
safeguards provided for by ... Article 6 of Regulation No 99/63 oblige it nevertheless to examine carefully 
the factual and legal particulars brought to its notice by the complainant in order to decide whether they 
disclose conduct of such a kind as to distort competition in the common market and affect trade between 
the Member States.' Case T-369/03 Arizona Chemical and others v. Commission, EU:T:2005:458, para. 35. 
176 The Commission in the T-Mobile case ‘acknowledges that it is under an obligation to carry out a diligent 
examination of complaints which it receives’; however, ‘considers that the Commission’s decision as to 
whether to pursue the infringement of the competition rules is not amenable to judicial review.’ The Court 
agrees with the Commission. Case C-141/02 P, Commission v. T-Mobile Austria GmbH, EU:C:2005:98, para. 
53. 
177 Chapter II, sections 3.1 and 4.1.  
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Participation is broadly understood as the possibility for non-institutional actors to take 
part in the decision-making process.179 Participation in the decision-making process aims 
at fulfilling two main functions: defensive and collaborative. Participation has a defensive 
function in that it affords anticipated procedural protection to affected persons that might 
be subject to disproportionate intervention by the administration.180 Participation has a 
collaborative function in that it structures the exercise of decisional tasks and the 
achievement of accurate and adequate results.181 Properly framed participatory 
procedures have the potential to contribute to the impartiality of the administrative 
power, by providing a broad range of information to be taken into account.182 In other 
words, participation helps the decision-maker to have a more complete and balanced 
view of the facts, and to protect affected parties. The distinction between the two 
functions – defensive and collaborative – is not always sharp.183 Participation in its 
collaborative function also entails the protection of interests; likewise, individuals when 
intervening to defend their interests also collaborate in providing info in the decision- 
making process.   
Consultation and the duty to hear the other side are two forms of participation 
mechanisms. The first is a form of ‘participation at large’ aimed at the intervention of 
natural and legal persons in decisional procedures. It involves the creation of public 
discussion fora in which either the public in general or particularly interested persons are 
asked to express their views on a specific act. The duty to hear the other side is instead 
granted to holders of substantive rights and interests who are affected by the outcome of 
                                                          
178 A.H. Türk, ‘Oversight of Administrative Rule Making: Judicial Review’, 19 European Law Journal 2013, at 
141. 
179 J. Mendes, ‘Participation and the Rule of Law after Lisbon: A Legal View of Art. 11’, 48 Common Market 
Law Review 2011, at 1849. 
180 D.J. Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1997), 140-143. 
181 D.J. Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures, (Oxford: Clarendon 
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182 D. Curtin, H.C.H. Hofmann and J. Mendes, ‘Constitutionalising EU Executive Rule-Making Procedures: A 
Research Agenda’, 19 European Law Journal 2013, at 14. 
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2011), at 35. 
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a decision.184 This last section will first analyse the duty to consult, and second, the duty 
to hear the other side.  
 
5.1 The duty to consult 
 
5.1.1 The principle internally: can there be a life after Atalanta? 
 
EU Courts have made it clear that consultation rights only exist when enshrined in 
positive law.185 The CJEU adopted this approach both for the Union’s legislative process 
as well as for non-legislative procedures leading to acts of general application.186 
However, article 11 TEU seems to bring a about a normative shift regarding the role of 
consultation in the EU.187 Consultation, after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, acquires 
a normative founding function against which the exercise of public authority needs to be 
justified.188 Despite having position article 11 TEU under title II on ‘Provisions on 
Democratic Principles’, not all of its provisions are restricted to citizens. It refers to 
representative associations without any specification regarding where they have their 
registered office; and it refers not only to citizens, but also to ‘parties concerned’, who 
arguably can be non-residents and legal persons without registered office in a Member 
State.189 Nevertheless, the question still remains open as to which institutions should take 
responsibility for operationalising the principle and under which conditions.190  
                                                          
184 J. Mendes, Participation in EU Rule-Making: A Rights-Based Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2011), 28-29. 
185 ‘In the context of a procedure for the adoption of a Community act based on an article of the Treaty, the 
only obligations of consultation incumbent on the Community legislature are those laid down in the article 
in question.’ Case C-104/97 P, Atalanta AG and others v. Commission and Council, EU:C:1999:498, para. 71. 
186 Case T-199/96 Laboratoires pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA and Jean-Jacques Goupil v. Commission 
EU:T:1998:176, paras 50 and 58; Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council, T:2002:209, para. 487; 
and Case T-70/99 Alpharma Inc. v. Council, T:2002:210, para. 388. 
187 Article 11 TEU: ‘1. The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative 
associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action. 
2. The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative 
associations and civil society. 3. The European Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties 
concerned in order to ensure that the Union’s actions are coherent and transparent.’ J. Mendes, 
‘Participation and the Rule of Law after Lisbon: A Legal View of Art. 11’, 48 Common Market Law Review 
2011, 1851-1858. 
188 J. Mendes, ‘Participation and the Rule of Law after Lisbon: A Legal View of Art. 11’, 48 Common Market 
Law Review 2011, at 1868. 
189 D. Curtin and J. Mendes, ‘Article 42 – Right of Access to Documents’, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. 
Ward, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights A Commentary, (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014), 1099, at 1107. 
190 Türk has argued that the task of concretising the normative standards of article 11 TEU in instances of 
policy-making ought to be primarily in the hands of the legislator and not of the Court. According to him a 
distinction needs to be kept ‘between (fundamental) rights granted to individuals by Union courts 
regardless of any statutory basis and (political) participation rights which are granted by the political bodies 
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5.1.2 Implementing arrangements in the external domain: establishing new pathways  
 
 As operationalised by the Court and by the European Ombudsman 
 
The General Court in the Front Polisario case recognised the existence of a duty to consult 
in the European legal order; however, it reduces the obligation to the right to be heard in 
case of individual measures, and to the principle of fair trial as established in article 41(1) 
and 41(2)(a) CFR.191 The judge, with this reasoning, disregarded the collaborative 
function of the duty to consult. The General Court missed the opportunity to discuss and 
evaluate the numerous developments in European administrative law aimed at 
promoting consultations mechanisms. The latter could have been used as basis to argue 
in favor of an eventual development of the duty to consult.192 The Court’s case law and the 
decisions of the European Ombudsman do not provide any further guidance as to the 
operationalisation of the duty to consult in the context of the administrative activities 
implementing the SAP and the ENP.193  
 
 As operationalised by internal rules  
 
The Commission operationalises article 11 TEU in its latest Better Regulation Package by 
strengthening its commitment to carry out consultations.194  The package builds upon and 
develops its 2002 consultation guidelines.195 The package does not differentiate between 
policy fields; therefore, the provisions contained in the package are also applicable to the 
Union’s external action. They provide detailed insight as to how consultations should be 
conducted. Nevertheless, the guidelines do not take into account the specificities of the 
external relations domain. Therefore, the operationalisation by the Union’s institutions 
and bodies of the duty to consult in the SAP and the ENP is helpful in complementing the 
                                                          
of the Union’. A.H. Türk, ‘Oversight of Administrative Rule Making: Judicial Review’, 19 European Law 
Journal, 2013, at 130. 
191 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, paras 132-137. 
192 See E. Chiti, 'Le relazioni esterne dell’Unione e il diritto amministrativo europeo’ – Commento alla causa 
T-512/12 - Giud. rel. M.D. Gratsias - Front populaire pour la libération de la saguia-el-hamra et du rio de oro 
(Front Polisario) c. Consiglio dell’Unione europea, 2 Giornale di diritto amministrativo 2016, 231-238. 
193 The reasons are rather obvious. Most of the activities are not legal acts, and they do not take the form of 
a decision – despite being indirectly addressed to third states (see chapter III, section 2.2). 
194 Commission Better Regulation Package. Commission Staff Working Document of 19 May 2015 on ‘Better 
Regulation Guidelines’, SWD(2015) 111 final, at 64. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/guidelines/docs/swd_br_guidelines_en.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
195 Commission Communication of 11 December 2002, ‘Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and 
dialogue - General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the 
Commission’, COM(2002) 704 final.  
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package.196 The latest Commission internal guidelines on how to draft SAP progress 
reports require EU Delegations to organize broader consultations with local organisations 
and civil society. These meetings are ‘crucial to ensure proper consultation of local 
partners’.197 The function of these consultations is to guarantee that reports draw on the 
widest possible array of sources.198 Likewise, the Commission internal documents on how 
to draft ENP progress reports requires EU Delegation to contact and collect information 
from the civil society organisations in partner countries.199 According to the EEAS, the 
rationale for embracing such an inclusive approach is two-fold: ensuring transparency 
and objectivity of the reports; and to ‘demonstrate the interest of the European 
institutions to make use of all sources available and help identify areas where further 
information needs to be collected.’200 Also the EEAS internal guidelines on how to adopt 
ENP action plans states that EU Delegations have to hold consultations with civil society 
prior to the start of negotiations.201 The Commission guidelines on how to carry out 
human rights impact assessments also stress the Commission obligation to consult widely 
on EU action. According to the guidelines, consultation serves three functions. First, it can 
provide very useful insights for the analysis of human rights impacts on individuals and 
groups that are likely to be affected. Second, the process of consultation improves the 
transparency of the trade initiative. Third, according to the guidelines, ‘[c]onsultations 
bolster the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs, a human right enshrined in 
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.’202 The reference to article 25 of the Covenant 
on the right to participate in public affairs seems to suggest that the Commission is 
recognising the impact of its action on the public affairs of third states.203  
                                                          
196 Article 11 requires only institutions – and not bodies – to maintain an open, transparent and regular 
dialogue with representative associations and civil society. Nevertheless, the EEAS in its internal guidelines 
stresses the need to carry out consultation when adopting acts. E.g. EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, 
Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2013/5084. 
197 European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, Guidance Note Enlargement package 2015, 
Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2016/450.  
198 European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, Guidance Note Enlargement package 2015, 
Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2016/450.  
199 EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2013/5084. 
200 EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2013/5084. 
201 EEAS, Non-Paper: Guidelines for Future ENP Action Plan 05.01.2012, Access to Documents request SG1 - 
Corporate Board Secretariat. 
202 Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy 
initiatives’, available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016), at 11. 
203 Article 25 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights establishes that the right and the opportunity to 
participate in the conduct of public affairs is a human right. The article states that ‘every citizen’ has the 
right to participate in the conduct of public affairs in his or her state.   
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The European Parliament has also stressed in its resolutions the importance of 
greater participation by civil society, non-state actors and social partners in the accession 
process and urged the Commission to keep up a continuous dialogue with them. The 
Parliament stressed how civil society ‘can work as an important engine of approximation 
with the EU, create bottom-up pressure for the advancement of the European agenda, 
improve the transparency of the process and strengthen public support for accession’.204 
Also the High Representative emphasised the crucial role of civil society in the Union’s 
foreign policy.205 Finally, the legislator has concretised the duty to consult beneficiaries of 
aid in both SAP and ENP financial regulations. Article 4(5) of the ENI regulation clearly 
states:  
 
‘Union support under this Regulation shall, in principle, be established in partnership 
with the beneficiaries. That partnership shall involve, as appropriate, the following 
stakeholders in the preparation, implementation and monitoring Union support: (a) 
national and local authorities; and (b) civil society organisations, including through 
consultation and timely access to relevant information allowing them to play a 
meaningful role in that process.’ 206 
 
Consultation is here targeted at beneficiaries of financial assistance; identified as being 
national and local authorities, and civil society. The Commission, when adopting 
implementing decisions that plan financial assistance, is, thus, required to carry out 
consultations and provide relevant information to these two groups of beneficiaries. This 




                                                          
204 European Parliament resolution of 22 November 2012 on Enlargement: policies, criteria and the EU’s 
strategic interests (2012/2025(INI)). 
205 E.g. Address by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the EU-NGO Human Rights 
Forum, Brussels 04.12.2015, available at <http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-
eeas/2015/151204_01_en.htm> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
206 Article 4(5), Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014; see also 
article 5(6), Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014.  
207 Quick Guide to IPA II Programming serving as a digest of the IPA II Programming Guide, available at: 
<http://www.evropa.gov.rs/Documents/Home/DACU/12/78/248/ipa-quickguide_v0%202.pdf> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016), at 23; Instruction for the Programming of the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI) 2014-2020, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/ENI%20programming%20instructions.pdf (Consulted 
on 07.08.2016), at 6. 
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5.1.3 Evaluating the state of art: not simply as means, always at the same time as ends  
 
In the context of the EU wider neighbourhood policies, stakeholders’ consultation is 
particularly important since it encompass numerous functions. First, it can help to 
structure the exercise of discretion by ensuring the plural and transparent configuration 
of the content of the act. Second, it has the potential to safeguard both private and public 
interests by recognising the meaningful role played by stakeholders in the process. Third, 
participatory procedures help to uphold the principles of partnership and joint ownership 
underlying the two policies. These three functions, as mentioned above, have been 
recognised – albeit not uniformly – by the institutions of the Union in their legislation and 
internal guidelines.208 Ultimately, conducting consultations help to ensure that the 
information gathered in order to compile the different acts and measures implementation 
of the Union external action are based on a plurality of sources, and strive to portray the 
most accurate picture of the reality and needs of third countries.  
Recognising the importance and the functions that consultations procedures play 
should not be without consequences. The recognition ought to demand that EU 
institutions sponsor and facilitate participation in public affairs. As correctly underlined 
by the Better Regulation Package, specific efforts should be made to ensure that 
consultations are carried out as openly as possible; ensuring effective and accountable 
participation.209 For example, in order to ensure sincere consultations, the Union’s 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, ‘must conduct their work as openly as 
possible.’210 This is particularly important in the context of international relations, which 
is historically a policy area protected by secrecy.211 As sustained by the Ombudsman in 
the context of the TTIP negotiations, transparency facilitates participation: it ensures 
access to information, which in turn, is a fundamental means to take part in the process 
of governance to which individuals are subject.212 Furthermore, the EU institutions ought 
                                                          
208 All the activities exercised by the administration in the SAP and ENP envisage to different degrees of 
‘bindingness’ the duty to consult stakeholders. Section 5.1.2 of this chapter.  
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not to use as an excuse for non-disclosure simply the risk of undermining international 
relations with a third state. In this context, nothing prevents the Union’s institutions from 
consulting the third country to understand its position on the issue. The arguments put 
forward by the Ombudsman in its own-initiate inquiry as to the respect of transparency 
during the TTIP negotiations are related to the importance of granting participation to the 
Union’s citizens.  
The argument put forward by this thesis extends the importance of granting 
participation also to third countries citizens, in light of the impact that Union’s action have 
on their states and because they may provide valuable information to the Union for 
reaching a decision. In other words, the Commission and the EEAS by valuing the 
participation of individuals and of natural legal persons in the SAP and the ENP ought to 
facilitate access to documents to stakeholders. Individuals and legal persons ought not to 
be treated as means to an end, simply as sources of information, but as ends in themselves. 
Waldron in this context suggests that the rule of law protects a positive freedom of active 
engagement in the administration of public affairs.213 This approach is potentially in line 
with article 11 which – in Mendes words – ‘implies focusing on the relationships of the 
participants, be they citizens or person concerned, the EU institutions and bodies, taking 
the former as reference points irrespective of the presumed quality of policy outcomes’.214 
The involvement of natural and legal persons in the exercise of public functions 
encompasses different forms. For example, participation can be foreseen as open 
consultations to whomever wishes to have a say in the matter at issue; more selective 
forms of involvement such as a dialogue with representative associations or civil societies, 
or it can acquire a more precise sense where persons external to the institutional set-up 
are formally associated therewith by reasons of a specific interest considered legally 
relevant for the subject matter being decided.215 International organisations such as the 
United Nations (and its agencies), the Organisation for Stability and Cooperation in 
Europe, the Council of Europe, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, etc. are 
external to the institutional set up but formally associated therewith by virtue of formal 
                                                          
213 J. Waldron, ‘The rule of law and the importance of procedure’, in J.E. Fleming (eds.), Getting to the Rule of 
Law (New York: New York University Press 2011), at 20. 
214 J. Mendes, ‘Participation and the Rule of Law after Lisbon: A Legal View of Art. 11’, 48 Common Market 
Law Review 2011, at 1862. 
215 J. Mendes, Participation in EU Rule-Making: A Rights-Based Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2011), at 28. 
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and informal arrangements between the Union and these institutions.216 Their 
participation in the SAP and ENP is also guaranteed by Commission implementing 
decisions, internal guidelines and by the financial assistance regulations.217 In light of the 
functions that consultation plays in the EU wider neighbourhood context, consultation for 
other actors, which are not formally associated with the policies’ institutional set up, 
ought to be opened to all relevant parties. Relevant parties ought to include those affected 
by the administrative activities implementing the SAP and the ENP, those who will be 
involved in implementation of these same activities, and those that have a stated interest 
in such measures. In this respect, the administration shall make sure that all relevant 
stakeholders will be invited to make their contribution via transparent and open calls. 
Openness and transparency in the way consultations are organised prevent the 
administration from inviting contributions only from associations and civil society 
organisations that reflect its own value judgment.218 The administration is disingenuous 
in pretending that decisions as to which associations should be consulted and whose 
suggestions should be accepted are technical and value-judgment-free.219 For example, 
the Union ought to better specify the reasons why certain international organisations are 
formally associated to the Union in conducting its external action.220 The duty of care, in 
its broader understanding, has the potential to structure the multiple contacts that the 
                                                          
216 For example, the EU concludes with the United Nations specific agreements on their interaction in a 
specific country. See the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement between the European Union 
represented by the European Commission and the United Nations, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/partners/humanitarian_aid/fafa/agreement_en.pdf (Consulted on 
07.08.2015).  
217 See preamble and annex of Commission Implementing Decision of 16.7.2014 approving the 
Memorandum of Understanding between the European Union and Tunisia related to macro-financial 
assistance to Tunisia, C(2014) 5176 final; preamble, Decision (EU) 534/2014 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 15 May 2014 providing macro-financial assistance to the Republic of Tunisia, OJ [2015] 
L151/9, 21.05.2014; article 4(4), Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30; 
article 5(5), Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014; EEAS, 
Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2013/5084; European 
Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, Guidance Note Enlargement package 2015, Access to 
Documents request GESTDEM reference 2016/450.  
218 This approach is in line with the Commission Better Regulation Package. Commission Staff Working 
Document of 19 May 2015 on ‘Better Regulation Guidelines’, SWD(2015) 111 final, at 65. Available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/swd_br_guidelines_en.pdf> (Consulted on 
07.08.2016). 
219 F. Bignami, ‘Creating Rights in the Age of Global Governance: Mental Maps and Strategic Interests in 
Europe’, bepress Legal Repository, September 2004, available at: 
<http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/390/> (Consulted on 07.08.2016), at 21. 
220 Chapter II, section 5. 
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Commission and the EEAS establish with other international organisations, civil society, 
experts, interest groups, etc.  
 
5.2 The duty to hear the other side 
 
5.2.1 The principle internally: a fundamental principle… 
 
The Court of Justice recognises the duty to hear the other side as a fundamental principle. 
The duty to hear the other side is recognised, even in the absence of a written rule, 
whenever an administrative act may have an adverse effect on the interest of an 
individual. The act should entail negative consequences, which are normally of an 
economic nature (e.g. application of sanction or a penalty, or the denial of an advantage 
sought by the applicant).221 The duty to hear the other side has been also recognised by 
the Court for legislative acts in cases of anti-dumping and of individual sanctioning; here 
the legislative acts are of an individualised nature and their effects are similar to the one 
entailed in an administrative decision.222 Overall, the duty to hear the other sides rests on 
four pillars: first, a procedure is initiated against a person; second, the bearers of the 
interest involved can be identified; third, the final decision entails a bilateral relationship 
between the author and the addressee of the act; fourth, the competent body has fairly 
broad power of investigation and of appraisal regarding the factual situation upon which 
it needs to decide.223 The Court’s approach to the duty to hear the other side has mainly 
been driven by competition law procedures as the archetype of administrative 
procedures in EU law, which is a very different realm from that of the SAP and the ENP.224 
However, it does represent a good starting point in highlighting the importance of the 
duty to hear the other side in respect to the relation that the Union develops with its 
neighbours. For the purpose of this last section, the duty to hear the other side will be 
analysed for third states, and for entities having an internationally recognised position as 
representative of a specific population (e.g. Front Polisario and Palestinian Liberation 
                                                          
221 Case 17/74 Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission, EU:C:1974:106, para. 15; Case 85/76 
Hoffman-La Roche v. Commission, EU:C:1979:36, para. 11. 
222 Case C-49/88 Al-Jubail Fertilizer v. Council, EU:C:1991:2, para. 15; Joined Cases C‐402/05 P and C‐415/05 
P, Yassin Adbullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, paras 335-352. 
223 For a comprehensive analysis on the duty to hear the other side see J. Mendes, Participation in EU Rule-
Making: A Right-Based Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), chapter 4, section 4.2. 
224 J. Mendes, Participation in EU Rule-Making: A Right-Based Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2011), at 187. 
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Organisation). This choice is made since the administrative activities implementing the 
SAP and the ENP have as addressee, or as de facto addressee, third states and any disputed 
territories therein.225  
 
5.2.2 Implementing arrangements in the external domain: …interpreted narrowly 
 
 As operationalised by the Court and by the European Ombudsman 
 
In its early anti-dumping case law, the Court established that a company was directly and 
individually concerned by an anti-dumping regulation since, among others, the same 
company was heard during the procedure leading to the adoption of the antidumping 
measure.226  In other words, the Court established a link between being heard during the 
procedure leading to the adoption of an anti-dumping regulation (legislative act) and 
standing.227 However, the reverse reasoning was not upheld by the General Court in the 
Front Polisario case. The General Court remained of the view, taken in Pfizer and 
Alpharma, that direct and individual concern is no assurance of the right to be heard in 
legislative procedures.228 In light of the Front Polisario’s identifiable role in the procedure, 
and in light of the impact that the legislative act has on the people of West Sahara, the 
right to be heard ought to have been granted to the liberation movement. The General 
Court in this case should have followed its Yusuf and Kadi line of cases which extended the 
right to be heard in the context of procedures leading up to the adoption of legislative acts 
– even in the absence of Treaty basis – whenever the general act is of direct and individual 
concern to certain person identified in the procedure.229  
The Commission before suggesting to the Council the conclusion of an Agreement in 
the form of an exchange of letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of 
                                                          
225 Chapter III, section 2.2. 
226 Case 264/82 Timex v. Council, EU:C:1985:119, paras 12-16; Joint cases 239 & 275/82 Allied Corporation 
v. Commission, EU:C:1984:68, paras 11-12. 
227 Article 13(1), Regulation No 3017/79 provides that 'Anti-dumping or countervailing duties, whether 
provisional or definitive, shall be imposed by regulation'. Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017/79 of 20 
December 1979 on protection against dumped or subsidised imports from countries not members of the 
European Economic Community, OJ [1979] L 339/1, 31.12.1979. 
228 The Court denied the right to be heard to both Pfizer and Alpharma within the context of a legislative 
procedure despite them being directly and individually concerned by the measure. Case T-13/99, Pfizer 
Animal Health SA v. Council, T:2002:209 para 487; and Case T-70/99, Alpharma Inc. v. Council, T:2002:210, 
para. 388. 
229 Joined Cases C‐402/05 P and C‐415/05 P, Yassin Adbullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation 
v. Council and Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, paras 335-352; see also Case T‐318/01, Omar Mohammed 
Othman v. Council and Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:187; J. Mendes, Participation in EU Rule-Making: A 
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Morocco ought to have consulted the Front Polisario.230 Despite the Council and 
Commission claims, from the outset it was clear that the agreement was to be applicable 
to the territory of West Sahara.231 As the Court rightly suggests: 
 
‘If the EU institutions wished to oppose the application to Western Sahara of the 
Association Agreement, as amended by the contested decision, they could have 
insisted on including a clause excluding such application into the text of the 
agreement approved by that decision. Their failure to do so shows that they accept, 
at least implicitly, the interpretation of the Association Agreement with Morocco and 
the agreement approved by the contested decision, according to which those 
agreements also apply to the part of Western Sahara controlled by the Kingdom of 
Morocco.’232 
 
Furthermore, in this respect the same Commission cooperated with the Moroccan 
authorities by including undertakings established in Western Sahara in the list of 
exporters approved under the Association Agreement with Morocco.233 DG SANCO also 
made a number of visits to Western Sahara to check compliance by the Moroccan 
authorities with health standards established by the European Union.234 If the agreement 
with Morocco was to apply to the territory of West Sahara, than the Front Polisario ought 
to have been granted the right to be heard in light of its internationally recognised 
position in the procedure. Both the Council and the Commission recognise the 
international status and legal position of Western Sahara, therefore, the law applicable to 
it must be determined in the context of the UN-led peace process.235 ‘It is precisely the UN 
which considers the Front Polisario as being an essential participant in that process.’236 
Moreover, the choice of the Union not to hear the liberation movement, as already 
discussed, has had the effect of potentially incentivising human rights violations. The right 
to be heard ought to have been granted to the Front Polisario in light of its identifiable 
role in the procedure; and as holder of a legally protected interest (the protection of 
                                                          
230 For a summary of the case see chapter III, section 3.  
231 ‘All the factors mentioned in paragraphs 77 to 87 above are part of that context and show that the EU 
institutions were aware that the Moroccan authorities also applied the provisions of the Association 
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232 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 102. 
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human rights in West Sahara) which ought to have been taken into account by the 
decision-makers as part of the overall assessment that finds the final decision.   
 
 As operationalised by internal rules  
 
The Commission and EEAS internal guidelines as to how to compile progress reports 
foresee the participation of third countries in the process. Third countries are invited to 
provide written inputs, and meetings are encouraged between the EU Delegation and 
third countries in order to clarify the written contributions.237 However, the guidance 
notices stress the importance of consulting the neighbouring countries in order to gather 
information from the widest array of sources, rather than specifically acknowledging the 
self-defense aspect of it. In this respect, the visa liberalisation progress reports also 
indicate that the factual information included in the report is based on the contributions 
submitted by the respective countries.238 The idea of proceduralising the duty to hear 
third countries as been endorsed by the Union in the agreement it concluded with 
Ukraine. The Association Agreement concluded by the Union with Ukraine foresees that 
access to the Union market shall be granted to Ukraine based on the level of 
approximation of Ukrainian legislation with EU law. In this respect, the Ukrainian 
government is obliged to provide reports to the EU in line with approximation deadlines 
specified in the Agreement; subsequently, the Commission and the EEAS are empowered 
by the agreement to adopt a report on the level of approximation of Ukrainian legislation 
with EU law.239 Based on this report, the Association Council established by the 
Agreement will decide on further market opening. The agreement explicitly 




                                                          
237 European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, Guidance Note Enlargement package 2015, 
Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2016/450; EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, 
Access to Documents request GESTDEM reference 2013/5084. 
238 E.g. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of the 15 November 2013 
‘First Progress Report on the implementation by Georgia of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation’, 
COM(2013) 808 final, at 2. 
239 For example, the Commission, under the new agreement concluded between the EU and Ukraine, is 
required to compile numerous reports on the level of approximation by Ukraine with the EU acquis. See 
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5.2.3 Evaluating the state of art: a relationship based on the wrong assumptions 
 
The duty to hear the other side needs to be analysed in the context of the relation 
established by the administration of the Union and third states. The relation between 
third countries and the administration is based on two incorrect assumptions. First, the 
belief that the activities implementing the SAP and the ENP do not have as de facto 
addressee the third states; second, that the relation between the Union and the third state 
is one between two equal partners. By rebutting these two assumptions, it will become 
clear why the third state ought to be heard in the process of adoption of the administrative 
activities implementing the Union’s wider neighbourhood policies.  
 Most of the administrative activities characterising the EU wider neighbourhood are 
not directly addressed to the SAP and ENP states; however, the fact that the instruments 
do not have as a clear addressee the third countries should not be misleading. As 
discussed in detail in section 2.2 of chapter III, the instruments – even if addressed to e.g. 
the Council – have as main addressee the neighbouring states, which should follow the 
suggestions made in the document; adopt the standards indicated in the latter; address 
the lacks identified; or adapt its political agenda to the strategy papers unless they want 
to trigger negative sanctions240 or renounce benefits.241 Administrative activities, 
whether binding or non-binding, acquire legal authority from the moment in which non-
compliance or compliance has legal consequences.242 The duty to hear the third state 
ought to be included as an essential element in the pre-legal relationship between the 
Union and the neighbouring states. The pre-legal relationship is the phase leading to an 
                                                          
240 Examples are: suspension of financial aid, postponement of the signature of an agreement, etc. The 2014 
Bosnia and Herzegovina progress reports states that: ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina also still refuses to adapt 
this Agreement [i.e. SAA Interim Agreement] to take into account its traditional trade with Croatia before it 
joined the EU. The Commission has undertaken steps to suspend Bosnia and Herzegovina from certain trade 
benefits if the adaptation process is not finalised by the end of 2015.’ Commission Staff Working Document 
Progress Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina accompanying the EU Enlargement Strategy of 8 October 2014 
SWD(2014) 305 final. 
241 Budget Support is one among other types of financing available under IPA II. The rules allow the use of 
Budget Support provided the eligibility criteria are fulfilled. Support can be provided only in a sector which 
has been identified in the Country Strategy Paper as a priority and which is endowed by an appropriate 
sector reform plan. Such plan must be linked to the enlargement agenda. Therefore, if the country wants to 
make use of IPA II funds it needs to adopt a country strategy paper or action plan on a subject identified in 
the Commission country strategy papers, which in turn are based on Commission communications on the 
enlargement strategy and on the progress reports. Lack in adoption of an action plan on a specific sector 
could block IPA II financing. See the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina available at: <http://eu-
monitoring.ba/en/the-initiative-warns-blocking-ipa-funds-does-not-punish-those-responsible-for-
political-obstruction/> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
242 J. Mendes, ‘Rule of law and participation: A normative analysis of internationalized rulemaking as 
composite procedures’, 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 2014, at 377. 
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eventual sanction or denial of benefits. Here the idea is that the entity whose situation is 
under scrutiny has a special status in defending itself.243 The third state not only ought to 
defend itself from the potential action of the Union, which has the power to limit through 
conditionality its wellbeing by cutting down their relations, but also ought to be heard in 
light of the impact that the administrative activities have on the state itself.244 In other 
words, the establishment of participatory rules at the administrative level affords 
anticipated procedural protection to actors that might be affected by the intervention or 
non-intervention of the Union. This should particularly be the case in light of the 
difficulties faced by third states in challenging the final decision.245 
 Believing that the relation between the Union and its neighboring states is one 
between two sovereign entities with equal powers is illusionary. It is the Union which 
decides when positive incentives are to be granted or negative sanctions are to be 
imposed. Therefore, the third state, depending on its willingness to integrate in the Union, 
will always find itself in a subaltern position. Visa liberalisation regimes are granted once 
the neighbor state respects the criteria identified by the Union in the visa liberalisation 
action plans. In several chapters of the Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
between the Union and Ukraine, the process of legislative approximation is clearly linked 
to additional access to the EU Internal Market. For example, in the area of technical 
barriers, it is only when the Union has determined that Ukraine has fully approximated 
its legislation to the listed EU acquis, that additional access to its Internal Market will be 
offered.246 It is only once the Union decides that SAP countries are ready that accession 
negotiations will be opened. Finally, it should not be forgotten that some states, like 
Ukraine and Tunisia, are also dependent on the EU for macro-financial loans.247 The point 
here is not to question whether morally or legally it is correct to impose such a standard 
on a third state. Rather, the point here is to recognize the type or relation that the Union 
                                                          
243 D.J. Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1997), at. 143. 
244 Chapter III, section 2.2. 
245 Third countries might not be able to challenge the measure either due to its non-legally binding nature 
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246 Article 57, Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, 
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has developed with the third state so as to grant to the third state some procedural 
protections.   
 The duty to hear the third state, alongside supporting the search for the right 
outcome, also allows the third country affected by a process to participate in it. The idea 
that an entity ought to be involved in defending and protecting its own interests is an 
intriguing attempt to link participatory procedures to the respect of that same entity. Here 
the rule of law is seen not just as a system of control imposed from above and external to 
the relationships developed between the Union and third states; but as a system of 
regulation occurring within the type of relationship developed between the Union and the 
third state over time.248 The principle that an accused person should be able to respond 
and defend himself is rooted in the rule of law. There seems to be three instances where 
the duty to hear the third states ought to be respected: in case of sanctions, in case of delay 
in granting benefits, and in case of adoption of regulatory frameworks.   
 Progress reports – but also other informal forms of Commission and EEAS 
investigations –249 might lead to actions against third countries. For example, progress 
reports can inform the Council of lack of progress by a third state in certain essential areas 
of cooperation between the latter and the EU. Based on these documents, the Council 
might decide to suspend the entrance into force of an agreement or the agreement itself. 
The act of suspension is a legislative measure adopted in accordance with article 218(9) 
TFEU but it is of an individual nature to the third state. The Council Decision names the 
third state as the subject of the sanction. In 2008 the Council decided to suspend the 
implementation of the Interim Agreement concluded between the EU and Serbia while 
waiting for the ratification of the formal Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The 
Council decision stated that: 
 
‘[…] on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, the Council decided that the 
Interim Agreement with the Republic of Serbia will be implemented as soon as the 
Council decides unanimously that the Republic of Serbia fully cooperates with the 
ICTY.’250  
 
                                                          
248 D.J. Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1997), at. 141. 
249 E.g. Reports on the level of implementation of the agreements concluded by the EU with third countries, 
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The decision of the Council to suspend the implementation of the agreement is a political 
decision. The Council hopes that the suspension of the agreement will push Serbia to fully 
cooperate with the ICTY. However, the type of relation that the Commission develops with 
Serbia in the pre-legal phase ought to be taken into consideration before reaching the final 
decision. Before taking the final decision which directly affects the legal relationship 
between the Union and Serbia; was Serbia given the chance to explain the difficulties it 
faced in cooperating with the ICTY? As already stated above, the point here is not to 
defend Serbia for not collaborating with the ICTY. The point here, instead, is to recognize 
the context in which such an act is taken. The political decision is the tip of the iceberg; 
the underlying, ongoing administrative procedure and its impact on the third states needs 
to be acknowledged. The investigative process alone has effects on the neighbourhing 
states; it does not necessarily have to lead to a sanction being imposed. Third states, 
fearing possible sanction, follow the guidelines provided by the monitoring reports.    
 The Court, in a very different context from the one under analysis, ruled that the 
right to be heard under the CJEU is granted to Member States in all proceedings that are 
liable to culminate in a negative measure. The Court in PTT acknowledged that, under 
article 106 TFEU, Member States under investigation can rely on the right to be heard as 
a general principle of EU law even in the absence of statutory provisions. 251 They can rely 
on the right on the basis of the Court’s general formula that the right must be guaranteed 
‘in all proceedings which are initiated against a person and which are liable to culminate 
in a measure adversely affecting that person’.252 Since the final sanction is not a conditio 
sine qua non for the establishment of an obligation to hear the other side, it does not seem 
unthinkable to demand from the Commission to hear the third state while monitoring its 
progress – particularly in light of the significant effect that the morning process has on 
third states. Finally, according to Craig, the general trend of the case law on the right to be 
heard has been to require a hearing even where no sanction is imposed, provided that 
there is some adverse impact, or some significant effect on the applicant interest.253  
 Progress reports can also delay the opening of accession negotiations for candidates 
to Union membership, or can slow down the speed of integration of a neighbouring state 
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in the Union internal market. Again it is undeniable that it is not a right to become a 
member of the Union or a close partner. Nevertheless, a delay in both processes can have 
a significant impact on the third countries to which these measures are addressed. The 
impact is not only related to the economy of the country but also to other issues such as 
visa liberalisation, the opening of exchange programmes, etc.254 The difference between 
this example and the previous one is that in this situation the EU is not sanctioning the 
third state, but is rather delaying the reception of benefits. Nevertheless, the obligation to 
hear the third country ought to be demanded in light of its defensive and collaborative 
functions. The third country ought to be heard in order to defend itself from accusations 
made by the Commission in the e.g. visa liberalisation progress reports. Based on the 
Commission’s scrutiny, the wellbeing of the third state and of its citizens may be delayed 
and potentially harmed. The third country ought to show its point of view to the 
Commission, which, based on its evaluation, might not find the state ready for a visa 
liberalisation regime. Moreover, hearing the other side allows the Commission to reach 
the most complete outcome, especially in light of the knowledge that third states have. 
The final outcome might result in a legislative act.255 
 In the Technische Universität München case the university concerned had applied for 
an exemption from customs duty on the import of a scientific instrument. The national 
customs authority refused the exemption on the basis of a Commission decision stating 
that a duty-free importation would be inappropriate. Before the Court of Justice, the 
university complained that, while the Commission had heard a group of experts, it had not 
given any opportunity to the university itself to submit technical information and 
observations. The Court ruled that even though the applicable regulation did not provide 
any opportunity to the importer of scientific apparatus to explain his position: 
 
‘[…] the right to be heard in such an administrative procedure requires that the 
person concerned should be able, during the actual procedure before the Commission, 
to put his own case and properly make his views known on the relevant 
circumstances’.256  
 
According to the Court, this conclusion was justified by the circumstance that ‘the 
importing institution is best aware of the technical characteristics which the scientific 
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apparatus must have in view of the work for which it is intended’. 257 if we transpose – 
always acknowledging the difference in context – this case to the activities of the EU in its 
wider neighbourhood, we can state that if the decision by the Union on whether to 
increase its partnership with the third country is based on the report compiled by the 
Commission and the EEAS, then the third country ought to be heard in light of its central 
position in the process.  
This last paragraph explores the possibility of extending the duty to hear the 
neighbouring states during the process of drafting action plans, European partnerships 
and Memoranda of Understanding. These documents are allegedly decided in partnership 
with third countries. Nevertheless, the third party, finding itself in a weaker position, 
might accept all the conditions established by the Union without exercising the right to be 
properly heard. In this respect, in order to fully guarantee the participation of a third 
country in the adoption of its action plan or of a Memorandum of Understanding, 
procedural guarantees need to be put into place. This is particularly important since 
neither action plans, nor Memoranda of Understanding are actual contractual relations 
where negotiations are guaranteed. With some countries there are real negotiations, 
while with some others this is not really an option since some states do not even have the 
technical expertise to engage in such negotiations. As pointed out at the beginning of this 
section, the process of governance here occurs in the context of a relationship which is 
egalitarian only from a theoretical perspective. Obliging the Union to hear the third state 
under these circumstances has the potential to structure their unbalanced relation. In this 
context, the dignity of the third state is not respected if they are treated as mere objects 
of decision. Respect for their dignity requires an opportunity for argumentation, and it 
requires acknowledging the type of relation the EU established with them.258  
The case law of the Court of Justice is not immune from considerations stemming 
from the type of relations the Union develops with third states. There are a number of 
cases where the Court has referred to the relationship that the Union developed with non-
EU states in order to interpret the EU-third countries agreements, particularly in 
interpreting the rights granted by them.259 EU-third state agreements are nothing more 
                                                          
257 Case C-269/90 Hauptzollamt München-Mitte v. Technische Universität München, EU:C:1991:438, para. 24. 
258 J. Waldron, ‘The rule of law and the importance of procedure’, in J.E. Fleming (eds.), Getting to the Rule of 
Law (New York: New York University Press 2011), at 20. 
259 Case C-81/13 United Kingdom v. Council, EU:C:2014:2449, para. 57; Case C-431/11 United Kingdom v. 
Council, EU:C:2013:589, para. 50; Case C-656/11 United Kingdom v. Council, EU:C:2014:97, para 55; C-
221/11 Leyla Ecem Demirkan v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EU:C:2013:583, para 52; C-265/03 Igor 
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than a legally binding regulatory framework between the Union and a third state. 
Memoranda of Understanding, action plans, and European Partnerships form the 
regulatory framework upon which relations between the Union and the third state should 
develop.260 As Mendes argues, ‘[i]mplicit in the conception of the procedural rule of law is 
the idea that procedural rules need at least to be considered in the creation of regulatory 
regimes’.261 This ought to be particularly the case in situations where the opportunity to 
make arguments about what the law is has a direct bearing on the third state. The idea of 
self-protection within relations calls directly on the value of allowing a specific state, 
namely, one affected by a process, to participate in the latter. The internal guidelines on 
how to draft action plans envisage the participation of the neighbouring states in the 
process of drafting the documents.262 However, the Council Regulation on the 
establishment of European partnerships in the framework of the SAP is silent on the 




This chapter tried to give effect and to make operational the respect of the administrative 
rule of law eternally by using as an example the EU wider neighbourhood policies. The 
principles chosen in order to give effect to the administrative rule of law externally have 
been selected in light of their ability to tackle the features and impacts that the 
administrative power assumes when exercised in the external relation context, and in 
light of their ability to secure the respect of the two key functions associated with the 
administrative rule of law; to wit, rationality of outcomes and individual protection. The 
selected principles are mainly concerned with the procedures to be followed by the 
administration in developing and implementing its external action. However, procedures 
shall not be underestimated; they can have a decisive impact on substantive outcomes. 
Among others impacts, procedures channel the flow of information and they mitigate 
                                                          
Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol, EU:C:2005:213, 
para 28 and paras 30-36.  
260 Chapter II, sections 3.1 and 4.1. 
261 J. Mendes, ‘Rule of law and participation: A normative analysis of internationalized rulemaking as 
composite procedures’, 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 2014, 381-387. 
262 ‘Objectives should be jointly formulated upon a thorough discussion of the expected results’ EEAS, Non-
Paper: Guidelines for Future ENP Action Plan 05.01.2012, Access to Documents request SG1 - Corporate 
Board Secretariat; EEAS, Guidance Note ENP Package 2014, Access to Documents request GESTDEM 
reference 2013/5084. 
263 Council Regulation (EC) No 533/2004 of 22 March 2004 on the establishment of European partnerships 
in the framework of the stabilisation and association process, OJ [2004] L 086, 24.03.2004. 
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possible information asymmetries between relevant actors. The application of the 
selected principles in the external relations context is starting to be operationalised by 
the Court, the Ombudsman, the legislators, and the administration itself.  
Despite the attempts so far made to operationalise the principles externally, the 
process is not fully completed. The overall operationalisation of the principles externally 
ought not to stop here. As the chapter suggested, new implementing arrangements aimed 
at operationalizing the principles externally ought to be constructed. The process of 
operationalisation is challenged by the general lack of primary and secondary legislation 
regulating the exercise of administrative power in the SAP and ENP, and by the Court’s 
reticent approach. The activity of the CJEU has been widely recognised as the focal driving 
force in operationalising the principles giving effect to the rule of law. However, under 
this approach the development of the rule of law externally will only be possible if 
European judges will embrace a more nuanced concept of the administrative rule of law, 
and will accept the complexity and relevance that the administrative power exercise in 
external action. Therefore, taking a more pragmatic approach that would embrace the 
role that can be played by the European Ombudsman and by non-conventional sources as 
parameters to be used in structuring the Commission’s and EEAS exercise of 
administrative power is a first important step.  
The respect of administrative law principles in the external relations domain has the 
potential to structure the relation between the Union and individuals, and between the 
Union and third countries. They are relational principles in that they indicate how the 
administration ought to interact and interface with external actors with whom the Union 
has built ties. In this respect, they support the administration in structuring its external 
activities. Furthermore, they guide and support the EU administration in executing and 
giving effect to the Union’s external policies and objectives. The policies’ finalité and 
underlying principles ought to be reflected in the role and operationalization of the 
administrative principles (e.g. the ENP rests on joint ownership, thus, participation is 
fundamental in the implementation of the policy). Ultimately, the respect of 
administrative law principles externally helps to secure the credibility that the Union’s 
action on the international scene is developed and implemented in accordance with the 
values which have inspired its own creation – among others the rule of law. The task of 
the next chapter is to check whether enforcement mechanisms are in place, or ought to be 
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in place, with the aim of ensuring that the external administrative power acts in 




Table 1 shows the rights monitored by the progress reports for the Western Balkan 
countries. The table does not differentiate among countries since, apart from minor 
variations, the progress reports cover the same rights. Table 2 shows the discrepancy as 
to the standards used by the Commission in order to determine their compliance. The 
table presents the selection of international instruments that the candidates and potential 
candidates have signed and/or ratified in order to comply with the accession criteria. The 





Civil and Political Rights 
 
 
Economic and Social Rights 
 
Minority Rights, Cultural Rights 
and the  
Protection of Minorities 
 
 
- prevention of torture and  
ill-treatment 
- pre-trial detention 
- prison conditions 
- access to justice 
- religious freedom 
- freedom of expression 
and media 
- freedom of association 
- non-discrimination 
- property rights 
- civil society 
- fight against impunity 
- death penalty (BiH & HR) 
- arbitrary arrest (BiH, HR 
& AL) 
- restitution of 
dispossessed property 
(HR) 
- right of effective remedy 




- gender equality 
- rights of the child 
- socially vulnerable and  
disabled persons 
- labour rights 
- social dialogue 
- woman’s right 
- refugees  
- internally displaced 
persons 
- property rights 
- education  
- trade unions  
(BiH, FYROM & AL) 
- restitution of property         
(HR & FYROM) 
 
 
- cultural rights 
- education (SER) 









                                                          






Observance of international human rights law  
Instrument  Country 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the abolition of the death 
penalty in all circumstances 
SER, BiH, MNE, HR 
BiH, MNE, FYROM 
AL 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture SER 
European Convention on Trans-frontier Television SER 
European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages  SER, MNE, FYROM 
European Social Charter 
Protocol 1 to the European Social Charter 
Revised Protocol No 2 to the European Social Charter 
SER, MNE, FYROM 
FYROM 
FYROM 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture MNE 
Europe Conventions on Exercise of Children's rights MNE, HR 
Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence 
MNE, AL 
Council of Europe Convention on Suppression of Terrorism HR 
European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent 
Crimes 
HR 
Council of Europe's Convention on Action against Trafficking in 
Human Beings 
FYROM, AL 
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of 
Terrorism 
AL 
Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism  AL 
Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural 
Heritage for Society 
AL 
Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine AL 
Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against 
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse 
MNE 
Additional Protocol to the European Council Convention on 
cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and 
xenophobic nature committed through computer systems 
HR 
Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 
AL 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights AL 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights AL 
UN Convention on the Right of the Child  AL 
UN Convention on the Status of the Refugees  AL 
International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
AL 
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women  
AL 
UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities and its 
optional protocol 
MNE, FYROM 
UN Convention on the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography, and on children in armed conflicts 
AL 
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Chapter V: Enforcing the rule of law externally 
Creating enhanced opportunities for out-of-court enforcement mechanisms 
 
1. Enforcement mechanisms: beyond neutrality into the complexity of the policy domain 
 
This chapter completes the analysis commenced by chapter IV by analyzing the 
mechanisms in place, and which ought to be in place, aimed at guaranteeing the 
enforcement of the administrative rule of law externally. Upholding the administrative 
rule of law externally not only requires the identification of the principles giving effect to 
the rule of law in the external domain; it also demands that a comprehensive set of 
enforcement mechanisms are in place with the aim of ensuring that the external 
administrative power adopts measures in conformity with the principles identified, and 
that natural and legal persons are able to challenge (directly or indirectly) any act which 
affects them.1 Enforcement mechanisms are usually associated with coercion; i.e. 
compliance with the administrative rule of law can be obtained only through Court and 
sanctioning mechanisms. Nevertheless, such understanding of the enforcement 
mechanisms fails to take into account the context in which they operate, as well as the 
increasing variety of out-of-court enforcement mechanisms that combine authority with 
non-coercive mechanisms.2 
Harlow and Rawlings have recently observed that enforcement ‘raises important 
issues of administrative policy and process, or discretion, procedural design and trade-
off.’3 This statement, as Chiti underlines, reminds us that enforcement should not be 
treated as a neutral and somehow mechanical process. ‘It should be rather considered as 
a complex process encapsulating specific strategies and normative preferences.’4 
Enforcement mechanisms regulating the relationships between EU subjects take place 
within the Union’s legal order, which has historically developed as a space oriented 
towards compliance with EU law and its principles. Enforcement mechanisms regulating 
the relationships between EU and non-EU subjects, instead, are carried out in a legal 
                                                          
1 Case 294/83 Les Verts v. Parliament, EU:C:1986:166, para. 23; Case C-455/14 H v. Council, Commission and 
EUPM, EU:C:2016:569, para. 41.  
22 E. Chiti, ‘The Governance of Compliance’, in M. Cremona (eds.) Compliance and Enforcement of EU Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 32, at 32.  
3 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014), at 
170. 
4 E. Chiti, ‘Enforcement of and Compliance with Structural Principles’, in M. Cremona (eds.) Structural 
Principles in EU External Relations Law (London: Hart Publishing forthcoming). 
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context which is partly within and partly outside the EU legal order. If it is certainly true 
that the difference between the internal and the external realm is reflected, and ought to 
be reflected, in the way the principles giving effect to the rule of law are enforced, it is also 
true that at times this divide has negatively influenced the approach of the Court and the 
responsiveness of EU institutions in developing enforcement mechanisms. In other words, 
sometime the divide has been used in a rather artificial manner in order to avoid entering 
into the merits of the case.  
In the context of external relations, judicial control is certainly relevant but it is only 
one component of the enforcement process. The Court has the obligation to review the 
action of the administration to the extent that it might touch upon protected rights, and 
to the extent that it has a direct impact on the legal situation of third parties. However, the 
role of the Court needs to be carefully balanced to preserve the freedom of the Council to 
take political decisions. A middle course between the original view of the Court as external 
to the measures aimed at developing and implementing the Union external action and the 
spectre of ‘juridification’ of the governance mode of foreign policy ought to be sought. 
Next to the Court, other forms of enforcement mechanisms are in place and ought to be 
strengthened in order to give full effect to the administrative rule of law externally: the 
Ombudsman and ‘compliance building’. The redress function of the European 
Ombudsman is one building block of the European rule of law.5 ‘Compliance building’, as 
we shall see, is particularly suited to enforcing the relations between the Union and third 
states. In analysing the enforcement mechanisms, the chapter will first cover judicial 
review and secondly, quasi-judicial mechanisms (i.e. the Ombudsman and ‘compliance 
building’). In developing the analysis, the chapter does not intend to enter the debate as 
to the different paths of compliance mechanisms (coercive strategy vs. problem-solving); 
it rather uses them as operational concepts.  
 
2. Judicial review: a long steeplechase 
 
The idea that the administration should be procedurally and substantively accountable 
before the Courts is a cornerstone principle stemming from the rule of law.6 
Notwithstanding the judiciary’s decentralised role in giving effect to the rule of law in the 
                                                          
5 A. Peters, ‘The European Ombudsman and the European Construction’, 42 Common Market Law Review 
2005, at 723. 
6 P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), at 251. 
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new form of foreign governance as exemplified by the SAP and the ENP,7 the Court still 
ought to play an important part in enforcing the rule of law when the administrative 
power acts externally. The Court ought to recognise that the administrative activities 
implementing the SAP and the ENP involve important political considerations; at the same 
time, it ought to hold EU institutions to their commitment to ensure that the 
administrative power acts within the boundaries established by the rule of law. The Court 
in this context ought to promote a principled approach to administrative activities, 
particularly if they lead to final decisions that directly impact on the legal situation of third 
parties or if they impinge on legally protected rights.8  
Final decisions are of different types. Some are of a purely political nature (e.g. 
Council Conclusions), and others are legal acts (e.g. Council decisions, Commission 
implementing decisions, etc.). Ideally, the Court is not to act as final arbiter of the legality 
of political decisions; instead it ought to highlight the relationship between political 
decisions, administrative activities and their impacts on the exercise of public power and 
on individuals.9 The enforcement of the rule of law as operationalised externally ought to 
catch the double impact that the administrative activities exercise both internally and 
externally. Internally final decisions are dependent on the content of administrative 
activities; externally they have preparatory and rule making functions. The General Court 
began to engage in this challenge in the Front Polisario case.10 The case is an example in 
which the Court encouraged the Commission to carry out human rights impact 
assessments (administrative activities) before suggesting to the Council to conclude an 
agreement with a third state (a political choice) due to the impact that the action of the 
Union would have on individuals (potential violations of human rights). Moreover, the 
Court in her recent H decision also made a step in this direction by affirming that 
limitations to judicial review – in this case the one related to the CFSP – need to be 
interpreted narrowly in order to give effect to the rule of law.11 
                                                          
7 Chapter IV, and more generally see chapter I, section 4.3. 
8 Final decisions are of different types. Some are of pure political nature (e.g. Council Conclusions) others 
are legal acts (e.g. Council decisions). Here it is argued that the Court ought to review only the administrative 
activities leading to legally binding acts.  
9 Chapter III. 
10 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953. 
11 ‘[…] the aforementioned provisions [Article 24(1) TEU and the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU] 
introduce a derogation from the rule of general jurisdiction which Article 19 TEU confers on the Court to 
ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed, and they must, 
therefore, be interpreted narrowly […]. The very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure 
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 While one could argue that the application of judicial review would involve 
squeezing the pre-accession and neighbourhood policy instruments into the rigidity of 
the law, this argument should be viewed with some suspicion.12 Surely introducing some 
level of judicial review – especially when the administrative power in external relations 
affects the position of third parties – would not have the effect of tightening the hands of 
the administration in developing and implementing the SAP and the ENP. Limited forms 
of judicial review could be designed without collapsing the whole pre-accession and 
neighbourhood projects, or undermining the goals for its emergence. However, there are 
reasons to suggest that judicial review – on its own – will do little in enforcing the 
principles giving effect to the rule of law in the system of foreign governance 
characterising the SAP and the ENP. The Courts’ understanding of ‘legally relevant impact’ 
and ‘protected rights’ ought to be adapted to the realm of external relations. The 
complexity and relevance of administrative power in external action does not follow the 
same scheme it does internally. What is considered as being legally relevant internally 
ought to be analysed in the context of a system of governance that evades the use of legally 
relevant acts. The belief that the Court will enforce the rule of law in the way the Union 
develops and implements the SAP and the ENP rests on the assumption of ‘a better Court’; 
however, the capacity of judicial review to effectively enforce the respect of the principles 
giving effect to the administrative rule of law externally presents several hurdles.13  
  
2.1 The types of obstacles  
 
Even if the EU is subject to various obligations under EU law, this by no means leads to 
the conclusion that these will be enforced. In the context of the SAP and ENP, there are 
two main ways of challenging the action of the Union before the Courts. First, in 
accordance with the conditions spelled out in article 265 TFEU, should Union institutions, 
offices, bodies, and agencies – in infringement of the Treaties – fail to act, natural and legal 
persons as well as Union institutions and Member States can challenge their action or 
inaction by filing an application to the Court for failure to act. Second, the Treaties provide 
                                                          
compliance with provisions of EU law is inherent in the existence of the rule of law.’ Case C-455/14 H v. 
Council, Commission and EUPM, EU:C:2016:569, paras 40-41.  
12 J. Scott and D. Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union’, 8 
European Law Journal 2002, at 18.  
13 Dawson makes a similar point in respect of the role of Court in reviewing the Open Method of 
Coordination. M. Dawson, New Governance and the Transformation of European Law coordinating EU Social 
Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001), at 267. 
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the possibility of challenging the legality of acts of Union institutions, offices, bodies, and 
agencies intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties (article 263 TFEU). 
According to the Court, judicial review of measures adopted by the Union institutions is 
guaranteed by the complete system of legal remedies and procedures established by the 
Treaties.14 However, in order for the principle of judicial review to be upheld, access to 
court needs to be guaranteed by this same system of legal remedies and procedures.15 In 
other words, access to court is indispensable to the guarantee of judicial review.16 
However, for different reasons affected parties are essentially excluded from most 
actions. 
In the first place, any direct action under article 263 TFEU is subject to the 
requirement of direct and individual concern – with the exception of regulatory acts not 
entailing implementing measures for which direct concern is sufficient. The Union’s Court 
infamous rules on standing have severely restricted the possibility for non-privileged 
applicants from challenging Union acts. The problem with the ‘direct and individual 
concern test’ is less the wording of the Treaties than the Court’s reading of it. The CJEU 
over the years has refused to follow the administrative law practice of national courts in 
liberalising standing rules in order to take account of new constituencies.17 The Court 
stood firm on the interpretation of article 263 TFEU set out in Plauman. According to the 
Plauman test ‘direct and individual concern’ is recognised when a decision affects the 
individual or group concerned ‘by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them 
or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons’.18 
Standing aside, individual applicants may be precluded from directly challenging EU acts 
for two sector-specific reasons: their extraterritorial application and the Court’s lack of 
recognition of their relevance externally.  
 
 
                                                          
14 Case 294/83 Les Verts v. Parliament, EU:C:1986:166, para. 23. 
15 K. Lenaerts, I. Maselis, and K. Gutman, EU Procedural Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014), at 111. 
16 P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), at 305. 
17 M. Dawson, New Governance and the Transformation of European Law coordinating EU Social Law and 
Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001), at 270. 
18 Case 25/62 Plaumann v. Commission, EU:C:1963:17, para 107. Extensive literature has been written on 
the topic. Among others see: P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), 
chapter 11; K. Lenaerts, I. Maselis, and K. Gutman, EU Procedural Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2014), 332-364; D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law: Texts and Materials (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), 444-455. 
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 Extraterritorial application  
 
In Commune de Champagne, applicants from Switzerland tried to challenge the Council’s 
decision to conclude an agreement with Switzerland on trade in agricultural products in 
light of its external effects.19 In this context, the General Court affirmed that the Union’s 
rights and obligations are limited to the territory of the EU Member States. It bases the 
claim on two grounds: first, on the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in article 2(1) 
of the United Nations Charter. In this respect the General Court clearly stated that: 
 
‘[…] it is, as a rule, a matter for each State to legislate in its own territory and, 
accordingly, that generally a State may unilaterally impose binding rules only in its 
own territory.’20 
 
Second, the Court stated that in accordance with article 299 EC (now 355 TFEU): 
 
‘[…] an act of an institution adopted pursuant to the Treaty, as a unilateral act of the 
Community, cannot create rights and obligations outside the territory [of the 
Union]’21 
 
The applicants were, thus, not able to contest the Council’s decision on the conclusion of 
an agreement between the Union and Switzerland on trade in agricultural products. The 
General Court was firm in stating that an act of an institution adopted pursuant to the 
Treaty, as a unilateral act of the Community, could not create rights and obligations 
outside the territory of the Union.22 In this respect, the General Court did not even attempt 
to analyse whether the act did actually have a legal effect on the applicants. It stopped its 
analysis here by holding that contested act did not bring about a change in the applicants’ 
legal position in Switzerland, such position being governed only by the third state in the 
exercise of its sovereign power.23 The argument so expressed by the General Court 
presents some flaws. First, as Bartles argues, the principle of sovereign equality does not 
have the effects ascribed by the Court. Even if there might be a presumption that domestic 
legislation does not apply outside of the territory of the state, the presumption is often 
                                                          
19 The external effect being the exclusion of the use of the name ‘champagne’, both in the EU and in 
Switzerland, for white non-sparkling wines produced in Swiss Champagne. Case T-212/02 Commune de 
Champagne v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2007:194. 
20 Case T-212/02 Commune de Champagne v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2007:194, para. 89.  
21 Case T-212/02 Commune de Champagne v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2007:194, para. 89. 
22 ‘[T]he scope of the contested decision is limited to that territory [the Union’s territory] and it has no legal 
effect in the territory of Switzerland.’ Case T-212/02 Commune de Champagne v. Council and Commission, 
EU:T:2007:194, para. 88. 
23 P. Eeckout, EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), at 292. 
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overridden.24 The Union routinely exercises its power over third states. A strict 
interpretation of the territorial scope of the Union’s Treaties might imply that EU law does 
not recognise any right in third countries, not even human rights.25 This approach is not 
uncontested and the General Court in the Front Polisario case seems to counter this 
approach.26  
 The General Court in the Front Polisario case used a rather original reasoning in 
determining whether the Council decision concluding the agreement between the Union 
and Morocco was of direct and individual concern to the Front Polisario. The General 
Court affirmed that the Council decision concluding the agreement was able to produce 
legal effects on third parties outside the Union’s territory in light of the actual ability of 
the agreement to have direct effect.27 In other words, in order to determine if the Council 
Decision concluding the agreement was of direct concern to the liberation movement, the 
General Court – in an about-face from its approach in the Commune de Champagne –
checked the ability of the agreement itself to create legal effects.28 It methodically 
examined which provisions of the agreement were capable of having a direct effect, i.e. 
they contained ‘clear and precise obligations, not subject, in their implementation or in 
their effects, to the adoption of subsequent measures’.29 While the General Court in 
Commune de Champagne excluded a priori the possibility of the Union decision to create 
effects on the position of third parties, in the Front Polisario case the fact that the 
agreement contained provisions capable of having a direct effect was crucial in 
establishing that the decision concluding the agreement could produce effects on the 
position of the whole territory of Morocco, which includes West Sahara. Nevertheless, the 
approach taken by the Court in the Front Polisario might have dangerous consequences.   
 The General Court in the Front Polisario case seems to establish a connection 
between direct and individual concern and the direct effect of the provisions contained in 
the agreement. This approach is worrisome for two main reasons. First, the impact of the 
                                                          
24 L. Bartel, ‘The EU’s Human Rights Obligations in Relation to Policies with Extraterritorial Effects’, 25 
European Law Journal of International Law 2014, at 1088. 
25 K. Schmalenbach, ‘Accountability: Who is Judging the European Development Cooperation?’, 2 
Europarecht 2008, at 181. 
26 Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Salemink affirmed that for EU law purposes the territory of a Member 
State is the area of exercise of EU competences; which does not necessarily coincide with its territory. 
Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered on 8 September 2011 on Case C-347/10 Salemink, 
EU:C:2011:562, para. 35. 
27 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 111. 
28 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 107. 
29 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 108.  
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Union’s action – capable of producing legal effects on the position of the territory of a state 
– cannot be limited to situations in which the provisions of the agreements concluded by 
the Union and third states have direct effect. Second, linking standing considerations with 
the direct effect of the provisions of an agreement can be detrimental for natural and legal 
persons in light of the increasing adoption by the Council of decisions excluding the 
possibility, for parts of the agreements, to have direct effect.30  Whether the Court will use 
these type of Council decisions as a biding constrain is not certain; however, it is likely 
that they will be used as a guiding tool in reaching the final decision – at least to the extent 
that they reflect the Council’s will.  
 
 The nature of the acts 
 
Proving legal effects becomes all the more difficult in the case of non-binding acts. The 
role of non-binding instruments and the need for their judicial review is increasingly 
becoming a topic of debate within the EU internal realm. In fact, even if the European 
Court privileges substance over form in deciding which measures may be challenged, 
there are still reasons to be concerned. Scott, for example, shows how post-legislative 
guidelines – despite their practical impact on Member States – too often escape judicial 
review.31 The OIV and the OMT cases signal a new opening towards recognizing the legal 
implications of non-binding acts. In the OIV case, the recommendations of the 
International Organisation of Vine and Wine have been found to be capable having legal 
effects in light of their ability to ‘decisively influencing the content of the legislation 
adopted by the EU legislature in the area of the common organization of the wine 
markets’32 in particular by reason of their incorporation on the European Union’s acquis 
in that area.  
 The Advocate General Opinion in the OMT case seems to open the door for a new 
approach as to the reviewability of non-legally binding acts. The Advocate General in his 
opinion seems to suggest that general action programmes of public authorities may take 
                                                          
30 E.g. article 7, International Agreements Council Decisions of 23 June 2014 on the signing, on behalf of the 
European Union, and provisional application of the Association Agreement between the European Union 
and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the 
other part, as regards Title III (with the exception of the provisions relating to the treatment of third-
country nationals legally employed as workers in the territory of the other Party) and Titles IV, V, VI and VII 
thereof, as well as the related Annexes and Protocols, OJ [2014] L 278/1, 20.09.2014. 
31 See: J. Scott, ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-Legislative Guidance as a Challenge for European Administrative Law’, 
48 Common Market Law Review 2011, at 344. 
32 Case C-399/12 Germany v. Council, EU:C:2014:2258, paras 63-64. 
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atypical forms and yet still be capable of having a very direct impact on the legal situation 
of individuals. The addressee and type of the measure loses importance, and what 
becomes relevant is the ability of the programme to have an impact on the legal situation 
of third parties. Beside the objective aspect, the AG also suggested a contextual approach: 
 
‘The context in which an act is adopted may provide further indications which confirm 
either the author’s intention that the act should produce effects vis-à-vis third parties 
or the fact that the author was aware of the potential external impact of the 
measure.’33 [emphasis added] 
 
This new contextual approach taken by the AG could be very well suited to draw a 
comparison with the administrative activities aimed at developing and implementing the 
SAP and the ENP. The Court in the OMT case simply stated that: 
 
‘[…] the fact that the OMT decisions have not yet been implemented and that their 
implementation will be possible only after further legal acts have been adopted is not 
a ground for denying that the request for a preliminary ruling meets an objective need 
for resolving the cases brought before that court.’34  
  
Since it is undeniable that the authors’ intention behind the different activities 
characterising the Union wider neighbourhood is that of producing effects vis-à-vis third 
parties,35 this approach could at least push the European Parliament to challenge the 
legality of progress reports. Natural and legal persons would still have to prove direct and 
individual concern.  
 
 The Commission’s wide margin of discretion  
 
The few cases in which individuals from third countries challenged the inaction of the 
Commission under article 265 TFEU and demanded compensation for non-contractual 
liability caused by the EU institutions serve as very good examples of the Court’s limited 
vision of the impact that the administrative activities implementing the Union’s external 
                                                          
33 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered on 14 January 2015 on Case C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler, 
Bruno Bandulet, Wilhelm Hankel, Wilhelm Nölling, Albrecht Schachtschneider, Joachim Starbatty, Roman 
Huber and Others, Johann Heinrich von Stein and Others, and Fraktion DIE LINKE im Deutschen Bundestag v. 
Deutscher Bundestag, EU:C:2015:7, para. 80.  
34 Case C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler, Bruno Bandulet, Wilhelm Hankel, Wilhelm Nölling, Albrecht 
Schachtschneider, Joachim Starbatty, Roman Huber and Others, Johann Heinrich von Stein and Others, and 
Fraktion DIE LINKE im Deutschen Bundestag v. Deutscher Bundestag, EU:C:2015:400, para. 28. 
35 Chapter III, section 2.2. 
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action have on individuals.36 The Court in these cases recognised the wide margin of 
discretion that the Commission enjoys in the management of Union external relations in 
so far as it involves complex political and economic assessments.37 However, it did not 
provide any indication as to how such wide margin of discretion could be guided and 
constrained. On the contrary, the Court affirmed that in order for an action for 
compensation for non-contractual liability to be successful the individual has to prove 
how the Commission has ‘manifestly and gravely disregarded’ the limits of its discretion. 
This task is particularly challenging for an individual in the absence of clear and 
transparent rules operationalising the administrative principles constraining the exercise 
of the Commission’s power externally.  
In three out of the four cases discussed in chapter III (section 3), the applicants 
challenged the inaction of the Commission. The applicants believed that the Commission 
was obligated to suggest to the Council suspension of relations between the Union and 
their respective countries: Lebanon and Turkey. The application by the ‘coalition of civil 
society and Turkish citizens’ is quite peculiar. They sought the annulment of a progress 
report because they believed it contained a decision to propose to the Council to take 
appropriate measures against Turkey for failing to comply with its pre-accession 
obligations and, in alternative, for failure to act in that regard.38 The General Court 
reformulated its claim by stating that the applicants did not seek the annulment of the 
Regular Report as such, but of a Commission decision refusing to propose to the Council 
to take appropriate measures against Turkey.39 In this case the Court stated that: 
 
‘[…] it is common ground that the regular report contains no express Commission 
decision refusing to propose that the Council suspend the financing granted to Turkey 
during the pre-accession period.’40 
  
                                                          
36 See cases: Case C-288/03 P Zaoui v. Commission, EU:C:2004:633; Case T-367/03 Yedaş Tarim ve Otomotiv 
Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, 
ECLI:EU:T:2006:96; Case T-346/03 Krikorian v. European Parliament, Council and Commission, 
EU:T:2003:348; Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner House Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights 
project v. Commission, EU:T:2006:97; Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418; 
Case C-581/11 P Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:C:2012:466.  
37 Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. Council and Commission, para. 60. 
38 Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner House Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights project v. 
Commission, EU:T:2006:97, for more details of the case see chapter III, section 3. 
39 Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner House Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights project v. 
Commission, EU:T:2006:97, para. 34. 
40 Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner House Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights project v. 
Commission, EU:T:2006:97, para. 37. 
Enforcing the rule of law externally 
187 
 
The Court, in making such statement, does not explain if, from a regular report, an implied 
decision could, instead, be inferred. The absence of an express Commission decision does 
not necessarily imply that no decision can be inferred from the regular reports. In any 
event, the General Court concluded that even if there was a refusal to submit a proposal 
to the Council, that refusal could not in itself be regarded as producing legal effects 
capable of affecting the applicants’ interests by bringing about a significant change in their 
legal position.41 However, interestingly enough, the General Court in this case stated 
clearly that:    
 
‘[…] individuals are not deprived of access to the courts by reason of the fact that a 
measure not producing binding effects capable of affecting their interests by bringing 
about a significant change in their legal position cannot be the subject of an action for 
annulment, an action to establish non-contractual liability provided for in Article 235 
EC and the second paragraph of Article 288 EC being available to them if such a 
measure is capable of causing the Community to incur liability.’42  
 
 Mr. Mugraby, in a comparable situation, filed an action for failure to act and an action 
for non-contractual liability against the inaction of the Commission. Yet, he failed to obtain 
judicial review of the inaction of the Commission since the exercise of Commission 
discretion excludes a right for an individual to require the Commission to take a 
position.43 Moreover, non-contractual liability is only available when there has been a 
‘sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals’44 and 
again, the article foreseeing the possible suspension of the agreement concluded by the 
Union with Lebanon does not confer rights on the individuals. Further, even if it did, a 
breach is considered sufficiently serious only if the Union institution ‘manifestly and 
gravely disregards its discretion’ [emphasis added].45 
The cases were not presented sharply by the applicants; therefore, it is difficult to 
argue that the Court should have decided the cases differently. Nevertheless, a more 
comprehensive review would suggest that the Court ought to have recognised the impact 
that administrative activities implementing the Union external action have in raising the 
                                                          
41 Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner House Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights project v. 
Commission, EU:T:2006:97, para. 51. 
42 Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner House Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights project v. 
Commission, EU:T:2006:97, para. 55. 
43 An action for failure to act is only available when the failure to adopt a measure produces binding legal 
effects capable of affecting the interests of the applicants by bringing about a distinct change in their legal 
position. Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418, para. 38. 
44 Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418, para. 55. 
45 Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418, para. 55. 
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expectations of individuals. The Court in these cases underlined the Commission 
discretion in deciding when to trigger suspension of Union benefits in case of human 
rights violations by a third country; however, it does not suggest possible constraints that 
ought be imposed on the Commission as to how it ought to exercise its discretion, 
especially in light of the impact that the non-action could have on individuals’ 
expectations.46 The Commission’s and EEAS’ documents denouncing human rights 
violations and stressing the importance of their respect are not consequence-free. The 
Commission is essential for triggering the implementation of human right clauses. The 
Commission is the institution which monitors third states and which has the power under 
article 218(9) TFEU to suggest to the Council whether action needs to be taken.   
 In summary, challenging the impact of the administrative power externally faces 
numerous hurdles. Direct actions aimed at challenging a final act, due to the misuse of 
administrative power informing its content, may be precluded ipso facto on grounds of 
extraterritoriality of the final act. Moreover, even if the extraterritorial effect is 
recognised, such legal act will only be challengeable if individuals manage to prove direct 
and individual concern, and if the act violates concrete rights or if it was concluded in 
breach of recognised duties. In this regard, the case Front Polisario is a first exception. The 
Court, by denying that the administrative activities aimed at implementing the Union 
external action contain implied decisions, and raise expectations of individuals, precludes 
itself from the possibility of constraining the exercise of administrative power externally 
and of protecting affected parties. Recognising the impact that administrative activities 
have could open the way to the application of the duty to state reasons and duty of care. 
Such duties, as analysed in chapter IV, might prevent individuals from building 
expectations. Finally, the non-binding nature of the acts is an inevitable additional hurdle, 
despite the Court’s approach to privilege substance over form.   
 
2.2 Limiting access to remedies  
 
The hurdles just described make enforcement through Court virtually ineffective. The 
Court’s tendency to exclude most of the administrative activities implementing the 
Union’s external action from judicial review prevents it from being able to evaluate and 
shape the process leading to the adoption of final acts as well as the impacts generated by 
                                                          
46 E.g. Commission Communication of 23 May 1995, ‘The inclusion of respect for democratic principles and 
human rights in agreements between the Community and third countries’, COM(95) 216 final. 
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the process of governance. This is a concern for a number of reasons. In circumstances 
where review of final decisions would be difficult or even precluded due to the political 
sensitivity of the issue, it is especially important that the Court ought to be able to oversee 
the procedural aspects leading to the decision.47 Annulling a Council decision suspending 
an agreement with a third state or annulling a decision not to act in case of human rights 
violations is virtually impossible.48 Nevertheless, the respect of process principles in the 
procedures leading to the act of suspension (or non-suspension) is crucial for 
constraining the exercise of administrative power externally – especially in light of its 
impact on public power and on individuals.49 The Court’s role as catalyst in facilitating the 
realisation of process values in areas of normative uncertainty and complexity has been 
elaborated by Scott and Sturm in respect of internal forms of new governance.50 
According to the two authors, the role of the Court in these contexts ‘is not to establish 
precise definitions or boundaries of acceptable conduct, which if violated, warrant 
sanction.’51 Instead, the judicial function is to create occasions for normatively motivated 
inquiries and remediation in response to signals of problematic conditions or practises.52 
While the Court has arguably worked as a catalyst internally in promoting rule of law 
values in areas of normative uncertainty and complexity,53 this is not fully the case 
externally. Despite the impact that the administrative power has externally, the Court has 
not yet fully ‘proceduralised’ the grounds of judicial review.54  
                                                          
47 Scott makes a similar point in respect of environmental guidance. J. Scott, ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-Legislative 
Guidance as a Challenge for European Administrative Law’, 48 Common Market Law Review 2011, at 346. 
48 Mugraby and the Coalition of Turkish citizens show how difficult it can be to challenge a Commission and 
Council decision not to act in case of human rights violations in third countries. Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. 
Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418; Case C-581/11 P Mugraby v. Council and Commission, 
EU:C:2012:466; Case T-2/04 Cemender Korkmaz, Corner House Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights 
project v. Commission, EU:T:2006:97. 
49 Chapter III. 
50 J. Scott and S. Sturm, ‘Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance’, 13 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 2007. 
51 J. Scott and S. Sturm, ‘Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance’, 13 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 2007, at 571. 
52 J. Scott and S. Sturm, ‘Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance’, 13 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 2007, at 571. 
53 According to the authors, the Court internally actively works as catalyst in introducing rule of law 
principles such as reasoned decision making, care and enhanced participation. Scott and Sturm refer 
(among others) to the following case law: Case T-135/96 UEAPME, EU:T:1998:128; Case T-13/99, Pfizer 
Animal Health SA v. Council, T:2002:209; Case C-269/90, Hauptzollamt München-Mitte v. Technische 
Universität München, EU:C:1991:438; Case C-320/03, Commission v. Austria, C:2005:684. J. Scott and S. 
Sturm, ‘Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance’, 13 Columbia Journal of 
European Law 2007, 576-592; and J. Scott, ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-Legislative Guidance as a Challenge for 
European Administrative Law’, 48 Common Market Law Review 2011, at 346. 
54 The only two exceptions are Al-Jubai and the Front Polisario. The Court in Al-Jubail proceduralised the 
duty to hear the other side for acts of general application in order to protect foreign companies directly 
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 The concern regarding the unwillingness of the Court to adjudicate administrative 
activities leading to final acts extends also to the respect of legally mandated participatory 
procedures in decision-making processes. In other words, judicial review might be 
withheld from natural and legal persons who would want to challenge a Commission 
decision for failure to conduct consultation. For example, article 4(5) of the ENI regulation 
and article 5(6) of the IPA II regulation establish that Union support under these two 
regulations ‘shall, in principle, be established in partnership with the beneficiaries.’55 The 
partnership shall include, as appropriate, competent national and local authorities, as well 
as civil society organisations. Therefore, civil society organisations could be interested in 
challenging the Commission implementing decisions strategising and programming 
financial assistance in the event they had been drafted without their participation. 
However, it is not clear whether or not the Court will allow civil society organisations to 
challenge a Commission implementing decision programming financial assistance. First, 
the Court in Bactria makes it clear that a provision expressing conditions conferring 
procedural rights should not be interpreted broadly.56 Therefore, even if both articles are 
expressed in mandatory terms, the expression ‘in principle’ might be used by the Court in 
limiting legally protected rights. Furthermore, the argument used by the Court in UEAPME 
to extend standing rules to meet the benchmarks required by the principle of democracy 
will doubtlessly be extended to the process of strategising and programming aid in third 
countries.57 If this is the case, an NGO which would want to challenge a strategy paper or 
a programming document for failure to comply with legally mandated procedures still 
would have to prove direct and individual concern.58 Participation opportunities (as seen 
in chapter IV section 5) are not always guaranteed by law, whether through legislation or 
general principle, but neither are they ad hoc or purely contingent. They arise by virtue of 
                                                          
affected by the anti-dumping regulation; in the Front Polisario it proceduralised the duty of care in light of 
the potential impact that the action of the Union could have on human rights of third countries’ citizens. 
Case C-49/88, Al-Jubail Fertilizer v. Council, EU:C:1991:2, para. 15; Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council 
of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953, para. 225. 
55 Article 4(5), Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014; article 5(6), 
Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing 
an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014.  
56 Case T-339/00 Bactria Industriehygiene-Service Verwaltungs GmbH v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2002:107, 
para. 51, upheld on appeal: Case C-258/02 P, Bactria v. Commission, EU:C:2003:675, para. 43 
57 Case T-135/96 UEAPME, EU:T:1998:128, paras 89-90. 
58 It is doubtful that the Commission implementing decisions strategising and programming financial 
assistance will be considered as regulatory acts not entailing implementing measures. Strategy papers and 
programming documents need further implementing acts for the disbursement of funds.  
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established procedures and practices, which are laid down and affirmed in documented 
form. In other words, over time participation has become consolidated as established 
entitlement to participate, and the parameters of participation are acknowledged as 
sound by all interested parties.59 Therefore, in a system of external governance like that 
of the SAP and ENP, it would seem appropriate to acknowledge a party’s entitlement to 
participate in a process even when it is not legally envisaged.  
 While the Court could potentially demand explanations, care and inclusivity from 
EU officials in implementing and developing the Union external relations, its own barriers 
to access, its limited understanding of the impact that external administrative activities 
have, and its short-sighted understanding of participatory rights may render many of the 
EU’s most important remedies either meaningless, or available only to a portion of the 
privileged. The traditional dichotomy between means of enforcement internally and 
externally has influenced the approach of the Court in developing and re-evaluating its 
role as norm enforcer in the way the Union develops and implements its external action. 
In sum, the obstacles on the way to guaranteeing that the administrative machinery is 
procedurally and substantively accountable before the Court raise some concerns as to 
the respect of the rule of law in the way the Union develops and implements its external 
action. Based on this analysis, it is now crucial to look beyond judicial review into other 
forms of enforcement mechanisms. The next section will analyse the European 
Ombudsman and ‘compliance building’ as two examples of mechanisms which could step 
in when the SAP and ENP administrative machinery fails, and which could eventually 
work as catalyst in articulating benchmarks for review.  
 
3. Creating enhanced opportunities for out-of-court enforcement mechanisms  
 
Compliance with the administrative rule of law externally cannot be confined within the 
strict boundaries of coercive means of enforcement, i.e. judicial review. In the context of 
the analysis carried out by this thesis, the notion of compliance needs to be understood, 
not only as the final outcome, but as the ‘whole of ongoing negotiations, political and legal 
processes, and institutional change’60 that are involved in the execution of the 
                                                          
59 A similar argument is made by Scott and Sturm in respect of the Water Framework Directive and its 
associated Common Implementation Strategy. J. Scott and S. Sturm, ‘Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking the 
Judicial Role in New Governance’ 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 2007, at 580. 
60 E. Chiti, ‘The Governance of Compliance’, in M. Cremona (eds.) Compliance and Enforcement of EU Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 32, at 32. 
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administrative rule of law externally. The next sub-sections present two mechanisms of 
enforcement that do not use coercion (in its strict sense) as a tool to achieve compliance: 
the European Ombudsman and ‘compliance building’. The European Ombudsman is a 
form of quasi-judicial enforcement in that the office is a third party adjudicating the 
dispute. However, the Ombudsman does not impose compliance with its decisions 
through coercion (like sanctions); instead, its interaction with the Parliament and its role 
within the Union legal systems are crucial in securing compliance. ‘Compliance building’ 
exploits other mechanisms like the institutional structures of the agreement concluded 
by the Union with third countries, or the Commission and EEAS internal implementing 
arrangements, in order to gradually build compliance with the administrative rule of law 
externally.  
 
3.1 Quasi-judicial enforcement: making a case for the European Ombudsman  
 
While the external administrative power appears to be an uneasy space for the Courts, 
the European Ombudsman would prima facie not face the same complications. The 
institutional position, the means of action, and the mandate of the Ombudsman to act 
upon instances of maladministration – extending beyond the Court’s understanding of 
legality – facilitate the possibility of reviewing the Union’s external administrative 
activities.61 Moreover, the Ombudsman’s ability to decide upon inquiries without the need 
to determine whether the action of the EU institutions affected the legal position of the 
complainant or whether his or her rights have been respected, offers to the office a wider 
space of manoeuvre.62 For example, the Ombudsman can accept individual complaints as 
to how progress reports are drafted, without needing to determine whether the 
administrative activity in question leads to final decisions that directly impact on the legal 
situation of third parties or it impinges on legally protected rights. More generally, the 
Ombudsman’s tendency to recognise individuals as parties to administrative procedures, 
who ought to be recognised as such and should enjoy procedural safeguards, allows her 
                                                          
61 Chapter IV, section 2.  
62 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration, (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014), 
80-84; A. Tsadiras, ‘Unravelling Ariadne’s Thread: the European Ombudsman’s Investigative Powers’, 45 
Common Market Law Review 2008, 757-770.  
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to more accurately assess the impact that the activities have on natural and legal 
persons.63 
 
 The European Ombudsman’s challenge 
 
The European Ombudsman is not intended to be a substitute for the Court; however, it 
ought to act in areas in which the Court cannot act, or in ones in which the Court has not 
yet decided to act. Clearly, in the mode of foreign governance established by the SAP and 
the ENP there will be instances in which the Court cannot interfere, or does not yet want 
to interfere. In these cases, the Ombudsman can prove a viable tool in enforcing the 
administrative rule of law. Moreover, in doing so the Ombudsman ought to function as a 
catalyst to identify rules and principles that should to be applicable in the way the 
Commission and the EEAS implement the Union’s external action. The Ombudsman’s 
recent decision on the Commission’s failure to carry out a human rights impact 
assessment during the negotiations for a free trade agreement between the EU and 
Vietnam exemplifies how the office could work as catalyst.64 The Ombudsman, by taking 
into account the values enshrined in the Treaties, the Council action plan on the 
promotion of human rights in the world, the Commission’s crystallised practice and the 
advocacy of human rights activities, established that not carrying out a human rights 
impact assessment before concluding an agreement with a third state amounts to 
maladministration. The Ombudsman’s ability to embrace a more holistic approach to 
legality of administrative action externally may help the Court to articulate benchmarks 
for review. It this respect, it can be argued that the Court’s decision in the Front Polisario 
might have been influenced by the European Ombudsman. On 26 March 2015, the 
Ombudsman adopted a provisional decision (confirmed on 26 February 2016) stating 
that a Commission failure to adopt human rights impact assessments before concluding 
an agreement with a third state amounts to maladministration (breach of legality and the 
duty of care).65 Eight months later, on 10 December 2015, the Court annulled the Council 
                                                          
63 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, ‘Accountability and law enforcement: the centralized EU infringement 
procedure’, 31 European Law Review 2006, 466-473. 
64 For further details on the case see chapter IV, section 2.2; Decision on 26 February 2016 of the European 
Ombudsman on complaint 1409/2014/JN against the European Commission, external relations, breach of 
Article 4 ECGAB, Duty of care. 
65 Provisional decision reached on 26 March 2015 and was confirmed on the 26 February 2016. Decision of 
the European Ombudsman on complaint 1409/2014/JN against the European Commission, external 
relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, Duty of care. 
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Decision concluding an agreement in the form of exchange of latter with Morocco for 
failure on the side of the Council to respect the duty of care, inter alia for not having 
conducted a human rights impact assessment before concluding the agreement.  
 The Ombudsman may be better suited than the Court to act as a catalyst in enforcing 
a principled approach in the way administrative action is exercised externally. The 
Ombudsman, by looking beyond the Court’s understanding of legality, aims towards more 
accountable and responsive administrative procedures in a broader sense. In other 
words, the Ombudsman makes sure that administrative action occurs within the 
framework established, not only by the legislator, but also by other sources such as 
international law, Commission and EEAS internal guidelines, and crystallised practice. 
This is particularly important for the enforcement of the rule of law externally, which 
lacks a clear set of legally binding rules and procedures.66 It is in this context that the 
Ombudsman could strengthen its review by being more open to communicating ideas and 
experiences aimed at the promotion of administrative rule of law principles externally, 
without being the source of their creation, and without being particularly prescriptive in 
relation to any particular form. In other words, the Ombudsman could act as a legitimate 
public intermediary between different sources. For example, studies conducted by civil 
society organisations from the SAP and ENP countries could be considered. More and 
more NGOs from the neighbourhood states are providing a nongovernmental perspective 
on the level of progress achieved by their states in the EU accession process, or in their 
level of implementation of the ENP policy. Some carry out fact-checking analysis, while 
others, by denouncing instances of wrong-doing, provide suggestions as to how the 
Commission and the EEAS should conduct their analysis.67 These reports are used by the 
EEAS in Brussels to review the information gathered by the Union delegations in third 
                                                          
66 Chapter IV, section 2. 
67 For example, an NGO from Israel every year provides shadow progress reports on the level of 
implementation of the ENP in Israel. Likewise, a coalition coalition of civil society organizations called the 
‘Initiative for Monitoring Bosnia and Herzegovina’s European Integration’ recently produced its first 
shadow progress report on the progress of BiH in its path to Union accession. Reports respectively available 
at: http://www.ngo-
monitor.org/article/analysis_of_the_eu_s_report_implementation_of_the_european_neighborhood_policy_i
n_israel_progress_in_and_recommendations_for_actions_ (Consulted on 07.08.2016); and at: 
http://cps.ba/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/SHADOW-REPORT_final.pdf (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
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countries;68 and have pushed the Commission to adopt guidelines for EU support to civil 
society.69 
Furthermore, the Ombudsman, by standing halfway between ‘adjudicator’ and 
‘government inspector’, has a significant capacity to affect change in administrative 
procedures.70 After adjudicating a case, the Ombudsman makes recommendations for 
reform and re-address; it does not simply aim at establishing who the winner is and who 
the loser is.71 For example, in the Mugraby case the Court sought to determine whether 
Mr. Mugraby had a claim against the Council and the Commission rather than whether the 
behavior of the Commission respected a principled approach. For the time being, even 
assuming that the Court would have reviewed the action of the Commission against e.g. 
the duty of care; the revision, as discussed in chapter IV section 4, would have been 
focused on a factual analysis. If on the one hand a factual analysis is certainly relevant 
when reviewing the Commission’s discretion, on the other, it should critically inquire as 
to how information has been collected. The Commission and the EEAS ought to ensure 
that they rely on a plurality of sources, representing different groups of individuals. This 
should particularly be the case since some of the evaluations are not based on a pure 
mathematical calculation, but rather on a comprehensive assessment of the situation on 
the ground (e.g. democracy, minority rights protection, level of implementation of market 
economy, etc.). The Ombudsman, in fulfilling its ‘government inspector’ function, does not 
have to interfere with the Commission’s discretion on how to ensure pluralism in 
                                                          
68 Interview with an EEAS civil servant working on the ENP, 18.11.2013, Brussels. 
69 A more principled approach to the SAP was advocated by the Balkan Civil Society Development Network 
in respect of how the Commission supported the development of civil society in the Balkans. The network 
developed a report titled ‘The Successes and Failures of the EU Pre-accession Policy in the Balkans: Support 
to Civil Society’ and wrote a letter to the Commission titled ‘The Chance for a Real Partnership: Civil Society 
Facility as a Motor for Support to Grounded Democratic Reforms in the Western Balkans’ urging the latter to 
better include local civil society organisations in the programming and implementation of the IPA Civil 
Society Facility. The action of the network was effective enough to push the Commission to adopt guidelines 
for EU support to civil society in enlargement countries for the years 2014-2020. European Commission, 
Directorate General for Enlargement, guidelines for EU support to civil society in enlargement countries for 
the years 2014-2020, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/civil_society/doc_guidelines_cs_support.pdf (Consulted on 
07.08.2016). 
70 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014), at 
80. 
71 M. Dawson, New Governance and the Transformation of European Law coordinating EU Social Law and 
Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001), at 294. 
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information gathering, but it could help the Commission and the EEAS to address possible 
biases that undermine values that the EU legal order protects.72   
Finally, the Ombudsman’s role as catalyst in enforcing a principled approach in the 
way the administrative action is exercised externally can be supported by its own-
initiative inquiry. Article 228(1) TFEU read in conjunction with article 3(1) of the 
Ombudsman Statute and article 9 of the Implementing Provisions, grant power to the 
European Ombudsman to conduct on her own volition enquiries to clarify any suspected 
maladministration in the activities of Union institutions, agencies and bodies.73 Article 9 
of the Implementing Provisions leaves the Ombudsman rather free in deciding to what 
extent she wishes to make use of the own-initiative inquiry tool.74 The current 
Ombudsman made important policy statements with this tool. For example, she opened 
an inquiry with the aim of increasing the transparency and accessibility of the TTIP 
negotiations. The closure of the inquiry resulted in a set of recommendations as to how 
the Commission could improve the openness and transparency of the negotiation process. 
The recommendations are aimed at ensuring that the public can follow the progress of 
these negotiations as far as possible, and can contribute to shaping their outcome.75 The 
Ombudsman, while conducting her own initiatives, has often consulted the public in order 
to gather ideas and understand the concerns of affected parties.76 Therefore, the own-
initiative inquiry is also a promising tool for individuals affected by the Union’s 
administrative external action. 
 
 
                                                          
72 Decision on 9 July 2013 of the European Ombudsman closing its inquiry into complaint 
1151/2008/(DK)ANA against the European Commission, energy, breach of Articles 8 and 9 ECGAB. 
73 European Ombudsman Statue, adopted by the Parliament on 9 March 1994, OJ L 113/15, 04.05.1994, and 
amended by its decisions of 14 March 2002, OJ L 92/13, 09.04.2002 and 18 June 2008 OJ L 189/25, 
17.07.2008. Decision of the European Ombudsman adopting implementing provisions, adopted by 
Parliament on 9 March 1994 OJ L 113/15, 04.05.1994 and amended by its decisions of 14 March 2002 OJ L 
92/13, 09.04.2002 and 18 June 2008 OJ L 189/25, 17.07.2008. 
74 Article 9: ‘The Ombudsman may decide to undertake inquiries on his own initiative. The Ombudsman's 
powers of investigation when conducting own initiative inquiries are the same as in inquiries instituted 
following a complaint. The procedures followed in inquiries instituted following a complaint also apply, by 
analogy, to own initiative inquiries.’ 
75 Decision on 6 January 2015 of the European Ombudsman closing her own-initiative inquiry 
OI/10/2014/RA concerning the European Commission, external relations, breach of other rights and duties 
resulting from the Charter of Fundamental Rights and not covered by this list. 
76 See as an example the open consultation launched by the European Ombudsman in relation to the 
transparency of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, available at: 
<http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/correspondence.faces/en/56100/html.bookmark> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016).  
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 Addressing criticism: the own-initiative inquiry and the European Parliament’s role 
 
For all the above reasons, the Ombudsman seems to be particularly well placed to review 
the administrative action externally when the Court cannot act or is not yet willing to act. 
Moreover, in doing so it has the potential to act as a catalyst in articulating benchmarks 
for review. In this respect, it might be argued that there are two limits to this reasoning. 
The first concerns the inadmissibility of complaints launched by natural persons who are 
neither EU nationals nor EU residents, and of those launched by legal persons with 
registered offices outside the Union territory.77 The second potential limit concerns the 
non-legally binding nature of the Ombudsman’s decisions. 78 However, both limits can be 
rebutted. If it is true that complaints launched by natural persons who are neither EU 
nationals nor EU residents, or by legal persons with registered offices outside the Union 
territory are rejected as inadmissible, it is also correct that the Ombudsman can initiate 
its own inquiry if the issues raised are important. Furthermore, international NGOs, 
associations, foundations, charities and initiative groups which have their registered 
offices in the EU can collect third countries’ individual complaints and present a case 
before the Ombudsman on their behalf.79 Recently the Ombudsman started an own-
initiative inquiry following a complaint submitted by the Serbian Association People’s 
Parliament, represented by Mr. Borivoje Djordjevic, in respect of the Commission’s failure 
to disclose its comments on a draft of the Serbian Free Legal Aid Act, as contrary to 
Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents.80 This case not only shows the willingness of the current 
Ombudsman to address alleged instances of maladministration in the way the 
Commission develops and implements its external action, but also the reliance by third 
countries’ citizens on the Ombudsman office. Third countries’ citizens are no longer 
                                                          
77 Article 2(2) of the Ombudsman’s Statute, adopted by the Parliament on 9 March 1994, OJ L 113/15, 
04.05.1994, and amended by its decisions of 14 March 2002, OJ L 92/13, 09.04.2002 and 18 June 2008 OJ L 
189/25, 17.07.2008. See also A. Tsadiras, ‘Navigating through the Clashing Rocks: The Admissibility 
Conditions and the Grounds for Inquiry into Complaints by the European Ombudsman’ 26 Year Book of 
European Law 2007. 
78 P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), 753-754.  
79 ‘The European Ombudsman has thus far agreed to take up complaints filed by companies, associations, 
federations, foundations, unions, funds, charities, NGOs, interest and initiative groups, city councils, 
municipalities, regional ombudsmen, and national courts.’ P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2012), at 743. 
80 Decision on 2 September 2016 of the European Ombudsman on complaint OI/7/2015/ANA against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 23 ECGAB; see also complaints 
1150/97/OI/JMA; OI/4/99/OV; OI/2/2003/GG; OI/ 4/2003/ADB; OI/2/2004/GG; OI/3/2005/OV; 
OI/7/2006/JF. 
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content to be passive subjects. They have begun to understand that they have a role to 
play in the external administrative processes, and that public administration involves 
striking a balance among conflicting interests and competing principles. In light of the 
increasing relevance acquired by the administrative activities externally, the Member 
States might want to consider the option of modifying article 228(1) TFEU to allow non-
EU citizens and legal persons with registered office outside the Union’s territory to lodge 
their complaints to the office.  
 While the remedies of the Ombudsman are ‘softer’, they are certainly not 
ineffective.81 The office’s ability to report instances of maladministration to the European 
Parliament may place considerable pressure on targeted institutions and bodies.82 Unlike 
a court, the European Ombudsman can monitor the implementation of recommendations, 
and can report to the European Parliament cases of compliance resistance. In other words, 
Ombudsman decisions ought not to be the end of the story; the European Parliament 
ought to adopt resolutions urging the Commission and the EEAS to follow the 
Ombudsman’s recommendations, especially in cases of compliance resistance. The EU 
Parliament already tries to influence the Commission and EEAS’ power in developing and 
implementing the Union’s wider neighbourhood policies by adopting resolutions. Some 
are of these are policy-embracing, some are country-specific, while others are topic-
related  e.g. on the human rights monitoring procedures externally or on the interaction 
with civil society.83 For the future, the challenge will be to have the Ombudsman’s 
decisions inform the European Parliament’s resolutions. 
 Despite resolutions, the European Parliament has also other occasions in which it 
could promote the respect of a more principled approach in the way the Commission and 
                                                          
81 Two in-depth surveys of compliance conducted in 2012 showed a compliance rate of around 82%. The 
European Ombudsman, Annual Report 2012 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EU 2012), 
at 7. 
82 The Annual Reports of the Ombudsman following-up investigations introduced a practice of highlighting 
‘star cases’ where the institutional response has been particularly satisfactory. C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, 
Process and Procedure in EU Administration (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014), at 80. 
83 Some examples of EU Parliament resolutions are: European Parliament Resolution on the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, (P6_TA (2006) 0028); European Parliament resolution of 15 November 2007 on 
Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy (2007/2088(INI)); European Parliament Report on the 
Review of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (2008/2236(INI)); European 
Parliament resolution of 22 November 2012 on Enlargement: policies, criteria and the EU’s strategic 
interests (2012/2025(INI)); European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2012 on the annual report on 
Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2011 and the European Union’s policy on the matter 
(2012/2145(INI)); European Parliament resolution of 4 February 2016 on the 2015 report on Serbia 
(2015/2892(RSP)); European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2016 on the 2015 report on Montenegro 
(2015/2894(RSP)).  
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the EEAS develop and implement the SAP and the ENP. A few examples will be hereby 
presented. Progress reports are presented every year as a package (Enlargement or ENP 
package) by the Commissioner responsible for the European neighbourhood policy and 
enlargement negotiations to the Foreign Affairs parliamentary committee (AFET). 
Normally, at the centre of the discussion are the state of play of the policies and the 
content of the progress reports.84 Moreover, the European Parliament also exercises some 
form of supervision in respect of the Commission’s powers in strategizing and 
programming financial assistance. Both the IPA II and ENI regulations contain a 
declaration by the Commission to conduct a strategic dialogue with the European 
Parliament during the programming of financial assistance.85 According to the 
declaration, the Commission is to present to the European Parliament the relevant 
available document programming financial assistance. In this respect, the Commission is 
asked to take into account the position expressed by the Parliament on the matter.86 
Furthermore, neither the IPA II regulation nor the ENI regulation contain a specific article 
allowing for the suspension of financial assistance in case one of the beneficiary countries 
fails to observe the basic principles set forth in the regulations, notably the principles of 
democracy, rule of law and the respect for human rights. The reason behind this choice is 
the firm conviction on the side of the Parliament that the Commission’s and Council’s 
decision to suspend or not to suspend financial aid needs to be taken under its 
supervision; the Parliament has to be entitled to fully exercise its prerogatives if a 
                                                          
84 See as an example the ENP the agenda of the AFET Parliamentary Committee of 31 March and 1 April 
2014, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+COMPARL+AFET-OJ-20140331-1+01+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (Consulted on 07.08.2016); and 
for the SAP the agenda of the AFET Parliamentary Committee of 9 and 10 November 2015 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+COMPARL+AFET-OJ-
20151109-1+05+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
85 Declaration by the European Commission on the strategic dialogue with the European Parliament, 
Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing 
an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014; Declaration by the 
European Commission on the strategic dialogue with the European Parliament, Regulation (EU) No. 
232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014. 
86 ‘The strategic dialogue is to be carried out also in preparing the mid-term review and before any 
substantial revision of the programming documents during the period of validity of the regulations. The 
Commission can be invited by the European Parliament to explain where the Parliament's observations 
have been taken into consideration in the programming documents and any other follow-up given to the 
strategic dialogue.’ Declaration by the European Commission on the strategic dialogue with the European 
Parliament, Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014. 
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suspension decision is to be taken.87 The article was present in the regulations preceding 
IPA II and ENI and did not foresee the participation of the Parliament in the suspension 
decision.88 Therefore, both IPA II and ENI regulations, instead of having an article on the 
suspension of financial assistance, which would have excluded the Parliament 
supervision, contain a statement by the European Parliament on the importance of being 
consulted in case suspension of assistance granted under the financial instruments is 
envisaged.89 Finally, assistance under the IPA II and ENI regulation is to be provided in 
accordance with the relevant European Parliament’s resolutions.90   
 Over time the European Ombudsman has the potential to promote the development 
of reviewable norms, especially, if clear, recurring patterns and a normative consensus 
emerge. In other words, the Ombudsman ought to engage in the operationalisation of 
administrative law principles that are crucial for upholding the rule of law in the Union’s 
new forms of foreign governance. Its dynamic interaction among the various stakeholders 
has the potential to reconnect the paths and enforce the efforts made by the various actors 
                                                          
87 ‘The European Parliament considers that any suspension of assistance under these instruments would 
modify the overall financial scheme agreed under the ordinary legislative procedure. As a co-legislator and 
cobranch of the budgetary authority, the European Parliament is therefore entitled to fully exercise its 
prerogatives in that regard, if such a decision is to be taken.’ Statement by the European Parliament on the 
suspension of assistance granted under the financial instruments, Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014. The wording of the provision in the ENI Regulation is 
identical.   
88 E.g. Article 21 of the IPA Regulation (predecessor of the IPA II Regulation: ‘1. Respect for the principles of 
democracy, the rule of law and for human rights and minority rights and fundamental freedoms is an 
essential element for the application of this Regulation and the granting of assistance under it. […] 2. Where 
a beneficiary country fails to respect these principles or the commitments contained in the relevant 
Partnership with the EU, or where progress toward fulfilment of the accession criteria is insufficient, the 
Council, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may take appropriate steps with 
regard to any assistance granted under this Regulation. The European Parliament shall be fully and 
immediately informed of any decisions taken in this context.’ Council Regulation (EC) No. 1085/2006 of 17 
July 2006 establishing an Instrument of Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), OJ [2006] L 210/82, 31.07.2006. 
89 Statement by the European Parliament on the suspension of assistance granted under the financial 
instruments, Regulation (EU) No. 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing an instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014; 
Statement by the European Parliament on the suspension of assistance granted under the financial 
instruments. Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014. 
90 ‘Assistance under this Regulation shall be provided in accordance with the enlargement policy framework 
defined by the European Council and the Council and shall take due account of the Communication on the 
Enlargement Strategy and the Progress Reports comprised in the annual enlargement package of the 
Commission, as well as of the relevant resolutions of the European Parliament. The Commission shall ensure 
coherence between the assistance and the enlargement policy framework.’ Article 4(1), Regulation (EU) No. 
231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument for 
Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ [2014] L77/13, 15.03.2014; see also article 3(1), ENI Regulation (EU) 
No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), OJ [2014] L77/30, 15.03.2014. 
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in promoting rule of law values such as participation, reasoned decision-making and care. 
Suggesting a stronger synergy between the European Ombudsman and the Parliament in 
the field of external administrative action is in line with the Parliament’s willingness and 
commitment to the respect on the rule of law when the Union acts externally.91 
 
3.2 Enforcement through compliance building: opening the door for new solutions 
 
Building compliance with the administrative rule of law externally through non-coercive 
means of enforcement is particularly relevant for the administrative principles which 
structure the relation between the Union administration and third states. The 
neighbouring states, as explained in chapter IV section 5.2.3, find themselves in a 
subordinate position in respect of the Union. Some of them are dependent on the Union 
for macro financial assistance (e.g. Ukraine and Tunisia); others, find themselves 
abandoned in the middle of the internal market, with few options other than trading with 
the Union (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, etc.); while others, 
having decided to turn their back to Russia, are left with the choice of cherishing their 
relations with the EU (e.g. Moldova). Therefore, it is highly unlikely that a third state will 
bring an action to Court challenging the legality of a Council decision in light of the 
Commission’s failure to hear them before the final decision was taken. Moreover, it cannot 
be assumed that EU Treaties confer standing rights to third states.92 The relation between 
the Union and third states is usually understood as one between two separate entities that 
interact in the world of diplomacy, and international relations. Therefore, neighbouring 
countries are likely to seek diplomatic solutions to disputes with the Union rather than 
challenging a Union’s act in Court, an act which would risk undermining its relation with 
the EU. Nevertheless, such reluctance should not excuse the Union from identifying 
mechanisms aimed at enforcing the duty to hear third states.93 From a rule of law 
perspective, it is fundamental that at least protected rights like the right to be heard is 
capable of overcoming the formal conception of the relation between the Union and the 
neighbouring states. As mentioned at beginning of the chapter, a system based on the rule 
of law ought to guarantee mechanisms of enforcement for the principles it protects. 
                                                          
91 Chapter I, section 4.3. 
92 The locus standi for third states before Union Courts is expressed in the agreements conclude by the Union 
with third states; e.g. article 20, Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation 
on Air Transport, OJ [2002] L 114/3, 30.04.2002. 
93 Chapter IV, section 5.2. 
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 The enforcement of principles governing the relationships between EU subjects 
exploits the compliance mechanisms worked out over sixty years of legal integration. The 
same cannot be said of the enforcement of principles governing relationships between EU 
and non-EU subjects.94 For the time being, the relationship between EU and non-EU 
countries uses the enforcement strategies envisaged by international agreements 
concluded by the Union with third states; however, such regulatory frameworks only 
consider the type of relationship established by the agreements themselves.95 As shown 
by this thesis, the relationship between the Union and its neighbours is far more 
encompassing: it is in fact a new form of foreign governance. Therefore, the enforcement 
mechanisms regulating the relations between the Union and third states ought to reflect 
this more complex reality. The relevant EU political institutions have taken a rather 
defensive approach and proved disinclined to develop mechanisms aimed at enforcing 
the Commission’s and EEAS’s duty to hear the third state when developing and 
implementing the SAP and the ENP.96 A possible justification for such a lack might be 
linked to the desire to protect the Commission's and EEAS’s manoeuvring space in 
exercising their external relations tasks.97  
 The context in which the duty to hear the other side operates requires rethinking 
the means of enforcement. The method of enforcement ought to reflect the context in 
which the relation between the administrative power and the addresses of the power 
develop. In this respect, building compliance through non-coercive mechanisms which 
use as a starting point self-imposed rules might help to accommodating the needs and 
allay the fears of both parties. The Commission and the EEAS would feel less threatened, 
and third states might feel more comfortable in claiming that the administration did not 
respect its own rule of behavior rather than a superior form law, which might have 
detrimental effects for the overarching relation between the Union and the third state. 
                                                          
94 E. Chiti, ‘Enforcement of and Compliance with Structural Principles’, in M. Cremona (eds.) Structural 
Principles in EU External Relations Law (London: Hart Publishing forthcoming). 
95 See articles 129, 130, and 133 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part, 
OJ [2010] L 108/3, 29.04.2010. 
96 Chapter IV, section 5.2.3. 
97 Case T-292/09 Mugraby v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2011:418, para. 60; Case T-2/04 Cemender 
Korkmaz, Corner House Research, and The Kurdish Human Rights project v. Commission, EU:T:2006:97, para. 
50. 
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Building compliance requires a relational understanding by each actor of their own role 
and position so as to avoid self-interested behaviours.98 
 As already discussed throughout the thesis, the administrative activities 
implementing the SAP and the ENP (i.e. progress reports, action plans, impact 
assessments, etc.) are adopted in accordance with administrative self-imposed 
guidelines.99 Türk, Hoffman and Rowe define these internal norms as forms of ‘internal 
administrative rule-making’; while Mashaw defines them as norms composing the 
‘internal administrative law’.100 Despite the difference in terminology, these measures are 
an important tool for the administration to guide its own administrative procedures. Self-
imposed guidelines regulate whether interested parties can participate in the drafting of 
an act; or they might determine the procedures aimed at guaranteeing the respect of 
internal policy principles e.g. the principle of joint ownership.101 Proceduralising the 
processes regulating the relations between the Commission and the third states through 
self-imposed rules could be a first best option in building compliance with the duty, on 
the side of the administration, to hear the third state. If this might be the best viable 
option, self-imposed rules ought to start recognising the actual role played by third 
countries in the process. So far, the implementing arrangements elaborated by the 
Commission and EEAS’s self-imposed guidelines governing the relationships between EU 
and third states recognise the third country as a source of information rather than as an 
entity whose subjective right ought to be protected.102 In other words, the current self-
imposed guidelines need to be further developed to be in compliance with the duty to 
hear the other side. In this respect, the internal domain could represent a starting point.   
 The administrative phase of the infringement procedure constitutes an interesting 
example. There are many similarities between the role of the Commission in the first 
phase of the infringement procedures and the monitoring role that the Commission and 
the EEAS have in the SAP and ENP. First, the administrative phase of the infringement 
procedure is characterized by a definite mix of political and administrative 
                                                          
98 E. Chiti, ‘Enforcement of and Compliance with Structural Principles’, in M. Cremona (eds.) Structural 
Principles in EU External Relations Law (London: Hart Publishing forthcoming). 
99 Chapter II, section 4 and Chapter IV, sections 2.2, 3.2, 4.2, 5.1.2, 5.2.2. 
100 H.C.H. Hofmann, G.C. Rowe and A.H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2012), Chapter 16; J.L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press 1983). 
101 Chapter IV, section 2.2. 
102 Chapter IV, section 5.2. 
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considerations.103 Second, the Commission enjoys a wide margin of discretion.104 Third, 
the administrative phase of the proceedings represents an essential guarantee for the 
protection of Member States’ interests that may not be ignored.105 Likewise, a 
proceduralisation of the processes regulating the relation between the Commission and 
the third states could work as an essential guarantee for the protection of third states’ 
interests. The administrative phase of the infringement procedure is normally preceded 
by informal contacts with the Member State concerned. The informal contacts are aimed 
at delimiting the subject matter of the dispute and at giving the Member State the 
information it needs to prepare its defence.106 During the informal phase the Member 
State is granted an opportunity to respond, ‘which is an essential guarantee required by 
the Treaty’.107 However, if a settlement remains elusive, the administrative proceedings 
will culminate in a reasoned opinion. The purpose of the reasoned opinion is twofold: it 
provides the Member state with the opportunity either to comply with its obligations 
under Union law, or to put forward an effective defence to the complaints made by the 
Commission.108 The reasoned opinion may not raise objections on which the Member 
State has not been invited to comment.109 Structuring the processes regulating the 
relations between the Commission and the neighbouring states in a similar way would 
allow the third state to intervene in the process at specific moments, and provide time 
limits and rules as to the adoption of the administrative acts, particularly if they lead to 
the suspension of benefits or to the adoption of sanctions. The proceduralisation of the 
obligation on the side of the Commission to hear third states in processes liable to 
                                                          
103 The infringement procedure has been described by Harlow and Rawlings has ‘a front-loaded procedure, 
which starts with a negotiatory, diplomatic phase; continues through a formal, bureaucratic phase, 
culminating only if unsuccessful in a Court ruling.’ C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, ‘Accountability and law 
enforcement: the centralized EU infringement procedure’, 31 European Law Review 2006, at 455. 
104 ‘An action against a Member State for failure to fulfil its obligations, the bringing of which is a matter for 
the Commission in its entire discretion, is objective in nature’. Case 416/85 Commission v. United Kingdom, 
EU:C:1988:321, para. 9. In this respect see also L. Prete and B. Smulders, ‘The Coming of Age of Infringement 
Proceedings’, 47 Common Market Law Review 2010, at 14.  
105 ‘[T]he proper conduct of that procedure [the administrative phase of the infringement procedure] 
constitutes an essential guarantee required by the Treaty not only in order to protect the rights of the 
Member States concerned, but also so as to endure that any contentious procedure will have a clearly 
defined dispute as its subject matter.’ Case C-1/00 Commission v. France, EU:C:2001:687, para. 53. 
106 Case 51/83 Commission v. Italy, EU:C:1984:261. 
107 Case 274/83, Commission v. Italy EU:C:1985:148, para. 20. 
108 A. Dashwood and R.C.A. White, ‘Enforcement Actions under Articles 169 and 170 EEC’, 14 European Law 
Review 1989, 398-399. 
109 Case 74/82 Commission v. Ireland, EU:C:1984:34, at 339-340. 
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culminate in negative measures ought to include some considerations as to the ability of 
third states to access documents and files.110  
 Building compliance with the administrative rule of law by making use of self-
imposed guidelines requires identifying ways that stimulate the Commission and the 
EEAS to respect them. In fact, proceduralisation does not exclude the possibility of actors 
acting according to their own preferences. One administrative principle which could 
support compliance building is transparency. Disclosing internal guidelines and making 
them available to third states and the wider public could put substantial pressure on the 
administration to follow them throughout the process. The European Parliament could 
more transparently monitor the Commission’s behavior. Furthermore, third states could 
complain of lack of compliance with the procedures within the Councils established by 
the agreements (e.g. the Stabilisation and Association Council, the Association Council, 
etc.). Finally, proceduralisation has also the effect of protecting the Commission from 
possible criticism. If the Commission can prove that it followed the proper steps, third 
states have no grounds to complain about the Commission’s behavior. Identifying 
responsibilities and duties not only has the effect of constraining the Commission’s and 
the EEAS’s discretion; it also has the potential to protect these same two institutions from 
criticism. Ultimately, proceduralisation may work as a machine for a gradual development 
of obedience.111 It can work as enforcement mechanism in guaranteeing the respect of a 
principled approach in the way the Union develops and implements its action towards 
third states. Moreover, it can stimulate the third state to respect, in turn, a principled 
approach in its relations with the Union; for example, when providing to the Union 
information concerning the level of implementation of the reform process. Internal 
implementing arrangements are only a starting point; more defined procedures which 




                                                          
110 Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights is applicable to individuals and not to third states; 
however, it makes the link between the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure 
which would affect him or her adversely is taken; [and] the right of every person to have access to his or 
her file. 
111 This point is developed by E. Chiti, ‘The Governance of Compliance’, in M. Cremona (eds.) Compliance and 
Enforcement of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 31, 36-42. 





As already stressed in different parts of the thesis, administrative activities developing 
and implementing the SAP and the ENP may be treated as authoritative by third states 
and individuals. They may influence their attitude and their behaviour, generating legal 
effects. Therefore, in a system based on the rule of law, the impact that administrative 
activities exercise on the public power and on individuals ought to be reviewed. The 
obligation to respect the rule of law when the Union develops and implements its action 
externally demands that mechanisms of enforcement ought to be put in place. 
Enforcement mechanisms are not neutral and ought to be considered within the context 
in which they are required to function.  
The Court ought to enforce a principled approach to external administrative 
activities, particularly, if they lead to final decisions that directly impact the legal situation 
of third parties, or if they impinge on legally protected rights. However, the capacity of the 
judiciary to enforce the respect of the administrative rule of law externally seems to be 
constrained by a number of factors. Despite the politically sensitive nature of the topic, 
significant obstacles stand on the way of effective judicial review. The rule of law as 
understood by the Court and as applied to the external domain is not satisfactory in 
protecting the subjects affected by Union action. The Court ought to be more open to the 
idea that underlying constitutional values like the rule of law may require different things 
in different setting. The only relevant attempt thus far was made by the General Court in 
the Front Polisario case, in which it hardened the obligation of the side of the Union to 
carry out a human rights impact assessment before concluding an agreement with a third 
state. Nevertheless, the Front Polisario case is currently under appeal. If on the one hand 
it will be difficult for the Court to argue against the obligation on the side of the Union to 
examine with due care the potential impacts of its action on human rights in third 
countries, on the other the Court might challenge the General Court’s understanding of 
direct and individual concern.  
 For the time being, the European Ombudsman can work as an effective alternative 
in upholding the administrative rule of law in all the situations in which the Court cannot 
act, is not willing to act, or is not called upon to act.  The Ombudsman’s cooperative and 
change-driven solutions – rather than adversarial remedies – have the potential to work 
with, rather than against, the experience of external governance in articulating 
benchmarks for review, and in contemplating the adequacy of specific procedures. The 
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Ombudsman’s intimate relation with the EU Parliament has the effect of hardening the 
impact of the office’s decisions in case of resistance, and can further the development of 
benchmarks for review thanks to the adoption of resolutions urging the Commission and 
the EEAS to follow the Ombudsman recommendations. Next to the Ombudsman, 
compliance building mechanisms seem to be well suited to support the enforcement of 
administrative principles aimed at regulating the relation between the administration 
and the third states. Revised self-imposed guidelines that clarify the procedures the 
administration is to follow when adopting progress reports, action plans, impact 
assessment, etc., may stimulate the internalisation of compliance through informal 
pressure by the European Parliament and the third state, without the need for coercion. 
This conclusion suggests that coercion, quasi-judicial enforcement strategies and 
compliance-building mechanisms are not necessarily alternative systems, as is often 
argued in the literature on compliance in the context of international and supranational 
legal regimes.112 On the contrary, in the context of the Union external administrative 
action, the three can work in synergy with the aim of developing and enforcing a 
principled approach which recognises the complexity and the impact that the 
administrative activities have on public power and on individuals both internally within 
the Union, and externally in third states.113 
 
 
                                                          
112 K. Raustiala and D.G. Victor stated that ‘[t]he two school of thought [coercive strategy and problem 
solving approach] reflect different visions of how the international system works, the possibilities for 
governance with international law, and the policy tools that are available and should be used to handle 
implementation problems.’ K. Raustiala and D.G. Victor, ‘Conclusions’, in D.G. Victor, K. Raustiala and E.B. 
Skolnikoff (eds.), The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory 
and Evidence (Cambridge: MIT Press 1998), at 681. In this respect see also K. Raustiala and A. Slaughter, 
‘International Law and Compliance’, in W. Carlsneas, T. Risse, and B. Simmons (eds.), Handbook of 
International Relations (London: Sage 2002), at 543. 
113 J. Tallberg and E. Chiti have also challenged the conception of enforcement and management as 
competing strategies for achieving compliance. J. Tallberg, ‘Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, 
Management, and the European Union’, 56 International Organisations 2002; E. Chiti, ‘Enforcement of and 
Compliance with Structural Principles’, in M. Cremona (eds.) Structural Principles in EU External Relations 
Law (London: Hart Publishing forthcoming). 
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Epilogue: Structuring upcoming and future encounters  
…giving effect to the administrative rule of law externally 
 
The thesis has charted both the development and the exercise of administrative power in 
EU external relations, using as case studies the Stabilisation and Association Process and 
the European Neighbourhood Policy. The use of administrative power externally is part 
of a significant transformation in the dominant approach which has so far structured the 
Union relations with third countries and their citizens. This transformative process has 
slowly developed a new legal reality and, consequently, also a new set of normative 
concerns over the future of this approach. Cases are currently litigated in front of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union and of the European Ombudsman which question 
the use of administrative power externally.1 If for a moment, we go back to the three-step 
waltz beating the tempo for the development of administrative law, we realise the 
importance that these cases potentially have in making the third step: fitting the new 
reality within the existing understandings of the administrative rule of law.2 Completing 
the third step of waltz is essential in a system based on the rule of law and committed to 
its respect in its actions towards the outer world. To view the obligation – spelled out by 
the Treaty of Lisbon – to respect the rule of law when acting externally merely as the 
continuation of previous practices without much normative content is to disregard the 
potential normative repercussions it introduces. The same Court, in two recent 
judgements, used article 3(5) TEU and the provisions of article 21 TEU to stress the 
obligation on the side of the Union to respect the rule of law when acting externally.3 The 
debate as to what this obligation concretely implies ought to be started also by EU and 
administrative law scholars.  
                                                          
1 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, EU:T:2015:953 (currently under appeal); 
Case C-660/13 Council v. Commission, EU:C:2016:616 (decided on the 28 July 2016); Decision on 26 
February 2016 of the European Ombudsman on complaint 1409/2014/JN against the European 
Commission, external relations, breach of Article 4 ECGAB, Duty of care; Decision on 2 September 2016 of 
the European Ombudsman on complaint OI/7/2015/ANA against the European Commission, external 
relations, breach of Article 23 ECGAB. 
2 ‘First, something happens in the world. Second, public policymakers identify that happening as a problem, 
or an opportunity, and initiate new forms of governmental action to take advantage of or to remedy the new 
situation. Third, these new forms of action generate anxieties about the direction and control of public 
power. Means are thus sought to make the new initiative fit within existing understandings of what it means 
to be accountable to law.’ J.L. Mashaw, ‘Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 
1787-1801’, 115 Yale Journal 2006, at 1337. 
3 Case C-263/14 European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, EU:C:2016:435, para. 47; Case C-




 This thesis proposes a path for a new line of inquiries, and makes the case for a new 
legal approach to be followed. The analytical framework suggested is about identifying 
which administrative law principles giving effect to the administrative rule of law 
internally have the potential of giving effect, in comparable situations, to the rule of law 
externally. The comparison is based on the features, functions, addresses and impact of 
the administrative power. In other words, the methodology demands starting from 
commonalities of fact-patterns between the internal and external domain, to 
subsequently move into the features and specificities of the external policies. The 
application of the administrative law principles externally ought to take a comprehensive 
approach which considers all the attempts so far made to drive the exercise of 
administrative power in external action. Such a comprehensive approach is essential to 
providing a full picture of the context in which administrative law principles have to be 
operationalised.   
 This epilogue aims at applying in concreto the legal framework, so far developed by 
this thesis, to a specific case which was recently decided before the European 
Ombudsman.4 This endeavour tries to portray how forums of encounter such as the 
Ombudsman have the potential to structure the meeting between EU external action and 
the administrative law rule of law. The dispute deals with a refusal by the Commission to 
grant access to documents to a Serbian civil society association, represented by a third 
country citizen. The complainant (the Serbian Association People’s Parliament 
represented by Mr. Borivoje Djordjevic) alleges that, contrary to Regulation 1049/2001, 
the Commission failed to disclose its comments on the draft of the Serbian Free Legal Aid 
Act.5 On 12 May 2015, the Ombudsman informed the Commission that she had opened an 
own initiative inquiry following Mr. Djordjevic complaint. The adoption of the Serbian 
Free Legal Aid Act is a pre-condition to opening chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental 
Rights) of the accession negotiations between the European Union and Serbia. The 
Ombudsman on 2 September 2016 published her decision on the case.6 
 
 
                                                          
4 Decision on 2 September 2016 of the European Ombudsman on complaint OI/7/2015/ANA against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 23 ECGAB. 
5 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council 
and Commission documents, OJ [2001] L145/43, 31.05.2001. 
6 This Epilogue was written before the decision of the European Ombudsman was published. However, since 




 The quest for rules and principles in pre-accession negotiations 
 
The absence of Union acquis as to how the draft Serbian Free Legal Aid Act should look 
allows the Commission to make recommendations based on its own judgment. The right 
to free legal aid is enshrined in article 47 of the CFR; however, the implementation of this 
right varies in accordance with the Member States’ legal culture. Fundamental differences 
in the philosophy, organisation and management of the Member States’ legal aid systems 
are reflected in their free legal aid acts.7 The absence of clear rules as to how the Serbian 
Free Legal Aid should look in order to comply with the Union’s standards hinders the 
ability of civil society to act as watchdogs during the adoption of the law and ‘limits the 
discourse between Serbian civil society and the EU.’8 This is true both for national and 
international civil society organisations. The Commission’s comments on the draft Free 
Legal Aid Act are not without consequences. Internally, they are preparatory acts 
informing the opening of chapter 23 of the accession negotiation with Serbia. Externally, 
the comments have a clear preparatory (and possibly rule-making function) for the third 
state. The same Commission expressly recognised both functions of the comments in its 
statement of opinion on the case. First, it makes a link between disclosure of its comments 
and the decision-making process in the context of the accession negotiations with Serbia. 
Second, the Commission bases its arguments against disclosure on the ‘real and 
reasonably foreseeable’ impact that publication of the comments on the draft Serbian Free 
Legal Aid Act could have on the country e.g. strikes.9  If the comments were deprived of 
impact externally, there would be no fear of social unrest.  
 
 Time to face the genuine lacunas in the Union legal system   
 
According to article 2(1) of Regulation 1049/2001 only citizens and natural or legal 
persons residing or having their registered office in a Member State have a right to access 
to documents. The right to access to documents for citizens and natural or legal persons 
residing or having their registered office in a Member State is also reiterated in article 42 
                                                          
7 European Justice, Legal Aid, available at: <https://e-justice.europa.eu/home.do?plang=en&action=home> 
(Consulted on 07.08.2016). As it will be discussed later, the progress reports are also silent as to which 
standards ought to be adopted by Serbia.  
8 Decision on 2 September 2016 of the European Ombudsman on complaint OI/7/2015/ANA against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 23 ECGAB, point 19. 
9 Comments of the Commission on a request for information from the European Ombudsman - Own-
initiative inquiry OI/7/2015/ANA, available at: <http://www.parlament.org.rs/res/comments-european-




CFR and 15(3) TFEU.10 The right to access to documents has been often associated with 
openness and democracy.11 The preamble of Regulation 1049/2001 clearly states:  
 
‘Openness enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making 
process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more 
effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system. Openness 
contributes to strengthening the principles of democracy […].’12 
 
By tightening the right to access to documents with democracy and citizenship, the 
regulation seems to distance the right from natural and legal persons not residing or not 
having their registered office in a Member State. In fact, article 2(2) of Regulation 
1049/2001 makes clear that EU institutions are not under an obligation to grant access 
to documents to natural and legal persons not residing or not having its registered office 
in a Member State. They may grant access to documents subject to the same principles, 
conditions and limits put forward by the regulation.13 Therefore, the right can be extended 
at the discretion of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.14 The approach taken by 
Regulation 1049/2001 discharges the role of natural and legal persons not residing or not 
having their registered office in a Member State within the Union’s decision-making 
process. As underlined by Ziller, the restriction of the personal scope of application of the 
right to access to documents is difficult to justify, given that non-citizens, non-residents 
and persons not registered in a Member States also may have an objective interest in 
accessing Union’s documents.15 The lacuna identified in Regulation 1049/2001 is 
accompanied by a general lack of internal rules governing the adoption, and the 
                                                          
10 Article 42 CFR: ‘Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered 
office in a Member State, has a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.’ 
Article 13(3) TFEU: ‘Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its 
registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their medium, subject to the principles and the conditions to be 
defined in accordance with this paragraph.’ 
11 Case T-84/03 Maurizio Turco v. Council, EU:T:2004:339, para. 53; Case T-403/05 MyTravel Group plc v. 
Commission, EU:T:2008:316, para. 49. 
12 Point 1, Preamble Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European 
Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ [2001] L145/43, 31.05.2001. 
13 Article 2(2): ‘The institutions may, subject to the same principles, conditions and limits, grant access to 
documents to any natural or legal person not residing or not having its registered office in a Member State.’ 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council 
and Commission documents, OJ [2001] L145/43, 31.05.2001. 
14 D. Curtin and J. Mendes, ‘Article 42 – Right of Access to Documents’, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. 
Ward, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights A Commentary, (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014), 1099, at 1107. 
15 Ziller J., ‘Article II-102 Droit d’Accès aux Documents’ in A. Levade, F. Picod and L. Burgorgue-Larsen (eds.), 
Traité étabilissant une Costitution pour l Europe. Commentaire article par article. Partie II: La Charte des 




conditions for disclosure, of Commissions’ comments on the laws of candidate countries 
for EU membership.  
 
 The application of administrative law principles in external action 
 
A contextual and comprehensive approach, which takes into account the finalité of the 
Enlargement Policy and all the sources which have so far tried to operationalise the 
respect of the rule of law externally, highlights how access to documents for citizens and 
legal persons from candidates and potential candidate states for membership is 
fundamental to help ensuring their sincere participation in the process of accession to the 
EU. Openness facilitates participation: it ensures access to information, a fundamental 
mean to take part in the process of governance to which individuals are subject.16 Within 
the enlargement framework, stakeholders attach a great deal of importance to 
Commission documents regulating the relations between the Union and their states, and 
the Commission attaches much significance to the role of civil society as a source of 
information.17 Over the years the Commission and the EEAS have developed a framework 
of guidelines stressing the importance of consultation with civil society and indicating 
their role in the decision making process.18  
 As already discussed in this thesis, recognising the importance and the functions 
that consultation procedures play should not be without consequence. The recognition 
ought to demand that EU institutions sponsor and facilitate participation in public 
affairs.19 Therefore, even if Regulation 1049/2001 does not grant a right to natural and 
legal persons not residing or not having their registered office in a Member State, the 
importance that participation has acquired externally needs to be taken seriously. In 
                                                          
16 Decision on 6 January 2015 of the European Ombudsman closing her own-initiative inquiry 
OI/10/2014/RA concerning the European Commission, external relations, breach of other rights and duties 
resulting from the Charter of Fundamental Rights and not covered by this list, point 38. 
17 The same Commission, in its comments to the own-initiative inquiry, acknowledges the value and the role 
of civil society in the accession process. Comments of the Commission on a request for information from the 
European Ombudsman - Own-initiative inquiry OI/7/2015/ANA, available at: 
<http://www.parlament.org.rs/res/comments-european-commission-ombudsman-own-initiative-
inquiry.pdf> (Consulted on 07.08.2016). 
18 Chapter IV, sections 2.2 and 5.1.  
19 The Ombudsman seems to embrace the same approach. In her own-initiative inquiry on transparency 
and TTIP negotiations, she stresses that in order to ensure sincere consultations, the Union’s institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies, ‘must conduct their work as openly as possible.’ Decision on 6 January 2015 of 
the European Ombudsman closing her own-initiative inquiry OI/10/2014/RA concerning the European 
Commission, external relations, breach of other rights and duties resulting from the Charter of Fundamental 




other words, access to documents ought to be guaranteed to non-EU citizens, not so much 
for a link to democratic values, but for their recognised role in the decision-making 
process. In the case at stake the Commission’s comments did not even identify which 
would be the potential interest of increased openness in enabling the Serbian civil society 
organisation to participate more closely in the decision-making process.  
Maintaining the trust of any international partner of the EU is certainly a public 
interest of the Union. As sustained by the Ombudsman in her own-initiative inquiry on 
TTIP negotiations, such a public interest offers reasonable and well-grounded 
explanations for the non-disclosure of documents based on the need to protect the 
legitimate interests of the international partner. However, the protection of the 
international partner cannot have an ‘unfettered veto over the disclosure of 
any document in the possession of the EU institutions.’20 The same Court affirmed that, 
where the institution concerned refuses to grant access to a document because it would 
undermine one of the interests protected by article 4(1)(a) of Regulation 1049/2001, that 
institution is obliged, also when enjoying a wide margin of discretion: 
 
‘to explain how disclosure of that document could specifically and actually 
undermine the interest protected by an exception provided for in that provision, and 
the risk of the interest being undermined must be reasonably foreseeable and must 
not be purely hypothetical.’21 
 
Furthermore, as stressed by this thesis, EU institutions ought not to use as an excuse for 
non-disclosure simply the risk of undermining the international relations with a third 
state. In this context, nothing prevents the Union’s institutions from consulting the third 
country to understand its position on the issue. The Serbian Ministry of Justice published 
                                                          
20 Decision on 6 January 2015 of the European Ombudsman closing her own-initiative inquiry 
OI/10/2014/RA concerning the European Commission, requests for information and access to documents 
(Transparency), breach of other rights and duties resulting from the Charter of Fundamental Rights and not 
covered by this list, point 20. 
21 ‘It must be noted in that regard that while it is true that, as regards the scope of the judicial review of the 
legality of a decision of an institution refusing public access to a document on the basis of one of the 
exceptions relating to the public interest provided for in Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001, that 
institution must be recognised as enjoying a wide discretion for the purpose of determining whether the 
disclosure of documents relating to the fields covered by those exceptions could undermine the public 
interest. […] However, where the institution concerned refuses access to a document the disclosure of which 
would undermine one of the interests protected by Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001, that 
institution remains obliged, as noted in paragraph 52 of the present judgment, to explain how disclosure of 
that document could specifically and actually undermine the interest protected by an exception provided 
for in that provision, and the risk of the interest being undermined must be reasonably foreseeable and 
must not be purely hypothetical.’ Case C-350/12 P Council of the European Union v. Sophie in ’t Veld, 




all the draft versions of the Free Legal Aid Act, as modified according to the Commission’s 
comments, on its own website.22 This shows the willingness of the Serbian Ministry to be 
transparent as to the process of accession.  
 
 Waltzing in search for innovative solutions 
 
The Ombudsman in deciding this case, and similar ones to come, ought to work as catalyst 
in stimulating the discussion as to how administrative law can face the challenges posed 
by the Union’s external action. The Ombudsman can embark on this new challenge by 
forcing the Commission into specific types of action (e.g. disclosing the document); or she 
can more timidly push forward the agenda through recommendations that would 
encourage the EU institutions and scholars to start thinking about new solutions. The 
Ombudsman in the case at stake opted for the second option. In her brief assessments, she 
agrees with the Commission’s decision not to disclose the document; but at the same time 
offers some suggestions for increasing openness. First, she encourages the administration 
to make the document available at a later date – for example after the entrance into force 
of the Serbian Legal Aid Act or the provisional closure of Chapter 23 of the accession 
negotiations. Even if this choice is not ideal for the Serbian civil society, the states lagging 
behind in the enlargement process could benefit from greater openness. For example, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s civil society could have access to the Commission’s 
recommendations on the Serbian Legal Aid Act when such act will be discussed in their 
own country. Second, the Ombudsman in her assessment indicates that some of the 
information contained in the requested document will be incorporated in the Serbia 
progress report, ‘which should adequately inform the public of the general 
recommendations directed at the Serbia authorities.’23 Therefore, the next progress 
report on Serbia accession to the EU should be more informative as to the Commission’s 
recommendations on the adoption of the Serbian Free Legal Aid Act, particularly when 
compared to past ones. In this respect, it is enough to highlight that the latest Commission 
progress report on Serbia – in reference to the Free Legal Aid Act – simply stated that 
                                                          
22 Decision on 2 September 2016 of the European Ombudsman on complaint OI/7/2015/ANA against the 
European Commission, external relations, breach of Article 23 ECGAB, point 16. 
23 Decision on 2 September 2016 of the European Ombudsman on complaint OI/7/2015/ANA against the 




‘[t]he 2011 Criminal Procedure Code […] remains to be completed, in particular when it 
comes to free legal aid’.24  
If on the one hand one could disagree with the Ombudsman’s decision of not making 
a finding of maladministration; it is also true that with her suggestions the Ombudsman 
paved the way to the discussion on the importance of guaranteeing openness in the pre-
accession negotiations. Should guidelines be imposed as to what progress reports ought 
to include? Should there be a time limit for non-disclosure of Commission’s comments on 
the laws of candidates and potential candidate states for membership? More generally, 
should article 2(1) of Regulation 1049/2001 also cover natural or legal persons residing 
or having their registered office outside the Union? The absence of an adequate system of 
rules which would guarantee the respect of the administrative rule of law externally 
demands EU institutions and scholars to find the right instruments to govern this reality. 
From the early years of its conceptions, the Union realised the importance of not 
remaining in isolation and of interacting with its external partners. The relations between 
the Union and its external partners have intensified immensely over the years. The 
changes brought forward by the process of intensification should not be perceived as a 
threat, but as venues for new original solutions. In exploring this new legal reality, the EU 
institutions and legal scholars ought to be forward-thinkers: they ought to move beyond 
the conventional legal categories that have helped us so far to comprehend EU external 
relations, into the full complexity and impact of the Union administrative action outside 
its borders. The construction of an administrative law systems that would embrace the 
developments in EU external action finds support – as argued by this thesis – in what is 
already offered by the Union’s legal order. 
 
 
                                                          
24 Commission Staff Working Document Serbia 2015 accompanying the EU Enlargement Strategy of 10 
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